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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the capacity of established international legal mechanisms to supress 
non-compliance with international law in cyberspace and thus to restore peace and security 
of individual nations as well as the international community. 
Based on a rational choice theory of compliance with international law, this thesis argues that 
States choose to disregard their international legal obligations and resort to unlawful cyber 
operations when the benefits of non-compliance outweigh the associated costs. In the 
absence of a central enforcement authority, countermeasures are the only viable and 
potentially effective compliance inducing mechanism in the anarchical setting of international 
relations. 
However, the technical complexity of cyber operations and legal standards of proof are likely 
to inhibit attribution, a legal precondition to invoking State responsibility and taking 
countermeasures. In response to the difficulties arising in relation to attribution, this thesis 
introduces the due diligence obligations of prevention and termination. Accordingly, States are 
not only required to abstain from conducting unlawful cyber operations but also to diligently 
prevent and terminate cyber operations emanating from their territory, which violate the 
international legal rights of other States and of which the State of emanation knew or should 
have known. Due diligence obligations require States not only to do their best to prevent and 
terminate internationally unlawful cyber operations but also to proactively develop the capacity 
to do so. Compared to attribution, invocation of State responsibility for non-diligent behaviour 
is indeed a more attainable task for the State injured by an unlawful cyber operation and 
wishing to take countermeasures.  
The final section of the thesis elaborates on several legal and practical conditions required to 
be met to take countermeasures against a non-diligent State. Most importantly, it argues that 
only countermeasures proportional with the initial wrongdoing and with the material injury 
caused by that wrongdoing have the capacity to alter the rational choice of the non-diligent 
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State, in fact also responsible for conducting or sponsoring unlawful cyber operations. These 
countermeasures induce compliance with obligations of due diligence as well as with the 
international obligations breached by the unlawful cyber operation occasioned by the lack of 
diligence. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: aim, object and methodology 
Faced with the proliferation of malicious cyber operations endangering international peace 
and security, the aim of this thesis is to examine the ability of international legal mechanisms 
to supress unlawful inter-State cyber operations and thus contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security.  
To that end, this chapter begins by presenting the problem – unlawful, inter-State cyber 
operations below the threshold of the use of force, which not only constitute a threat to peace 
and security but also contribute to the erosion of international law. To avoid a purely theoretical 
discussion, three examples of non-forceful, yet unlawful, inter-State cyber operations are 
presented in this chapter. The circumstances of these real-world examples and their legal 
implications are analysed in detail in later chapters and throughout this thesis. The second 
part of the chapter outlines existing solutions to the aforementioned problem and explains why 
they are unlikely to have any meaningful impact on reducing threats to peace and security. 
For this reason, this chapter explores established international law and the encompassing 
mechanisms able to supress inter-State cyber operations thereby increasing peace and 
security. The chapter concludes by briefly explaining the methodology, originality and utility of 
this thesis.  
1. Problem – internationally wrongful inter-State cyber operations 
below the use of force threshold 
There is no denial that malicious cyber operations – the employment of software and the 
enabling hardware for the purpose of an unauthorised manipulation of a remote software and, 
consequently, various dependant computerised and networked physical systems – are a 
menace of the modern world. Gradually, the world is accepting cyber operations as a plausible 
and potentially dangerous threat preying not only on individuals and businesses but also 
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States. These ‘unintended consequences of technological advances’,1 as UN Secretary 
General Guterres labelled them, are not science fiction and the list of serious occurrences 
seems to be of indefinite length.  
This thesis considers internationally wrongful inter-State cyber operations below the threshold 
of the use of force. The paragraphs that follow elaborate on what are considered inter-State 
cyber operations and when they constitute internationally wrongful acts below the threshold of 
the use of force. This introductory chapter also rationalises the limited scope of the research 
by advancing the argument that inter-State cyber operations below the use of force are the 
biggest threat to peace and security and a very real problem of the present and not the 
dreaded future. To underline the practical implications of my research, this section also 
introduces three real-world examples of unlawful inter-State cyber operations below the use 
of force threshold which will then be subjected to further rigorous analysis throughout the 
thesis. 
1.1. Inter-State cyber operations 
Inter-State cyber operations are operations that target States and operations for which States 
are in fact, though not necessarily also in law,2 responsible. These operations are hereinafter 
referred to as inter-State cyber operations.  
In the context of this thesis, a State is the target of an unlawful cyber operation when the 
consequences of that cyber activity proximately result in the denial of a legally protected right 
of that State. As will be explained in the sixth chapter, a cyber operation can constitute a 
international legal rights of a State directly or indirectly. 
 
1 United Nations, ‘The Secretary-General's remarks at opening of 72nd session of the General Assembly’ (New 
York, 12 September 2017) <un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-09-12/secretary-generals-remarks-opening-
72nd-session-general-assembly> accessed 12 August 2019 
2 See ch 4 
9 
On the other hand, a State is considered to be in fact responsible for a cyber operation 
whenever the cyber operation is conducted or executed by a State organ or by any natural 
person exercising a State function. A State is also deemed to be in fact responsible for a cyber 
operation when it is conducted by a non-State actor and would not have materialised but for 
the enabling involvement of that State in any degree or capacity. This includes, inter alia, cyber 
operations conducted by a non-State actor receiving general or specific support by a State, 
be it in the form of financial, operational, intelligence or otherwise; such operations are 
hereinafter labelled as State-sponsored operations.  
In addition to cyber operations conducted by private actors focused on illegal financial gains, 
States have embraced cyber operations as a new ‘low-cost tool of statecraft’3 to attain their 
self-interested strategic objectives in international relations.4 Since 2007, the year Estonia was 
hit by a crippling cyber operation, there have been no less than 220 known malicious State-
sponsored or -conducted cyber operations or on average 20 per year.5 As such cyber activities 
often go undetected or unreported, it is highly likely that the incidence of such cyber operations 
is greater.6 
Responsibility in fact is to be distinguished from responsibility in law. Socio-political methods 
of attribution of cyber operations can indicate responsibility in fact but, as the fourth chapter 
argues, do not provide evidence up to the international standard of proof required for the 
establishment of the responsibility in law. Responsibility in law is governed by the secondary 
rules of the law of State responsibility, in particular the legal framework of attribution. Asserting 
that a State is in fact responsible for a cyber operation does not automatically denote legal 
attribution of the act that deprived the injured State of its international legal rights, although 
 
3 Daniel R Coats, ‘Statement for the Record – Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community’ 
(Office of the Director of National Intelligence, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 13 February 2018) 5 
<dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf> accessed 12 August 2019 
4 See ch 2 
5 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Cyber Operations Tracker data’ <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-
operations/export-incidents?_format=csv> accessed 12 August 2019 
6 See eg ENISA, ‘Threat Landscape Report 2017’ (January 2018) 94 <enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-
landscape-report-2017> accessed 26 January 2019 
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the responsibility in fact and responsibility in law are intertwined concepts. The process of 
establishing the legal attribution of cyber operations to a specific State and the consequential 
invocation of the international legal responsibility of that State is elaborated upon in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis. 
Even when technology fails to lead to the State and prevents the injured State from legally 
attributing a cyber operation to a particular State, the scope or sophistication of a cyber 
operation are sufficient indicators to exclude the private non-State actors acting out of their 
(usually) profit-pursuing rationale and to assert that it is a State that is in fact behind the cyber 
operation. This approach can be justified even when the non-State actor was the one who 
developed the tools and means for a cyber operation or even launched it. ProjectSauron, a 
cyber operation targeting the computer networks of (mostly) Russian government entities, has 
not been technically attributed to any State. Nonetheless, researchers concluded that an 
operation of such complexity ‘can only be executed with support from a nation-State’7 and thus 
qualifies as State-sponsored as well as an inter-State cyber operation. Rid and Buchanan 
draw similar conclusions in the context of a Stuxnet operation targeting Iranian uranium 
enriching facilities: ‘No non-State actor, and indeed few governments, would likely have the 
capability to test Stuxnet, let alone build and deploy it.’8 ‘This is not some hacker sitting in the 
basement of his parents’ house[;] it seems that the resources needed to stage [Stuxnet] point 
to a nation State’9 another security analyst echoed.  
Although inter-State cyber operations seldom cause physical damage or injury to persons, 
their negative consequences are considerable. States point their cyber arsenal towards 
another State to quickly and inexpensively maximise their relative power resources. 
Correspondingly, and what is of particular importance to this thesis, by diminishing the national 
 
7 Global Research & Analysis Team, ‘ProjectSauron: top level cyber-espionage platform covertly extracts 
encrypted government comms’ (Kaspersky Lab, 8 August 2016) 21 <securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-
apt/75533/> accessed 26 January 2019 
8 Thomas Rid & Ben Buchanan, ‘Attributing Cyber Attacks’ (2015) 38(1–2) J of Strategic Studies 4, 20–21 
9 Jonathan Fildes, ‘Stuxnet worm 'targeted high-value Iranian assets' BBC (23 September 2010) 
<bbc.com/news/technology-11388018> accessed 26 January 2019 
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power resources of the targeted State(s), malicious inter-State cyber operations lessen the 
security of the targeted State(s).10 
Despite the fact that modern technology has theoretically democratised the ability to bring a 
State to its knees and to undermine its peace and security,11 it holds true that State-sponsored 
or -conducted cyber operations still hold more significant potential to do so. According to the 
Swiss National Cybersecurity Strategy, for instance, ‘[n]ational actors or actors financed by 
States usually have greater financial, technical and personnel resources and are better 
organised, which explains their relatively great damage potential’.12 Correspondingly, research 
indicates that the most feared threats among cybersecurity professionals are the ones 
exploiting previously undiscovered, so-called zero-day vulnerabilities and the ones conducted 
by actors with attack skills of highest sophistication or with the strong backing of States,13 
which are all typical attributes of a State-sponsored cyber operation.  
Scale and complexity, the definitive characteristics of a State-conducted or -sponsored cyber 
operations are positively correlated with the magnitude of the resulting disruption. In other 
words, State(-sponsored) cyber culprits in possession of significant resources and knowledge 
are the ones that wreak the biggest havoc on the networked infrastructure and pose the 
greatest threat to peace and security of States. This is the reason this research focuses on 
cyber operations that are conducted or sponsored by States.  
Being focused on inter-State cyber operations for their potential disruption and the scale of 
such disruption, the following chapters attempt no investigation of cybercrime, computer-
related acts committed by private actors constituting a criminal offence in contravention of 
particular pieces of domestic legislation taking form of, for example, an offence against the 
 
10 See ch 2 
11 See ch 5 
12 Swiss Confederation, ‘National strategy for the protection of Switzerland against cyber risks’ (19 June 2012) 
10. See also Eric Lundbohm, ‘Understanding nation-state attacks’ (2017) 2017/10 Network Security 1, 5–8: 
‘[f]rom the limited number of verified State sponsored cyber activities, both the intent and the targets are large.’ 
13 ‘2017 Black Hat Attendee Survey’ (BlackHat USA, July 2017) 20 <blackhat.com/docs/us-17/2017-Black-Hat-
Attendee-Survey.pdf> accessed 12 August 2019 
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confidentiality, integrity and availability of cyber infrastructure and data, computer-related 
fraud and forgery, content-related offences, including ones related to infringements of 
copyright and related rights, etc.14  
1.2. Internationally wrongful cyber operations below the use of force 
The focus of this thesis are inter-State cyber operations which are internationally wrongful or, 
in other words, the ones constituting conduct not in conformity with the international legal 
obligations of States or conduct contrary to the international legal rights of another State, 
regardless of the origin or character of such obligations and rights.15 Much like the 
understanding of the ILC in its deliberations on international law of State responsibility and of 
the Arbitral Tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior affair, ‘any violation by a State of any obligation, 
of whatever origin’16 is considered to be internationally wrongful for the purpose of this thesis. 
As I explain in the following chapter, unlawful inter-State cyber operations present a serious 
threat not only to the targeted States but to the whole international community as well. On one 
hand, internationally wrongful inter-State cyber operations deprive the targeted States of their 
national power resources and award the State in fact responsible for the operation with 
illegitimate, inexpensive and quick power gains. On the other hand, non-compliance with 
international law further erodes the rule of law and endangers international peace that is 
sustained by legally prescribed constraints on the selfish maximisation of power. Both 
consequences have a detrimental effect on the security of the States. 
The methodological approach adopted in this thesis is not without its limitations, however. This 
thesis excludes from its research scope cyber operations constituting an internationally 
prohibited use of force. In accordance with the prevailing use of terminology in the relevant 
literature, forcible cyber operations are referred to as cyber attacks. Instead, this research 
 
14 Examples inspired by the Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest, 23 November 2001) 185 CETS arts 2–10 
15 UNGA Res 56/83 ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (12 December 2001) UN Doc 
A/RES/56/83 art 12 (ARSIWA) 
16 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France) [1990] XX UNRIAA 251 para 75 
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centres on cyber operations below the use of force, or the ones which fall short of resulting in 
injury to humans or physical damage to property. To understand when a cyber operation is 
indeed below the use of force, the content and limitations of the international prohibition of the 
use of force must be considered further.  
Except for a pair of notable exceptions,17 use of force in international relations is not only 
prohibited by the UN Charter Article 2(4) but it also constitutes a violation of ‘the integral part’18 
of international customary law.19 Acknowledging the historical context of the UN Charter, one 
can easily see that the ambitions of the Article 2(4), or of any other Charter articles, were never 
intended to govern inter-State cyber operations.  
This, however, does not mean the law does not apply to cyber operations or that cyber 
operations cannot amount to an internationally prohibited use of force. Nevertheless, the 
prohibition of the use of force is limited to armed force and does not extend to the prohibition 
of political or economic pressures. Arguments in favour of the narrow understanding of Article 
2(4) can be extrapolated from the object and purpose of the treaty expressed in the Charter’s 
Preamble and upon a closer inspection of the travaux préparatoires. The purpose of the 
Charter to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’20 and to ‘ensure […] that 
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’21 is a clear indication that the 
prohibition of the use of force is limited to armed force. An even more compelling (and oft-
cited) piece of evidence supporting this assertion are the rejections of the amendments during 
the Charter drafting process. Brazil’s proposal to expand Article 2(4) to include the prohibition 
of the use of economic force22 was rejected by a convincing majority23 and so was the proposal 
 
17 Charter of the UN (San Francisco, 26 June 1945) arts 51 & 39 
18 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence (CUP 2001) 92 
19 ‘Article 2, paragraph 4, together with other provisions of the Charter, authoritatively declares the modern 
customary law regarding the threat or use of force.’ ILC, ‘Draft articles on the law of treaties’ (1966) II Ybk of the 
ILC 247 
20 Charter of the UN (n 17) Preamble [emphasis added] 
21 ibid 
22 UNCIO, ‘Commission 1, general provisions’ (San Francisco, 1945) VI London, United Nations Information 
Organisations 559 
23 ibid 335 
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of Iran to expand the Article 2(4) to include the prohibition of the use of political force.24 
Subsequent UN practice25 confirms this narrow interpretation of the prohibition of the use of 
force. 
What is more, conduct is to be characterised as an unlawful use of armed force when the 
effects of the conduct damage physical property or injure human beings, regardless of the 
instrument used.26 This effect-conscious approach is particularly relevant for the definition of 
cyber attacks within the framework of Article 2(4) and has since gained considerable traction 
among legal scholars.27 Roscini goes as far as to argue that ‘[i]t is virtually uncontested that a 
cyber attack that causes or is reasonably likely to cause physical damage to property, loss of 
life or injury to persons’28 would nowadays be considered to have reached the threshold of a 
prohibited use of force. 
Albeit limited, evidence of opinio juris supports this interpretation of the law of the use of force 
in cyberspace. Koh, then Legal Adviser to the US Department of State, argued that ‘[c]yber 
activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be 
viewed as a use of force’.29 A similar argument has been put forward by Nakasone of the US 
 
24 Nico Schrivjer, ‘The Ban on the Use of Force in the UN Charter’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook on 
the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) 470 
25 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States’ (16 November 1964) 19th Sess UN Doc A/5746, 35 para 39 
26 Dinstein (n 18) 88. Similar argument put forward also by Karl Zemanek, ‘Armed Attack’ in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (October 2013) para 21 
<https://opil.ouplaw.com/abstract/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e241?rskey=FxjPfU&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 26 January 2019 
27 Russell Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17(2) J of Conflict 
and Security L 212, 221. See also eg Michael Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare (CUP 2013) 
28 Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2014) 53 
29 Harold H Koh, ‘International Law in Cyberspace’ (US Department of State, 18 September 2012) <2009-
2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm> accessed 26 January 2019 
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Cyber Command,30 British Attorney General Wright31 and, most recently, Estonian President 
Kaljulaid.32 
Although Koh’s statement confirms how to apply the doctrine, as can be observed in the 
writings of prominent legal scholars, it also uncovers two particularities of the definition of the 
use of force in the cyber context. First, in assessing the legal qualifications of the cyber 
operation, its destructive and harmful effects need not be direct but can be proximate and 
must exhibit a legal causal nexus33 with the cyber operation. For this reason, the Tallinn 
Manual argues that ‘all reasonably foreseeable consequences of the cyber operation’34 qualify 
as proximate results. This argument is also advanced by Roscini, who claims the destructive 
or harmful secondary and tertiary effects of the cyber operation signal that the act itself is 
considered to have reached the threshold of the use of force.35 The reasoning is in fact rooted 
in established international law; the unlawful character of (and State responsibility for) an 
indirect use of force has been recognised by the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment.36 Considering 
that the direct result of a cyber operation is in fact merely an alteration of a computer code, 
which, indirectly, causes damage to physical objects, or injury or death to persons, this 
recognition of indirect consequences as a legal foundation for establishing the violation of the 
 
30 ‘[C]yber operations that cause death, injury, or significant damage to property would likely be considered a 
prohibited use of force triggering the U.S.’s inherent right of self-defense.’ US Senate, ‘Advance Policy Questions 
for Lieutenant General Paul Nakasone, USA Nominee for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Director, 
National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service’ (1 March 2018) 14 <https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nakasone_APQs_03-01-18.pdf> accessed 26 January 2019 
31 Wright argued ‘the UK considers it is clear that cyber operations that result in, or present an imminent threat of, 
death and destruction on an equivalent scale to an armed attack will give rise to an inherent right to take action in 
self- defence, as recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter.’ Jeremy Wright, ‘Cyber and International Law in the 
21st Century’ (23 May 2018) <gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century> 
accessed 23 July 2019 
32 Michael N Schmitt, ‘Estonia Speaks Out on Key Rules for Cyberspace’ (Just Security, 10 June 2019) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/64490/estonia-speaks-out-on-key-rules-for-cyberspace/> accessed 23 July 2019 
33 For more on causation in fact and in law, see ch 5. 
34 Michael N Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (CUP 
2017) 343 [emphasis added] 
35 Roscini (n 28) 53 
36 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) 
[1986] ICJ Rep para 209 
16 
obligation to refrain from using force, is also imperative when establishing a breach of the 
prohibition of the use of force by a cyber operation.  
Acknowledging the secondary and tertiary consequences of a cyber operation is especially 
important because the destruction of a computer code does not automatically constitute an 
unlawful use of force. Although traditional legal doctrine does not consider data as property, 
some scholars proposed that the destruction of, or damage to, computer data would constitute 
a use of force. One of the scholars in favour of this approach is Barkham who argues that 
‘[g]iven that technological advances have increased the strategic importance of the 
information industry, there is a clear argument for equating data with property’.37 I am not 
convinced computer data – zeroes and ones which, in comparison to brick and mortar, are 
replicated with relative ease – should be considered property, but its destruction or alteration 
can certainly amount to a use of force if the said cyber operation indirectly causes damage to 
physical property or injury to a human being. Such consequences are indeed likely, but 
certainly not guaranteed.  
The second lesson from Koh’s statement relates to the extent of physical damage required to 
classify a cyber operation as a use of force. It appears there is no de minimis threshold when 
it comes to the resulting injury or death, but there is one when assessing physical damage to 
property for the purpose of determining whether a cyber operation is indeed considered to be 
use of force or not. While every injury or death caused by a cyber operation means it is indeed 
a violation of the prohibition of the use of force, it seems that damage to property must be 
significant to qualify as such. This reasoning corresponds to arguments advanced by legal 
theorists who distinguish between so-called minor uses of force and uses of force that are not 
 
37 Jason Barkham, ‘Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force’ (2011) 34 (1) New York 
University J of Intl L and Pol 57, 88 
17 
minor; an act constituting a mere unlawful intervention and an act prohibited under the Article 
2(4), respectively.38 
Aside from Schmitt’s attempt,39 neither scholarship nor opinio juris related to cyber operations 
provide a clear legal framework for assessing the gravity of the damage caused by a cyber 
operation in order to classify it as an unlawful use of force. In fact, later expressions of opinio 
juris cast a shadow of a doubt on the hard delineation between forceful and non-forceful cyber 
operations previously advocated by Koh. In 2018, Commander Nakasone of the US Cyber 
Command noted that ‘the malicious cyber operations that meet the definition of significant 
consequences would likely also cross the threshold of an unlawful use of force.’40 Moreover, 
no explicit affirmation in the established doctrine of the use of force may be found to support 
the theory that the extent of damage determines whether the act is considered to have risen 
to the requisite level of the use of force or not. Discussing the prohibition enshrined in the UN 
Charter Article 2(4), ILC’s Special Rapporteur Ago was adamant that ‘no doubt should […] 
remain as to the prohibition by the Charter—in keeping with general international law—of any 
kind of conduct involving any assault whatsoever on the territorial sovereignty of another State, 
irrespective of its magnitude, duration or purposes’.41 Also, the UN Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December 1960 reaffirmed the 
international obligation to respect the prohibition of the use of force, including ‘[a]ll armed 
action’,42 reaffirming the idea proposed by ICJ Judge Alvarez in his individual opinion in the 
Corfu Channel Case.43 The fact that State practice recognises no de minimis threshold has 
 
38 See eg Marry E O’Connell, The Prohibition of the Use of Force’ in Nigel White & Christian Henderson, 
Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 89–120 
39 Michael N Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a 
Normative Framework’ (1999) 37 Colum J of Transnat'l L 885, 914–915 
40 US Senate (n 30) 27–28 [emphasis added] 
41 ILC, ‘Addendum - Eighth report on State responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur the 
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also been convincingly established by Yiallourides, Gehring and Gauci.44 For these very 
reasons, and perhaps until State practice and opinio juris establish otherwise, this chapter 
remains focused on a rather basic definition of cyber attacks in violation of the use of force 
prohibition, defined by the reasonably foreseeable effect of any kind of physical damage to 
property or injury to a human being. 
Two reasons guide the decision to limit the research scope of the present investigation to 
cyber operations which do not result in damage to physical objects or injury to human beings 
and thus fall below the threshold of the use of force. First, the legal treatment of cyber 
operations amounting to use of force attracted a wealth of contributions from prominent legal 
scholars who explored and applied the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello to cyber 
attacks. Indeed, the academic discussion on the application of public international law and the 
unlawful character of aforementioned cyber operations has been lively; scholars such as the 
above-quoted Buchan, Roscini, Schmitt, Tsagourias45 and others have generated an 
impressive volume of scholarship explaining and applying existing international law to cyber 
operations amounting to the use of force and beyond. On the other hand, less has been written 
about cyber operations below the use of force. This is the first reason behind the decision to 
limit the research scope and focus on the legal inquiry of cyber operations which do not result 
in damage to physical objects or injury to human beings.  
More importantly, the second reason for the limited scope of the research is dictated by the 
prevalence of cyber operations below the use of force. While I certainly lack the courage to 
claim that the future does not hold destructive or deadly cyber operations and I am of a firm 
conviction that clarification of the applicable international law framework before such a thing 
does occur is imperative, the research omits the investigation of forcible cyber operations, or 
 
44 Constantinos Yiallourides, Markus Gehring & Jean-Pierre Gauci, The Use of Force in relation to Sovereignty 
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cyber attacks, because most computer network operations, a reality of a modern society, in 
fact fail to violate the prohibition of the use of force.  
Despite the dire prognoses of an impending cyber Pearl Harbour,46 cyber operations are yet 
to injure a human being. What is more, at the time of the drafting of this chapter, only two 
known cyber operations resulted in the destruction of property. In 2010, Stuxnet malware 
caused the destruction of about one thousand uranium enriching centrifuges in a Fuel 
Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran.47 And in 2014, the German Federal Office for Information 
Security reported that a cyber attack had caused ‘an accumulation of breakdowns of individual 
components of the control system or of entire facilities’48 of a German steel mill facility. In 
accordance with the definition of the use of force in the context of cyber operations, both would 
qualify as an unlawful use of force. 
Far more urgent than the discussion of destructive cyber attacks is the extensive scholarly 
debate on the capacity of international law to reduce the prevalence of cyber operations below 
the use of force. In the words of Michael Rogers, a Commander of the US Cyber Command, 
the major concerns nowadays are ‘cyber threats to US interests and infrastructure, [many of 
which] now occur below the threshold of the use of force and outside of the context of armed 
conflict, but cumulatively accrue strategic gains to our adversaries.’49 
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(November 2014) 31 
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1.3. Shamoon, 2007 DDoS, RedOctober 
Three examples of unlawful inter-State cyber operations below the use of force serve as the 
framework for this enquiry and assist in eliminating the shackles of a purely theoretical 
perspective. Even though these examples are extensively analysed throughout the thesis, the 
following paragraphs offer a practical context and analyse how these operations fit in the 
limited framework of the present research.  
Pragmatism guides the choice of these examples. While a great majority of inter-State cyber 
operations are shrouded in a veil of mystery, much has been uncovered and documented 
about each of the examples listed below and this wealth of publicly available information allows 
for a relatively detailed analysis. However, the three examples are by no means an absolute 
limitation on my analysis; the thesis frequently refers to a variety of other cyber operations to 
support the theoretical arguments presented in the following chapters.  
The first example to be considered is the Shamoon cyber operation, which erased thousands 
of computer hard drives of Aramco, the national Saudi Arabian oil company in 2012. The 
operations of the biggest oil company in Saudi Arabia were crippled but no physical damage 
has been recorded;50 indeed Aramco replaced the erased hard drives – which led the drafters 
of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 to argue that the operation resulted in physical damage.51 In reality 
however, the cyber operation itself did not result in physical destruction; Aramco arguably 
replaced computer hard drives affected by the Shamoon malware but only because the 
company ‘decided trying to recover data or figuring out what was usable would be too time-
consuming’.52 The operation had no negative effect on the oil production capacity of Aramco.53 
 
50 See eg Christopher Bronk & Eneken Tikk-Ringas, ‘The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco’ (2013) 55(2) Survival, 
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Despite the fact that no clear and convincing evidence identifying a specific orchestrator of the 
operation is freely available, the responsibility in fact for Shamoon is ascribed to a State. The 
use of previously-unknown system (so called zero-day) vulnerabilities as well as the quantity 
and quality of resources and skills employed by the perpetrators of this operation is what led 
the researchers to draw such a conclusion.54 
Since Shamoon did not cause physical destruction or injury to human beings, it does not 
constitute an unlawful use of force. Much like any other cyber operation consisting of 
unauthorised access to cyber infrastructure located in the sovereign territory of another State, 
Shamoon does, however, constitute a violation of sovereignty; in this case, the sovereignty of 
Saudi Arabia. This means Shamoon can rightfully be classified as an unlawful inter-State 
cyber operation. To reinforce the assertion of its unlawful character, I must delve into the rather 
contentious status of the norm of sovereignty in cyberspace.  
Sovereignty equals independence; ‘whatever the person or thing is on [the territory of a 
sovereign State] is ipso facto subjected to the supreme authority of the State [and] no other 
State may exercise its power within the boundaries of the home territory.’55 Being a principle 
of the international law, it denotes ‘the collection of rights held by a state’56 protecting the 
States from, for example, external intervention in its domestic affairs and the use of force 
against it.57 Many of the principles of international law, however, ‘find expression in customary 
law, and therefore exist as rules derived from that source.’58 Accordingly, aside from being a 
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general principle of international law, sovereignty has gained status as a customary norm, the 
violation of which bears legal consequences. In addition to the writings of prominent legal 
scholars arguing that ‘States are under international legal obligation not to commit any 
violation of the independence, or territorial or personal authority, of any other State’,59 this 
narrative has been promoted also by international jurisprudence. In the Corfu case, the ICJ 
decided that the unauthorised intrusion of British naval forces into Albanian territorial waters 
‘constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty’.60 Similar claims were made by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case, pronouncing the unauthorised American overflight of Nicaragua’s territory as 
having ‘directly infringed’61 the territorial sovereignty of Nicaragua.  
The ideas of reconceptualisation of sovereignty for cyberspace proposed at the end of the last 
millennium62 were laid to rest long ago; States63 and scholars64 have taken the position that 
the principle of sovereignty applies to cyberspace, not least because the integral parts of 
virtual cyberspace are the enabling physical objects, which are undeniably governed by the 
traditional doctrine of sovereignty. Thus, States have an absolute and supreme authority over 
the cyber infrastructure located on their territory, subject to restrictions laid down by 
international law. Accordingly, any unauthorised intrusion into a cyber infrastructure located 
on the territory of a sovereign State constitutes an internationally wrongful violation of the 
sovereignty of that State.  
 
59 Jennings & Watts (n 55) 382. See also Crawford (n 56) 448; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 
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While this interpretation of international law in cyberspace enjoys considerable support 
amongst scholars,65 the position of the British government runs very much against it. Consider 
the expression of the opinio juris on the subject matter by the British Attorney General Wright:  
Some have sought to argue for the existence of a cyber specific rule of a 
“violation of territorial sovereignty” in relation to interference in the computer 
networks of another state without its consent. Sovereignty is of course 
fundamental to the international rules-based system. But I am not persuaded 
that we can currently extrapolate from that general principle a specific rule or 
additional prohibition for cyber activity beyond that of a prohibited intervention. 
The UK Government’s position is therefore that there is no such rule as a 
matter of current international law.66 
I cannot agree with this interpretation of the law for a number of reasons. Not only does it go 
against the traditional understanding of sovereignty and the resulting norms involving the legal 
consequences outlined above but it has also, to my knowledge, not been supported by any 
other State or relevant legal scholarship.67 In fact, Brazil has previously called the American 
intrusions into its sovereign cyber infrastructure internationally wrongful; they stated that ‘[a] 
country’s sovereignty can never affirm itself to the detriment of another country’s 
sovereignty’68, a statement which was critical of American cyber espionage activities against 
Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff. What is more, in the face of these new circumstances, 
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normative value ascribed to the expressions of opinio juris in the formation of customary law 
encourages States to re-interpret old (or suggest new) norms and thus reshape the law in 
accordance with their interests and capacities. Considering that British offensive cyber 
capability is soaring69 and their practice of such actions is widely-reported,70 it would be 
reasonable to claim that the provided opinio juris is seeking to reshape the law and normalise 
the behaviour of the State, which is more than capable and willing to realise their geostrategic 
interests or procure peace and security by means of cyber operations in contravention of the 
sovereignty of the targeted States. As will be explained in the following chapter, the less 
restraint on the capable and powerful, the better for them. For less powerful States, on the 
other hand, international law presents an important framework of protection, providing peace 
and security. Freeland, Foreign Minister of Canada, argued ‘[a]s a middle power, Canada has 
a vital interest in a rules-based order in which might is not always right; in which the world’s 
strongest countries are constrained by standards that are internationally recognised and 
enforced.’71 This is perhaps why Canada has not spoken against the existence of the rule of 
sovereignty in the context of inter-State cyber operations.72 
Another interpretation of the law of sovereignty in cyberspace argues that not every cyber 
operation consisting of unauthorised remote intrusion into sovereign cyber infrastructure is a 
violation of State sovereignty; according to the US State Department legal adviser, not every 
such act is unlawful, particularly so when ‘[cyber] activities in another State’s territory have no 
effects’.73 The theory is further developed and enumerated by the second Tallinn Manual, 
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which argues that remote unauthorised intrusions into sovereign cyber infrastructure 
constitute an unlawful violation of sovereignty when its effects amount to physical damage, 
loss of functionality or other effects such as ‘causing cyber infrastructure or programs to 
operate differently; altering or deleting data stored in cyber infrastructure without causing 
physical or functional consequences; emplacing malware into a system; installing backdoors; 
and causing a temporary, but significant, loss of functionality.’74 Accordingly, the proponents 
of this school of thought argue cyber operations, which have no effect on the foreign cyber 
infrastructure, are a legitimate, lawful State practice. Schmitt, for example, argues cyber 
operations qualifying as ‘monitoring activities in another State may merely constitute 
espionage, which is not prohibited.’  
Buchan and Iñaki have developed a strong argument against this interpretation of the law75 
and I am equally yet to be convinced that only intrusions into the sovereign cyber infrastructure 
bearing effects on the targeted State constitute internationally wrongful conduct. In addition to 
the aforementioned Brazilian expression of opinio juris contradicting the theory, the 
understanding of the law of sovereignty in analogous domains other than cyberspace indicates 
that tangible effects on objects by the sovereign territory are not prerequisites to establishing 
the violation of international law. Aerial reconnaissance is one such example. Not only has the 
ICJ argued that American intrusion into the national airspace of Nicaragua violated its 
sovereignty,76 but so do recent instances of practice and expressions of opinio juris indicate 
that unauthorised aerial reconnaissance in a national airspace constitutes a violation of 
territorial sovereignty; ‘Israel regards with utmost seriousness any violation of its 
sovereignty,’77 protested Israeli Defence Minister in 2017 after a Syrian surveillance drone 
breached Israeli airspace.  
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Customary law is indeed in its embryonic state and any definitive conclusion is perhaps 
premature. Regardless of which school of thought prevails in the future, looking at the issue 
from a technical or practical vantage point makes me doubtful that remote operations 
constituting an unauthorised intrusion into sovereign cyber infrastructure can indeed be 
possible without any sort of effect on the said infrastructure. The alteration of the computer 
code allows the perpetrator to conduct a cyber operation and forces the targeted computer to 
perform actions not intended by the manufacturer or the user – send data to remote servers, 
log and share credentials, open a backdoor for additional malware package installation, turn 
on the microphone or camera for image and sound recording, etc. Having said this, and no 
matter the accepted threshold one choses to accept, Shamoon’s unlawful character lies in its 
violation of the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia.  
When an inter-State cyber operation interferes with what is essentially the sovereign 
prerogative of a State and does so by way of dictatorial means or by coercion, the cyber 
operation in question may be classified as an unlawful intervention. The 2007 DDoS operation 
against Estonia is an example of such. 
The Estonian government’s decision in 2007 to move the Bronze Soldier Soviet memorial from 
the centre of its capital to the military cemetery on the outskirts of Tallinn, not only sparked 
violent street riots but also attracted a negative response in the form of a DDoS operation 
shutting down the websites of all major political parties, government ministries, the 
parliamentary email server and even the computer network systems of two major banks.78 The 
main targets of the operation ‘were information distribution channels of both the government 
and the private sector, and business sector websites, specifically, banks.’79 
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The operation deserves to be labelled as inter-State because both the target and the source 
of the cyber operation were States. That Russia is in fact responsible for the DDoS operation 
has been widely argued.80 At the same time, the operation unlawfully deprived Estonia of its 
international sovereign rights. By ‘bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the 
principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely’,81 which in this particular case means 
interference with the right of Estonia to decide freely where on its territory to display a war 
memorial, the 2007 DDoS operation is a clear example of interference with the sovereign 
prerogatives of Estonia. This argument is reinforced by the clearly expressed displeasure of 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Duma with the Estonian policy.82 
Interference amounts to the prohibited intervention when it uses methods of coercion in regard 
to choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines and indeed 
forms the very essence of prohibited intervention,83 is generally accepted to denote an act of 
compelling, intimidating, even forcing a sovereign State to pursue an involuntary course of 
action.84 If expressions of opinio juris indicate no harmony in whether sovereignty is merely a 
guiding principle or in fact a norm with legal consequences, there is less contention when it 
comes to intervention; American and British positions have both argued that the traditional 
understanding of international prohibition of intervention is applicable to cyberspace.85 
DDoS cyber operations, predominantly a form of politically motivated disruptive interference,86 
certainly fall within the ambit of prohibited coercion. Since the 2007 cyber operation was a 
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coercive response to the sovereign decision of the Estonian government to relocate the 
Bronze Soldier statue it may be reasonably argued that it is considered to have amounted to 
coercion against political independence of the State, and thus a violation of the established 
international prohibition of intervention.  
Although the use of force is a form of prohibited intervention, the 2007 DDoS operation did not 
amount to a violation of the use of force; no source reports any physical damage to the 
infrastructure in Estonia. What is more, Goldstein, US Deputy Ambassador to Estonia at the 
time, reported that experts agreed that the operation was not a serious threat to the integrity 
of Estonia’s cyber infrastructure, which ‘was not in any serious danger of being shut down.’87 
In other words, the 2007 DDoS was a cyber operation below the use of force.  
Much like the international law of sovereignty protects the cyber infrastructure in a given 
sovereign territory, international diplomatic law protects diplomatic and consular premises, 
documents, archives and communication. The violation of these provisions is exemplified by 
a third unlawful inter-State cyber operation below the use of force in a cyber operation titled 
RedOctober. 
For at least five years, RedOctober malware harvested and misappropriated information 
belonging to the embassies of at least 47 nations in Algeria, Afghanistan, Belgium, Iran, 
Ireland, Switzerland, US etc.88 Although technical research yielded no evidence of specific 
responsibility for the operation, the scope, customised malware, extensive command and 
control structure are clear indicators that RedOctober was the work of a State.89  
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No physical damage caused by the RedOctober has been reported, which means that it has 
not reached the threshold of the prohibited use of force. The operation did, however, violate 
the provisions of international diplomatic law on at last three accounts. ‘[E]ssential for the 
maintenance of relations between States’90 and for the ‘efficient performance of the functions 
of diplomatic missions as representing States’,91 international diplomatic law dictates, inter 
alia, the inviolability of diplomatic premises, documents and archives, as well as 
correspondence.92  
First, much like how sovereign rights apply to cyber infrastructure located on a territory of a 
sovereign nation, inviolability of diplomatic premises applies to the computers and other 
networked infrastructure located therein.93 Constituting an unauthorised intrusion into the 
computerised equipment of several diplomatic missions, the State responsible for RedOctober 
violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), stipulating ‘the premises of 
the mission shall be inviolable’.94  
Second, the proscription of the inviolability of the diplomatic extends to archives and 
documents ‘at any time and wherever they may be’.95 The inclusion of the electronic form of 
documents and archives can be deduced from the wide definitions, provided by the 
commentary to the ILC Draft articles on Succession of States in respect of State Property, 
Archives and Debts, arguing that archives refer to ‘all documents of whatever kind’ and 
documents ‘should be understood in its widest sense’,96 regardless of their form and material 
used for their storage. Thus, I see no real reason why archives and documents stored on 
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computer servers and removable storage drives, as was in the case of RedOctober,97 
pertaining to a diplomatic entity, would not fall within the scope of the protected archives and 
documents. Though it is unlikely that diplomatic archives and documents would be stored on 
a remote server (or on, what the popular discourse designates as, the cloud), ‘wherever they 
may be’ is a clear indication that their inviolability is not awarded on the basis of their location 
but on the basis of their diplomatic status. Accordingly, since the archives and documents 
appropriated by the perpetrators of the RedOctober operation were located in embassy 
computer servers and removable USB storage,98 the operation was indeed in violation of the 
provision of the VCDR establishing inviolability of diplomatic archives and documents.  
Third, much like archives and documents, international diplomatic law provides that ‘all 
correspondence relating to the mission and its functions’99 is inviolable. The fact that the 
perpetrators of the RedOctober operation appropriated locally and remotely stored email 
correspondence of several of the diplomatic missions100 states that the operation’s unlawful 
character rests on the violation of the aforementioned proscription enshrined in the VCDR, 
Article 27. 
Since the operation ran contrary to the international rights of the 47 States, it may be classified 
as an inter-State cyber operation. No physical damage or injury to persons as a result of the 
cyber operation has been reported, making the RedOctober a cyber operation below the use 
of force. 
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2. Solution(s) 
States appear to be well aware of the fact that inter-State cyber operations endanger not only 
their individual security101 but also the security of the international community. In the words of 
a Dutch representative to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, malicious cyber 
operations ‘cause instability in international relations and could present risks for international 
peace and security.’102 For this reason, many States have sought to supress the occurrence 
of internationally wrongful inter-State cyber operations and to maintain peace and security by 
building their defensive and offensive capacities, by investing in technology-based solutions 
and through promotion of voluntary norms discouraging the conduct of inter-State cyber 
operations. 
By increasing their national institutional capacity103 to defend from and respond to cyber 
threats, States attempt to maintain peace and enhance their national (cyber)security.104 To 
achieve this, defensive capabilities are insufficient; accordingly, Panetta, former American 
Secretary of Defence, acknowledged that ‘[the US] won’t succeed in preventing a cyberattack 
through improved defences alone.’105 For this reason, many States have not only invested in 
the development of their defensive capacity,106 but also established organisational units 
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responsible for cyber offence. The US, for one, established the US Cyber Command, a unit of 
self-proclaimed cyber warriors responsible for improving the security and stability of 
cyberspace, the success of which is measured ‘by the reduction of adversary aggression’.107 
In fact, according to the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community 
more than thirty nation States have established a form of offensive cyber forces.108 This 
statistic does not include nations that chose to outsource the development of their offensive 
cyber capabilities to non-State organisations.109 Still, as elaborated by the second chapter of 
this thesis, reactionary offense has no positive effect on the proliferation of unlawful inter-State 
cyber operations and may aggravate the situation. 
In addition to institutional capacity building, States have also invested in the development of 
technology aimed at prevention and defence against cyber operations targeting national 
infrastructure. Official statements assert that ‘considerable time and attention […] invested in 
improving the intelligence and science behind attribution’110 has resulted in a significant 
increase in the ability to point a finger at the culprits. However, whether such claims have merit 
or are merely deterrence tactics remains to be seen; US officials, for example, were quick to 
point out that the ‘[p]otential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the 
capacity to locate them and to hold them accountable for their [cyber] actions that may try to 
harm America’,111 but have presented rather unsatisfactory evidence in support of the 
attribution of certain State-sponsored or -conducted cyber operations against their 
infrastructure.112  
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National cybersecurity is multi-faceted, requiring solutions beyond those of a technical and 
operational nature. In addition to the aforementioned domestic efforts to shield themselves 
from malicious cyber operations, States have attempted to act externally and to reduce the 
number of malicious inter-State cyber operations by establishing and promoting various 
voluntary, non-binding norms which encourage responsible behaviour in cyberspace and 
therefore introduce some form of order in what is an otherwise chaotic state of inter-State 
cyber affairs and reduce the frequency of malicious inter-State cyber operations. Notably, 
China, Russia and several other States jointly introduced the International Code of Conduct 
for Information Security to the UN General Assembly in 2011113 and 2015, which was to assure 
‘peaceful, secure, open [cyberspace] founded on cooperation’.114 Another example of 
voluntary binding norms, which gained significantly wider international acceptance was the 
UN Group of Governmental Experts’ (GGE) outline of the norms, rules and principles for the 
responsible behaviour of States in cyberspace,115 unanimously adopted by the General 
Assembly at the very end of 2015,116 aimed at ‘[reducing] risks to international peace, security 
and stability’.117 
Some authors suggest voluntary cyber norms play a ‘prominent role in contemporary 
international relations’,118 offering a temporary solution to the rise of malicious inter-State cyber 
operations in the absence of a codified international consensus on the legal matters of 
cyberspace. While one cannot deny their valuable contribution to the formation of customary 
international law, or their potential to contribute to peace and security in contemporary 
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international relations,119 voluntary norms currently have no perceptible impact on the 
frequency or the magnitude of malicious inter-State cyber operations.120 This should come as 
no surprise. The voluntary nature of norms, a form of ‘shared beliefs held within a 
community’,121 means that their impact cannot stretch beyond that of a gentlemen’s 
agreement. Adherence to the norms depends on ‘individual conscience’122 and on the power 
of an international community’s disapproval to diminish the reputation of the nonconformist 
States. In particular, the aforementioned UN GGE report confirms that international cyber 
norms are ‘the expectations of the international community […] and allow the international 
community to assess the activities and intentions of States’.123 As elaborated upon in the 
following chapter of this thesis, a clear conscience and positive international reputation are 
not strong enough incentives to discourage the rational States from resorting to malicious 
cyber operations.124  
In summary, reactions in the form of capacity building, investments in technological 
advancements and development of voluntary international norms of responsible behaviour in 
cyberspace have no tangible effect on the frequency of malicious inter-State cyber operations 
threatening peace and security. In fact, despite all of these efforts, such inter-State cyber 
operations are on the rise. ‘We are witnessing an increase in cyberthreats originating from 
both State actors and non-State actors alike. Such activities have become increasingly 
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targeted, complex and sophisticated’125 warned the Swiss representative at the UN General 
Assembly 1st committee. 
Empirical data confirms this. Out of the aforementioned 220 known malicious State-sponsored 
or -conducted cyber operations in the last 11 years, no less than 40 occurred in 2017, more 
than any year before.126 What is more, it seems the trend will persist in the foreseeable future; 
according to the US authorities’ official assessments of the 2018 threat landscape ‘[t]he risk is 
growing that some adversaries will conduct cyber attacks – such as data deletion or localised 
and temporary disruptions of critical infrastructure – against the United States in a crisis short 
of war’.127 
Another solution to the proliferation of inter-State cyber operations, the one explored in detail 
in this thesis, is international law with its ability to restrict the selfish pursuit of power resources 
and to provide peace and security. In accordance with the theory of compliance elaborated 
upon in the following chapter, the basic nucleus of the anarchical international community is 
represented by a rational, self-interested State, primary interest of which is its security or 
survival. Accordingly, reducing the security of an adversary by way of cyber operations is 
merely a way of maximising the relative power of the State behind the malicious cyber 
operation and a self-centred act of survival. Historically, modern society has sought to limit the 
selfish maximisation of power and consequential decrease of security through the 
development and promotion of international law, the framework of rights and obligations of 
sovereign States uniting humanity in an effort to promote peace and cooperation, to establish, 
strengthen and re-establish international peace and security.128 In the context of realism, 
international law traditionally restricts selfish maximisation of power and seeks to deliver 
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security by providing peace. As I explain in the following chapter, international law represents 
a normative framework of rights and responsibilities, enabling peaceful and orderly interaction 
between civilised nations united in a common goal – security. It provides a ‘standard of 
conduct in the normal relations between nations’,129 by imposing limitations on rationality of 
members of the international community. As such, ‘[international] law stems from the human 
desire for society – not for society of any sort, but for peaceful and organised life according to 
the measure of his intelligence.’130 
Unfortunately, there are currently no universally accepted special agreements outlining the 
international legal restrictions on the maximisation of power by way of cyber operations. There 
are no universally accepted agreements on the international law specifically governing inter-
State cyber operations or the consequences of State responsibility flowing from the violation 
thereof. The prospects of a specialised, black-letter international legal regime, or a Treaty for 
Cyberspace131 if you will, also appear bleak in 2019.  
On paper, there is no lack of interest for such a new regime. The US representative at the UN 
GGE Markoff promoted the need of the international community to affirm that ‘international 
law provides States with binding standards of behaviour that can help reduce the risk of conflict 
[in cyberspace]’.132 Russia has also advocated for an international treaty regulating State 
behaviour in cyberspace.133 The reason why no such attempts have come to fruition likely lies 
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in the highly politicised debate134fuelled by ideological differences135 and the preference of 
powerful States to rely on their own cyber capacity rather than on international law to provide 
peace and security.136  
This is also why the agreements among States are limited to non-binding norms of State 
behaviour in cyberspace. And even those attempts only enjoy limited support by the States; 
after issuing several consensual reports outlining the non-binding norms of responsible 
behaviour and applicable principles of international law to cyberspace, the latest functional 
UN GGE failed to reach an agreement and faced dissolution.137  
For the above reasons, this thesis seeks a solution to the increase in malicious cyber 
operations threatening peace and security in the established international law. It disassociates 
itself from the proponents of an urgent need for a new cyber-specific international legal 
regime.138 Instead, it establishes that there is no such thing as a legal vacuum in cyberspace 
and investigates how existing international law restricts the contemporary peace- and security-
eroding behaviour of States in cyberspace. 
The technological revolution, as disruptive as it is, has not altered the objective of the law nor 
has it diminished the legitimacy of established international legal obligations. The objective of 
international law remains focused on peace and security and is still ‘essential to maintaining 
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peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT 
environment,’139 states the report submitted to the UN General Assembly by the Group of 25 
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications 
in the Context of International Security in 2015. Similar assertions may be found in various 
individual national cybersecurity strategies. The Government of Japan, for example, pledged 
to ‘take the initiative in implementing international rules and norms and subsequently make 
contributions to the establishment of the rule of law in cyberspace [in order to] bring peace 
and stability to the international community’.140 
Also, international law generally remains a legitimate social order in the new era, undoubtedly 
considered to be ‘obligatory or exemplary’141 in relation to the activities of States in 
cyberspace. Writings of the most prominent scholars142 and, more importantly, 
pronouncements of the States confirm this assertion; the American International Strategy for 
Cyberspace, for instance, explains that the introduction of cyberspace does not necessitate ‘a 
reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms 
obsolete. Long-standing international norms guiding State behaviour—in times of peace and 
conflict—also apply in cyberspace’.143  
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In order to be effective in supressing malicious cyber behaviour and therefore live up to its 
promise of peace and security, the law must be complied with. Only compliance of the subjects 
of law will provide the individual States and the international community with peace and 
security.144 For this reason, the central question this thesis seeks to answer is how can the 
established international legal mechanisms reduce non-compliance with international 
law in cyberspace and thus restore peace and security of individual nations as well as 
the international community? 
To answer this question, this thesis investigates the potential of countermeasures for the 
violation of the due diligence obligations of prevention and termination, to allow the injured 
State to restore the power relationship and thus induce compliance with international law of 
the State in fact responsible for the unlawful inter-State cyber operation. 
3. Methodology, originality and utility of the thesis 
3.1. Methodology 
Tasked to find a solution and to uncover the ability of international law to supress unlawful 
inter-State cyber operations below the use of force, this thesis cannot neglect the technical 
aspect of the issue at hand. Accordingly, besides the international relations inspired theory of 
compliance that explains why States choose to disregard their international legal obligations, 
this thesis regularly points to lessons from computer science research. To an extent, this 
methodological approach is a distinct advantage of this research vis-à-vis other relevant legal 
scholarship. Careful consideration of the computer science underpinning the rising non-
compliance with international law in the cyber era is imperative to understand the nature and 
extent of the problem and therefore necessary to be able to propose a viable solution.  
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First and foremost, however, the primary methodological approach is the doctrinal 
investigation of international law. This thesis scrutinises different sources of international law, 
namely the primary obligations of the developing cyber-specific customary international law, 
the primary obligations stemming from the analogous and dynamically-interpreted traditional 
customary and treaty law applicable to inter-State cyber operations, as well as the secondary 
obligations of the customary international law of State responsibility, applicable in the event of 
violation of the primary rules. The analysis of these sources is augmented by an examination 
of the relevant general principles of law, jurisprudence and writings of the most prominent 
scholars. 
Due to the aforementioned absence of a discrete treaty law, the main source of primary 
obligations in inter-State cyber relations and the first source of law scrutinised by this thesis is 
the developing cyber-specific international customary law. As is already apparent from the 
paragraphs above and without a doubt evident in the following chapters, the scope of State 
practice and opinio juris indicating the development of a specific customary international law 
in cyberspace is not extensive. While practice does exist, it cannot be claimed to be 
widespread and consistent, which is a recognised requirement of an established rule of 
international law.145 Thus, at the time of drafting the present text, a customary body of law 
specific to conduct in cyberspace cannot yet be considered as fully formed. Although the 
passage of a certain amount of time is not a legal requirement for a customary norm to arise,146 
the formation of the law is more likely to occur over an extended period of time. In spite of its 
infancy, the cyber-specific customary law development trajectories are evident and presented 
throughout the thesis.  
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For now, the trends of the developing customary law are identified in expressions of opinio 
juris found in news sources, official reports, testimonies of officials, opinions of official legal 
advisers, national cyber security strategies and other relevant policy documents. Indeed, for 
now, ‘legal evolution is likely to occur in significant part through defensive planning doctrine 
and declaratory policies’.147 Documents and resolutions of international organisations, another 
recognised source of opinio juris,148 will also be consulted to uncover the developing 
customary law. Additionally, in an attempt to identify the current and future State practice, the 
research will consult the abovementioned sources and other similar documents which are 
generally149 accepted as a form of State practice, particularly so when the State conduct is 
shrouded in secrecy.150 
Although this chapter has previously argued that the non-binding norms of responsible 
behaviour in cyberspace have no immediate tangible effect on the proliferation of inter-State 
cyber operations threatening peace and security, the role of so-called soft law in formation of 
customary law should not be neglected. As Finnemore and Hollis argued, ‘the real power of 
norms (and much of their attraction as a regulatory tool) lies in the processes by which they 
form and evolve’.151 Thus, the States which will decide to comply with non-binding norms in 
fear of the possible stigmatisation by the international community and the consequential loss 
of international reputation will inevitably aid in the formation of the customary law by way of 
their practice. 
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The fact that traditional international law applies to State conduct in cyberspace has already 
been established. The main issue, however, is to establish how it applies. Because the law is 
in the slow lane152 and the traditional law precedes the cyber era, the research will resort to 
the customary interpretation rules,153 namely: seeking the intent of the law, the ordinary 
meaning of terminology and subsequent practice of States154 in order to establish how the 
traditional law applies to the modern reality. 
An equally important part of this thesis are the secondary obligations of the law of State 
responsibility, arising in the event of violation of the primary rules of international law. Similar 
to the primary rules of the international law, States have recognised the applicability of the law 
of State responsibility in the event of unlawful cyber operations.155 Much like the UN Charter 
does not discriminate between different weapons amounting to a violation of the use of 
force,156 secondary rules of the law of State responsibility automatically arise upon the 
commission of any conduct in violation of the primary rules of international law, regardless of 
the methods employed by the wrongdoing State.157 
While considering the law of State responsibility, I largely rely on the ILC’s codification of the 
customary law laid down in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts. Although the codification is, strictly speaking, not a binding international legal framework, 
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e1093?rskey=dfuWu4&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 17 January 2019 
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it has been endorsed by the UN General Assembly and is frequently relied upon by the 
international and national judiciary entities,158 reaffirming its customary status.  
In order to determine the options offered by international law to a State injured by a malicious 
cyber operation and therefore fully elaborate a solution to the rising occurrence of unlawful 
inter-State cyber operations, one must first understand why States resort to unlawful cyber 
operations. This is explained by the compliance theory based on the rational choice theory in 
the second chapter of this thesis.  
3.2. Structure of the thesis 
Following the elaboration of the rational choice theory of compliance with international law and 
the conclusion that the inflation of the costs of non-compliance is necessary to restore peace 
and security in cyberspace, the third chapter compares various compliance inducing 
measures provided by the international law of State responsibility and makes a case for 
countermeasures. 
The fourth chapter considers the application of countermeasures in the context of inter-State 
cyber operations in violation of international law and presents a number of unsurpassable 
obstacles an injured State is likely to encounter when attempting to lawfully inflate the costs 
of the State behind an unlawful cyber conduct.  
For this reason, the fifth chapter proposes a reconsideration of the unlawful character of inter-
State cyber operations, which can be characterised not only as unlawful conduct but also as 
unlawful omission of diligent prevention and termination of acts injurious to another State. The 
chapter presents the due diligence obligations in cyberspace, their content, scope and the 
relevant international standards.  
 
158 ‘Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2012) 25 United Nations 
Legislative Series UN Doc ST/LEG/SER B/25, II–VIII 
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Under these circumstances, chapter six revisits the objective of the fourth chapter and 
investigates the inflation of the costs of non-compliance through the application of 
countermeasures, although this time on the basis of international responsibility for non-diligent 
behaviour occasioning a cyber operation injurious to the other State. 
The concluding chapter provides a summary and a critical assessment of the arguments 
advanced in this thesis. It exposes the benefits and the limitations of the promoted theoretical 
solution to the rising non-compliance with international law in the cyber era. 
3.3. Originality and utility 
This thesis is original in number of ways. Aside from the advantage of using a methodological 
approach that embraces computer science, the thesis develops a unique rational choice 
theory of compliance with international law, accurately reflecting the state of international 
affairs in the 21st century and explaining why States decide to violate international law by way 
of cyber operations. In this context, it argues that countermeasures are the only viable and 
potentially effective compliance inducing mechanism under the given theoretical 
circumstances.  
Secondly, the thesis proposes an innovative method of overcoming the issues preventing 
injured States from inducing compliance by way of countermeasures in reaction to 
internationally wrongful inter-State cyber operations. It explains how a State injured by a cyber 
operation can induce compliance of the non-diligent State, not only with the obligations to 
diligently prevent or terminate internationally wrongful cyber operations, but also with the 
obligations violated by the operation in fact sponsored or conducted by the non-diligent State.  
Finally, the originality of the thesis is reflected in the extensive exploration of the principle of 
due diligence and the resulting obligations of prevention and termination, including the content 
and the legal standards of these obligations in cyberspace. The arguments are supported by 
a wealth of opinio juris and State practice examples. 
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All these aspects contribute to a unique solution to the problem presented at the beginning. It 
is hoped that the arguments presented in this thesis will be of interest and of use to a wide 
audience. I hope that legal scholars find it stimulating in their research of inter-State cyber 
operations below the use of force, of the international law of countermeasures, and of the due 
diligence obligations of prevention and termination in cyberspace. I hope this thesis will 
encourage also the international community to continue recognising the due diligence 
obligations in cyberspace and their potential to contribute to mutual international assurance in 
the modern interconnected world, where egoistic non-compliance with the international legal 
obligations is no longer a sustainable security maximisation tactic. Above all, this thesis is 
addressed to the operators of law, that is, the decision makers of the States injured by the 
unlawful and non-forcible State-sponsored or -conducted cyber operation. From its very 
beginning, the aim of this research project is to prove that the specific technological 
developments have not rendered existing international law obsolete and that it can indeed 
provide a useful self-help framework to the injured party in a cyber conflict. I hope the 
conclusions of this thesis will encourage the injured States to take lawful action against the 
rational power-maximising States and thus dissuade the latter (and others) from selfishly 
diminishing its relative power and eroding the rule of international law.
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Chapter 2 
International law, compliance and the rational choice theory 
1. Introduction 
Generally speaking, international law matters and is most of the time complied with.1 Be that 
as it may, there is no denial that deviations do occur. As indicated by the previous chapter and 
by the oft-reported examples of unlawful inter-State cyber operations, violations of 
international law in cyberspace are not uncommon. Although the application of international 
law and its normative restrictions on operations in cyberspace have largely been explained by 
the scholarship, no comprehensive exploration has been attempted to understand the reasons 
behind the deviant behaviour of States in this context. This chapter attempts to rectify this and 
elaborate as to why States choose to disregard their international obligations in cyberspace.  
To this end, the chapter is structured as follows. The first part argues that the anarchical nature 
of the international society encourages selfish, egoistic behaviour of States. Due to this 
competitive anarchy, the primary concern of States is security, their survival and self-
preservation, which is provided by State power and/or peace. Peace, offered by international 
law, comes at the costs of constraints on the maximisation of power.  
The second part explains how the anarchical environment, the desire for ultimate security and 
the enabling new technology provide States with temptation to violate international law.  
 
1 See eg Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (Council on Foreign Relations 1979); 
Anthony D'Amato, ‘Is Law Really “Law”?’ (1984) 79(5 & 6) Northwestern University L Rev 1293, 1304; Leo Gross, 
‘States as Organs of International Law and the Problems of Auto-interpretation’ in George A Lipsky (ed), Law and 
Politics in the World Community (University of California Press 1953) 64: it is commonly accepted ‘States by and 
large obey international law’. 
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The third section argues that rational and selfish States will choose to disregard their 
international obligations when a unilateral disregard of the normative constraints brings a 
positive cost benefit calculous. 
In the last part, the chapter explains that benefits of unlawful cyber operations and the resulting 
ultimate security are nothing but a mirage. In order to restore the initial power relationship and 
the level of security it enjoyed prior to the unlawful act, an injured State will respond with a 
breach of its international obligations. Other States are likely to follow suit, which will eventually 
lead to the deterioration of the international norms in the specific context, inability of law to 
provide peace and the consequential decline of security for all members of the international 
society. 
2. Interests of the rational egoists in an anarchical society 
While there is no denial that this thesis is of a legal nature, one must seek the theoretical 
foundations beyond the law. Of course, law is ‘generated by politics’;2 in the case of 
international law that would be international politics. In an effort to explain the role of public 
international law and State responsibility in the cyber era I resort to exploiting the wealth of 
theories in international relations; for it is international relations literature that provides answers 
to what motivates States’ behaviour, including the decision to comply or not comply with the 
provisions of international law. Engagement with the international relations literature ‘reminds 
us that international political forces affect State behaviour including in matters of international 
law’.3 
Three assumptions underline the following theoretical framework; States, operating in an 
anarchical international society, are egoistic and rational. This anarchical society4 is 
characterised by the superiority of the concept of sovereignty and, consequentially, the lack 
 
2 Nigel White, The law of International Organisations (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 2005) 3 
3 Andrew T Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (OUP 2010) 216 
4 Hedley Bull, The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (3rd edn, Palgrave 2002) 25–30 
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of an overarching political or enforcement authority. Albeit plagued by a poorly chosen term,5 
anarchy is considered to be ‘the fundamental fact of international relations’.6 It is this very 
absence of a central authority which allows for the ultimate respect for the independence, 
sovereignty and unique cultural identities of different States. Those arguing that the UN or the 
Security Council may effectively assume the role of the world government7 should look no 
further than article two of the UN Charter explicitly proclaiming that the ‘Organisation is based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’.8  
This anarchy dictates egoism. Every action of the State serves the attainment of its selfish 
agenda. This egoistic pursuit of national interest denotes that State policies guiding its 
international behaviour patterns are ‘designed to promote demands that are ascribed to the 
nation rather than to individuals, subnational groups, or mankind as a whole. It emphasises 
that the policy subordinates other interests to those of the nation’.9 It is this preference of self-
interest over the interest of the international society as a whole that allows for survival. 
Addressing the UN General Assembly in 2017, US President Trump reminded us this is not 
an outdated Cold War mindset: ‘As president of the United States, I will always put America 
first. Just like you, as the leaders of your countries, will always and should always put your 
countries first’.10 
The lack of a central authority indeed makes this world a dangerous place. Thus, security, 
enabling self-preservation or survival is a core and consistent motive of States in the 
 
5 The definition of anarchy indicates the state of lawlessness. By labelling international society as anarchical one 
implies it is a primitive society. Which certainly is not true. See more on that below and, for example, Anthony 
D’Amato, ‘Is International Law really “Law”?’ (1985) Northwestern University L Rev 1293; Onuma Yasuaki, 
International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of International Law in International Society’ 
(2003) 14(1) EJIL 105 
6 Robert Art & Robert Jervis, International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Pearson 
Education 2016) 7 
7 David L Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (OUP 
2009) 47 
8 Charter of the UN (San Francisco, 26 June 1945) art 2(1) 
9 Arnold Wolfers, ‘"National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol’ (1952) 67(4) Political Science Quarterly 481, 481 
10 Andrew Buncombe, ‘Donald Trump's explosive UN speech: Read it in full’ The Independent (19 September 
2017) <independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-un-speech-read-in-full-transcript-north-korea-
general-assembly-a7956041.html> accessed 9 August 2019 
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competitive, international game of politics.11 States in an anarchic ‘constellation must be, and 
usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or 
annihilated by [others]’.12 Though the notion of security may be contested, it generally denotes 
absence of (the fear of) internal and external threats to the State.13 The concept is not limited 
to the threats of force. Statesmen, to whom security is entrusted by the social contract, will 
therefore seek security of all the components of the modern State – territory, people, 
governmental and legal institutions, as well as its sovereignty. The primary concern of this 
chapter is the security of various State elements from outside threats. 
Some authors would have us believe that the primary concern of the State in an anarchical 
society is a struggle for power but even Morgenthau, one of the most prominent authors who 
sought to advance the power theory of international relations, was well aware of the fact that 
power is not the ultimate goal of States.14 ‘[I]nternational politics is too serious business for 
that’15 concurs Watlz. The fact that security is the primary concern of a State, is supported by 
the sciences other than international relations or law. Even though the language of this thesis 
often personifies the State, the State is a social construct, a community of people, acting 
through the medium of a national legal order. So, the description of the behaviour of the State 
is essentially the description of the deeds of people – statesmen, lawmakers and generally 
anyone in a position to steer the conduct of the State in the international setting. If they do so 
in the name and for the benefit of their people, an affirmation of the superiority of security can 
be found also in the science of psychology – Maslow’s theory of human needs puts safety on 
the very top of human psychological needs.16  
 
11 Kenneth N Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’ (1990) 44(1) J of Intl Affairs 21, 36. See also Avril 
McDonald & Hanna Brollowski, ‘Security’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (May 2011) 
<https://opil.ouplaw.com/abstract/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e399?rskey=321VIt&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 19 May 2019 
12 John Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’ (1950) 2(2) World Politics, 157, 157 
13 See eg Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration Essays on International Politics (Johns Hopkins Press 
1962), 150; McDonald & Brollowski (n 11) 
14 Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (McGraw-Hill 1993) 29 
15 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Waveland Press 2010) 127 
16 Abraham H Maslow, ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’ (1943) 50 Psychological Rev 370, 376 
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In this struggle to attain security, States behave rationally. It is assumed that security as a 
preference is universal and constant17 and that States ‘calculate costs and benefits of 
alternative courses of action in order to maximise their utility in view of those preferences’.18 
In other words, States pursue actions which pay off. This defines their attitude towards 
international law; the rational choice theory can explain why States comply and why they 
violate international law. 
Security is attained by means of power and peace. The first part of this chapter focuses on 
the elaboration of the two preferences while the second part explains their interdependencies 
and the maximisation calculations of the rational States.  
2.1. Security is attained by means of power 
Although it may be true that the ultimate goal is security, power is the currency of international 
politics; competitive ‘calculations about power lie at the heart of how States think about the 
world around them’.19 States seek maximisation of their power resources as a means to 
security. While power resources may not guarantee security, they are essential for attaining 
security. And cyber operations have become an important tool for their maximisation. 
Power is a resource of a State, representing ‘specific assets or material resources that are 
available to a State’.20 The assessment of State power therefore depends on quantitative 
indicators such as gross national product, the size and equipment of their armed forces, the 
size of the population and territory as well as other, harder to quantify indicators such as social 
stability, quality of government and diplomacy, international reputation etc. It is generally 
measurable21 in absolute as well as relative terms. States maximise their power directly or 
 
17 For an insight in preferential consistency see eg Scott Burchill, The National Interest in International Relations 
Theory (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2005) 27 
18 Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton 
University Press 2005)  
19 John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (WW Norton 2001) 17 
20 ibid 57 
21 See Ashley J Tellis et al, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Rand 2000) ch 3 
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indirectly – through actions which increase their power or actions which decrease the power 
of the adversaries, respectively. To cause damage to a State is to increase the relative power 
of the other States.  
Striving to attain security, States ‘are driven to acquire more and more power in order to 
escape the impact of the power of others.’22 This is, to a certain degree, inevitable. Humankind 
is driven by progress and the advancement of knowledge, which naturally leads to the 
increases of the State power, be it military, economic or political. But how much power is 
enough to secure the nation from a foreign threat? Mearsheimer argued States aim for the top 
– ‘the ultimate goal of the great powers […] is to gain hegemony, because that is the best 
guarantor of survival’ – but was also quick to admit that ‘[i]n practice, it is almost impossible 
for any country to achieve global hegemony’.23 If hegemony is not possible – and it certainly 
is out of reach for great majority of the States on this planet – the more power the better.  
A wealth of power resources, however, does not guarantee security. Power as a resource is 
nothing without a successful conversion strategy or successful projection which would achieve 
the desired goal in particular circumstances or, in the context of this thesis, security. By all 
means, the United States is considered to be the most powerful country in the world. In terms 
of power resources, that is. It is (one of) the world hegemon(s), if you like. Yet, the events of 
11th of September 2001 have demonstrated that power in terms of capacity is not enough for 
national security. Speculation would suggest the American strategy in employing this power 
was inadequate to prevent the devastating terrorist attack.  
To delve into the wealth of conversion or power projection strategies would be an overly 
ambitious task for a chapter. Though operations in cyberspace may very well be a convenient 
and cheap instrument of power projection – think of the potential of spreading various forms 
of soft power through the Internet or a cyber-attack in the context of military operations – this 
 
22 John H Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’ (1950) 2(2) World Politics 157, 157 
23 John J Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism’ in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (eds) International Relations 
Theories (OUP 2010) 83 
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thesis focuses on the analysis of cyber operations as a function of maximisation of national 
power resources.  
The contextual relativity of power resources and above-mentioned issues surrounding the 
conversion led certain scholars24 to diminish the importance of power resources. Nevertheless, 
accumulation of power resources, either through cyber or any other means, is vital in the 
pursuit of security for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is important to note that a good projection strategy is nothing without a power 
resource. To utilise the analogues language of Nye and Baldwin, winning cards at a game of 
poker may not guarantee the player to win but sure are a great advantage in the pursuit of the 
ultimate goal – domination. In the context of international relations, a sizable army (as a 
military power resource of a State) may not guarantee security, but certainly does hold a 
potential for a successful military power projection to attain security (defend the incoming 
armed attack by the neighbouring State, for example). The bigger the army, the greater the 
possibility of successful military power projection and, consequentially, security.  
This argument extends beyond the considerations about military power. Countries with large 
GDPs, for example, have greater potential to successfully attain security through the projection 
of their economic power than States with a smaller GDP. A country of great wealth may use 
their financial resources for the projection of soft power and to secure its sovereignty, cultural 
values or even the primacy of its relative economic power. As Keohane puts it ‘[w]ealth is an 
absolutely essential means to power, whether for security or for aggression’.25 
The US’ Economic Cooperation Act of 194826 (known also as the Marshall Plan) is a fitting 
example supporting the assertion. After the Second World War devastated the continent, the 
 
24 See eg David Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A 
Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (SAGE 2002); Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing 
Nature of American Power (Basic Books 1991) 26; Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (Hachette UK 2011) 240 
25 Keohane (n 18) 22 
26 S 2202 Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 80th US Congress (2nd Sess, Ch 169, 3 April 1948) 
<legisworks.org/congress/80/publaw-472.pdf> accessed 24 February 2019 
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US offered unprecedented financial aid for the reconstruction of Europe. By way of this 
financial instrument, the US was thus able to convert its considerable economic power 
resources into security; a State with a significantly lesser economic power would not be able 
to do so. In the wake of the Cold War, the aim of the Marshall Plan was to secure the US from 
the growing threat of the communist Soviet Union and inhibit its influence in Western Europe.27 
Its aim was also to secure the American values and proliferate the free economy market; 
‘through economic, financial, and other measures necessary’ the aid was intended to ensure 
‘the maintenance of conditions abroad in which free institutions may survive and consistent 
with the maintenance of the strength and stability of the United States’.28 Considering that the 
US is the largest trading partner of the EU in 2016,29 the projection can be labelled as 
successful. 
Secondly, the possession of power resource provides security through deterrent function. 
Admittedly, the terrorist attack of September 11th (or any other terrorist attack for that matter) 
may not be the best example here. Impressive military power did not guarantee security for 
the US. But then again, one cannot argue terrorism activities are rational much as the States 
are. What one can maintain with a large degree of confidence is that no rational State will 
descend on the US with its current relative military power resources. State power resources 
therefore offer security in its role as a deterrent and may not need to be employed at all. ‘We 
do not seek the progress of the defence industry for conquest and domination over other 
countries’ former Iranian president Ahmadinejad said, as he rationalised the development and 
installation of new military hardware, ‘rather, deterrence is our objective’.30 Similarly, US 
 
27 US Department of State, ‘The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan’ (Office of the Historian) 
<history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/truman> accessed 24 February 2019 
28 Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (n 26) preamble 
29 European Commission, ‘Client and Supplier Countries of the EU28 in Merchandise Trade’ (Trade-G-2, 21 
September 2018) <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf> accessed 24 February 
2019 
30 MNA, ‘Iran unveils upgraded missile, five pieces of military hardware’ Mehr News (21 August 2012) 
<en.mehrnews.com/news/52172/Iran-unveils-upgraded-missile-five-pieces-of-military-hardware> accessed 24 
February 2019 
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Secretary of Defence Ash Carter spoke of the nuclear arsenal: ‘America’s nuclear deterrence 
is the bedrock of our security’.31 
Economic power may very well act as a deterrent as well. For example, a small, poor State 
would be reluctant to impose a trade embargo on produce from a wealthy State with strong 
purchasing power. Economic power would, in this context, offer security to the stronger of the 
two. Indeed, States with lesser economic power resources rarely impose trade embargos 
against the stronger parties. And when they do, they are usually unsuccessful. A 
comprehensive historical analysis of trade embargos indicates that the country imposing them 
is usually economically much more powerful than the target. In most of the analysed cases, 
the GDP of the State imposing the trade embargo was ten times greater than that of the 
targeted State. What is most important is that in many instances when the difference in GDP 
between the States was less than tenfold, embargos proved to be futile.32 
States maximise their power resources by, inter alia, expanding their military arsenal, by 
waging wars, by investing in education, research and development, through good governance, 
international trade and diplomacy. More importantly, States also complement their power-
maximisation efforts by conducting (unlawful) inter-State cyber operations. China, for one, has 
been regularly accused of conducting cyber operations against foreign private and public 
entities for its economic gain,33 which undoubtedly complements its top national priority – 
economic growth.34 The following paragraphs offer a number of examples of unlawful inter-
State cyber operations and identify their power maximisation effects.  
 
31 Ash Carter, ‘Remarks on “Sustaining Nuclear Deterrence”’ (US Department of Defence, 26 September 2016) 
<defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/956630/remarks-on-sustaining-nuclear-deterrence/> 
accessed 24 February 2019 
32 Gary C Hufbauer, Jeffrey J Schott & Kimberly A Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current 
Policy (Vol 1, Peterson Institute 1990) 63 
33 See eg Jon R Lindsay, ‘The Impact of China on Cybersecurity’ (2014/15) 39(3) Intl Security 7, 20 
34 Xinhua ‘Stabilising economic growth “top priority”’ China Daily (11 July 2012) 
<chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-07/11/content_15568386.htm> accessed 24 February 2019 
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2.2. Security is attained by means of peace 
The modern international society may be anarchic in that it lacks a central enforcement 
authority but it is most certainly not lawless. None of the States would appreciate a primitive 
society where only the self-inflicted constraints of morality and power capacity would limit their 
behaviour and safeguard them from annihilation. In such a lawless system ‘war would be 
frequent, insecurity would be very high, and anarchy would approximate to chaos’.35 In addition 
to this, the endless race of States to ever greater power is an exhausting and a dangerous 
game. Insecurity is an inherent element of a competitive setting, in which a threat of being 
outperformed is always present.  
For these very reasons, in the pursuit of their security from the external threats, States also 
maximise peace. Even though, much like the concept of security, the conceptualisation of 
peace can be disputed, it generally denotes the state of international relations characterised 
by the absence of not only a violent conflict but any kind commotion or undesired disturbance. 
Under the conditions of peaceful coexistence of nations, States can enjoy the autonomy given 
by their sovereign prerogatives and freely pursue their economic, social, scientific, cultural etc. 
development as they see fit. To protect the nation, territory, sovereignty, culture and other 
components, States seek peace by, inter alia, the creation of so-called peace regimes, 
providing a multilateral normative framework of permitted rationality in their power 
maximisation efforts.  
General public international law is an example of such a regime and peace is certainly one of 
its primary objectives. Firstly, as it is for example in the case of the UN Charter, modern 
international law outlaws a violent inter-State conflict and consequently provides peace; States 
are under obligation to ‘refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
 
35 Barry Buzan, ‘Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations’ (1984) 
21(2) J of Peace Research 109, 121. See also Henkin (n 1) 15 
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against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’ reads the article 2(4).36 
Secondly, and what is more important in the context of this thesis, international law aims to 
provide peace or the absence of any commotion with the independence of the States through 
one of its key principles – principle of sovereignty. Accordingly, law protects the States from 
any external interference with their territorial integrity, political independence and, generally, 
its ultimate power and supreme authority within and over the specific territory.  
In addition to establishing a normative framework of permitted rationality, international law also 
promotes cooperation and fosters peace among nations. Last but not least, international law 
provides means of conflict resolution or a framework and tools for restoration of peace, a 
function to which I will return in the third chapter of this thesis.  
Ago’s assertion that States ‘are far more interested in attaining their objectives than in invoking 
strict and coherent principles’37 is not entirely correct as the rule of law can very well be in the 
interest of the said subjects. More than for ‘the well-being of the international society and 
possibly survival of mankind’,38 States establish, develop and participate because international 
law serves the egoistic purpose of their interests – peace and security of the nation. 
Sceptics should look no further than at the pattern of historic periods of insecurity and the 
consequential rise of peace regimes during or soon after; peace of Westphalia, peace of 
Versailles and the birth of the League of Nations. Post-1945, States sought peace in the 
creation of the United Nations and the rapid development of modern international law. Many 
of these legal regimes are very specific in conveying their goals – the maintenance of peace 
and security.  
Insecurity is sometimes consequential to the inevitable advancement of human knowledge 
and the leaps in computer science are certainly not the first example of such disruptive 
 
36 Charter of the United Nations (n 8) preamble 
37 Robert Ago, ‘4th report on State Responsibility’ (1972) II Ybk of the ILC 71, 73 
38 John HE Fried, ‘How Efficient is International Law?’ in Karl Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann (eds), The Relevance 
of International Law (Schenkman Publishing 1968) 96 
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progress of human knowledge. The Outer Space Treaty, for example, was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly only a few years after the Soviets landed an unmanned aircraft on the 
moon and it became clear that advancement of relevant sciences may soon allow the use of 
celestial objects for malicious projects. The Treaty aimed to neutralise the newly-arisen 
insecurity to the States by, inter alia, pronouncing that ‘[t]he moon and other celestial bodies 
shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes’.39 Also, 
Eddington, theorising the unprecedented energy outputs of the nuclear fusion in 1926, and 
Rutherford proving the theory through experimentation less than a decade later, probably had 
no idea that their research would lead to the development of nuclear weapons and a 
consequential period of great international insecurity.40 The unprecedented insecurity caused 
by the accumulation of nuclear military power during the Cold War gave rise to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a particularly indicative example of States 
maximising peace and reducing insecurity through the instrumentality of law.  
States also resort to international law when technology introduces a significant threat to shared 
spaces, resulting in an indirect and long-term insecurity to the individual nations. The objective 
realities of an interconnected world and the inability to individually address the insecurities 
drive the States to form new legal arrangements (or expand existing ones) purely out of their 
self-interest. The Outer Space Treaty, for example, aimed to not only prevent States from 
utilising celestial objects for malicious purposes but also to avoid harmful contamination of 
outer space, which could turn into insecurity for all mankind in the future.41 Similar motivation 
may be observed in the texts of various environmental legal regimes. The Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its additional Montreal Protocol serve as an 
illustration. The depletion of the Earth’s protective layer exacerbated by the scientific progress 
 
39 UNGA Res 2222 (XXI) (19 December 1966) art IV 
40 Robert Arnoux, ‘Who invented fusion?’ (ITER, 12 February 2014) <https://www.iter.org/newsline/-/1836> 
accessed 9 August 2019 
41 UNGA Res 2222 (XXI) (n 39) art IX states: ‘States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful 
contamination.’ 
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is a concern for the States because it introduced a threat to the wellbeing of the population of 
every State on the planet. ‘For any environmental threat to be a security threat, there must be 
some demonstrable connection to some vital national interest. In the case of ozone depletion, 
the connection is to public health and human lives’42 argues Levy. No State can patch the 
ozone hole by itself and thus remove the insecurity introduced by the phenomenon. To this 
end, States vowed, inter alia, ‘to protect human health and the environment against adverse 
effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify 
the ozone layer’.43  
Although the rapid advancement of computer science indeed introduced a great deal of 
insecurity, and cyberspace is a domain shared by all the nations, it is unlikely States will rush 
into creating a new, specific international legal regime anytime soon. The invention of the 
Internet did not introduce the same level of insecurity as did nuclear weapons. Also, unlike the 
natural environment, cyberspace is a manmade domain, which can be quickly rebuilt, repaired, 
even circumvented, and thus the insecurity stemming from the damaged domain eliminated. 
Coupled with the fact that it offers an unprecedented opportunity for a cheap (though 
illegitimate) power, a cyber-specific international legal regime is not in sight.44  
Nevertheless, a newly accessible environment does not necessitate a new legal regime nor 
does it indicate the lawless state of international cyber affairs. As explained in the first chapter 
of this thesis, traditional international laws still apply in new domains and its primary functions 
remain unchanged. States have indeed indicated interest in pursuing peace through law in 
cyberspace. As pronounced by the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on 
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, ‘[i]nternational law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, 
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is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability’45 in cyberspace. What is more, 
the aforementioned UN GGE has explicitly reaffirmed the State’s right to the absence of any 
commotion with their sovereign rights in cyberspace; ‘State sovereignty and international 
norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT-related activities, 
and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory’.46 
3. Non-compliance with international law is a preference  
As I argued above, States generally do comply with international law.47 Generally, however, 
does not mean always. The anarchical system provides a temptation to deviate from 
compliance for a number of reasons. Indeed, ‘[a] regime of mutual cooperation is then better 
for all than no regime, but each actor is constantly tempted to cheat’.48 The temptation arises 
because peace has its price and because the expected benefits of international law, the 
manifestation of security, are very much dependent on the self-restraint of others and not just 
themselves. 
Through the facilitation of cooperation, international law can aid States in increasing national 
power resources.49 Its crucial function in the context of this chapter, however, is that it promises 
peace and security, inter alia, by imposing limitations on maximisation of power. In other 
words, the discretion in matters which are normally in the exclusive domain of the sovereign 
State is restricted by its previous commitments in the form of international law.50 International 
law creates a framework of permitted rationality in the pursuit of security. It is by the limitation 
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of one’s sovereignty that it contributes to the peace and security of the other nations. 
Constraints are implicit or explicit, sometimes just the other side of the coin; one nation’s right 
to sovereignty, for example, is another nation’s duty to refrain ‘from military, political, economic 
or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of 
any State’.51 Similarly, normative prescription dictating the inviolability of diplomatic 
correspondence and archives represents the restriction on acquiring information on one hand, 
as well the right to the absence of commotion on the other. 
Under the condition of a functioning international law, a compliant State will source security 
from peace and power. The existence of the aforementioned restrictions in the form of 
international law does not mean that law imposes status quo of the distribution of power and 
that States are not allowed to maximise their power. By establishing a framework of permitted 
rationality and in exchange for the security provided by peace, law renders the overall gains 
of power incremental and expensive.  
For example, to maintain peace among nations, the prohibition of the ‘threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’52 imposes a constraint on 
maximising the power resources; a State with an appetite to expand its territorial power may 
not attempt a forceful annexation of the territory belonging to another State. What it can do 
however is to use diplomacy or other non-forceful but significantly more time-consuming 
methods to expand the territory; in this case, lawful devolution or succession and subsequent 
reunification would be a permissible alternative to forceful annexation. Another example of 
constraint of international law is the VCDR articles on inviolability of diplomatic 
correspondence and archives,53 codified to promote the development of friendly, ergo peaceful 
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inter-State relations.54 States are therefore prohibited from unlawful appropriation of diplomatic 
documentation and the containing information, which may increase their security though the 
maximisation of, for example, economic or military national power. Law, however, does not, 
and quite frankly cannot, serve as an imposition of the status quo of a power distribution in a 
given space and time.55 Law does not prevent States from increasing their power but it does 
make it rather expensive and incremental. Protecting the privacy of said documents, VCDR 
does not prohibit a member of the State’s agents to get a hold of the diplomatic secrets with 
wine, compliments or any other usual method of diplomacy. While this method is likely to be 
rather inexpensive, it is also significantly slower than ignoring the said limits of the law, 
infiltrating the premises of the guest State and taking what one will. 
International law also does not prohibit maximisation of power through innovation. The F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter is an appropriate example of a slow and expensive yet lawful and 
innovative growth of national power. What is thought to be most advanced military aircraft to 
date, the F-35 was in development for over twenty years and its research and development 
expenses surpassed 55 billion USD.56 This increase of US military power spells a decline in 
relative power and security for its international competitors. In an attempt to restore the power 
relationship, China seemed to have orchestrated a cyber operation infiltrating the US computer 
network infrastructure and snagged the blueprints and other documents pertaining to the 
above-mentioned military airplane.57 To put it another way, by means of an unlawful cyber 
operation in violation of the US’ territorial sovereignty,58 China acquired the military technology 
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and hence reversed the loss of its security at a lower cost in a considerably shorter period; the 
unlawful cyber operation ‘reduce[d] the costs and lead time of [the] adversaries to doing their 
own designs, so it gives away a substantial advantage’59 heard the US Senate from Under 
Secretary of Defence Kendall in 2013. 
In addition to the unwelcome costs in a form of a restricted power maximisation, peace and 
security provided by international law are based on trust. Since trust in a competitive, selfish 
and anarchical society represents a risk, States are tempted to seek security by disregarding 
these constraints. To make matters worse, with the introduction of a new and complex 
technology, distrust strengthens and (unlawful) maximisation of power resources becomes 
more accessible, reinforcing its preferential status vis-à-vis compliance.  
In the wake of new circumstances, compliance with international law is based on a promise of 
peace and the enabling reciprocity. States thus comply with international law and adhere to 
the aforementioned constraints in exchange for a promise of a long-term peace and security. 
Compliance rests on faith and trust in the effects of the law; ‘[i]t rests on the premise that a 
veil of ignorance stands between us and the future, but that we should nevertheless assume 
that regime-supporting behaviour will be beneficial to us even though we have no convincing 
evidence to that effect’.60 Compliance is also based on trust of reciprocity; a reciprocal respect 
of the law is ‘a condition theoretically attached to every legal norm of international law’.61 
Therefore, by observing the legal restrictions, States put their faith in compliance by the rest 
of the community. Particularly so in the anarchical community defined by the absence of 
central supervision or enforcement authorities, security is awarded by compliance or self-
restraint of not oneself but of the others. But to be able to reap the benefits, States need to 
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exhibit a reciprocal attitude, as a one-sided compromise is not really a compromise. Only 
mutual compliance will further the sustainability of international law and enable it to provide 
peace and security. 
By complying with the limitations imposed by law, States increase their vulnerability. 
Compliance implies States prefer the promise of peace over unlimited power maximisation 
and that they are willing to place their faith in the hands of other rational and self-interested 
members of the international society. This is clearly a paradoxical conception of the state of 
affairs. Promise and trust are fragile concepts in the international society and misplaced trust 
can quickly result in inferiority. States have no reason to trust each other to respect the law. 
The problem derives from the anarchical conception of international relations and the absence 
of an overarching compliance monitoring entity.62 Distrust is a powerful temptation to lure 
States into non-compliance and rely on security by maximisation of their own power. Besides, 
a newly established legal regime promises results and long-term benefits, which may not 
materialise overnight. Power gains, on the other hand, can.  
Aside from these temptations, scientific developments provide several additional incentives 
for non-compliance. One cannot deny that the advances in computer science reduce the 
prospect of the compliance benefit, and the costs of restraint may just become too great to 
bear.  
Cyberspace is a relatively new, technically complex and, apart from its enabling hardware, 
immaterial and invisible domain. Once praised as a great democratisation tool, it has also 
democratised the threat; to connect, to code, and to penetrate foreign State infrastructure is, 
in relative terms, easy and inexpensive. How is a State to detect an invisible threat and how 
is it to protect itself from teenagers and nation States alike? In his testimony before the US 
House of Representatives, Healey warned that ‘adversaries will continue to use cyber means 
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to challenge American power and our citizens, as it offers significant opportunities for our 
adversaries’.63 
Invisible and hard to comprehend, cyberspace and cyber operations are frightening to decision 
makers; '[c]yber is just pounding me from every direction'64 complained US Congressman 
John Carter, concerned about the omnipresence of cyber threats to the State. Technology 
empowered, ill-intended individuals and States violate law remotely and silently. States no 
longer need planes and bombs to delay one adversary’s development of nuclear weapons or 
increase of nuclear military power;65 a computer code can be just as successful.66 Detecting 
zealous accumulation of power of a particular State is not as easy as it seems, warned 
Morgenthau in 1960;67 it is even harder in the 21st century. Unlawful cyber campaigns can 
remain undetected for years. Red October malware, for instance, allowed for the gathering of 
data pertaining to several diplomatic establishments around the world for full five years before 
it was exposed to the public and its victims.68 In other words, the State orchestrating the cyber 
operation was able to unlawfully maximise its informational power resources for five years 
before anyone noticed.  
Lastly, unlawful cyber operations may enable States to go after a certain power resource, 
which was previously out of reach. Benefits of such nature are without a doubt a strong 
incentive to ignore the law. To demonstrate, as per a US Presidential Executive Order from 
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2011,69 imports from North Korea are generally prohibited70 and in the decade between 2005-
2015 North Korea’s net export to the US amounted to no more than 12,000 USD.71 North 
Korea, therefore, has no legitimate means to maximise economic power on the account of US 
trade cooperation. And yet in 2016 North Korea, by employing its cyber capabilities, managed 
to steal 81 million USD from the US Federal Reserve Bank and increase its economic power.72 
Forty years ago, this would have not been possible without any use of force. 
Even when the legal regime has proven to provide peace, States have good reason to 
gravitate towards violation. Nevertheless, they do need to keep the law alive for a simple 
reason – compliance of the adversary is necessary for the advantage of unlimited power 
maximisation. 
States will attempt legal gymnastics in order to rationalise and legalise their conduct and by 
doing so reinforce the validity of the restraints imposed by law. For instance, there is a strong 
indication that Russia, by the annexation of Crimea in 2014, violated international law.73 After 
they were unable to deny the presence of Russian armed forces in Crimea,74 the authorities 
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did not attempt to dismiss the normative restrictions on maximisation of territorial power. 
Instead, Russian administration served an alternative legal explanation of the conduct and 
labelled it as lawful reunification75 because international law on sovereignty and territorial 
integrity restraining their neighbours is in their security interest. Generally speaking, violators 
are not interested in the collapse of the international legal order. Although it gives them 
advantage in terms of maximisation of power violators, as explained at the beginning of the 
chapter, do not want chaos.  
An egoistic State’s preferred setting is one where they are not restricted by the law and can 
maximise their power by whatever mode they desire but can nonetheless count on the 
performance of the law to restrain the other States from doing so as well. In order to enjoy the 
peace offered by international law, States, from a standpoint of a purely rational egoist, do not 
need to comply. As long as their competition does, that is. Compliance or self-constraint from 
the maximisation of power is only for the benefit of the rest of the community and the survival 
of the peace regime, which will, as a matter of reciprocity, provide peace. This implies a desire 
for unilateral violation of the legal restraints on the maximisation of power. 
True, violations may invite other internationally wrongful acts or repercussions. To be able to 
violate and keep the others from doing so as well, States violate in secrecy or denial. What is 
more, to reinforce the constraints on the others, a non-complying State tends to reiterate the 
legitimacy of international law; ‘[t]he law-breaker will constantly invoke the sacredness of 
treaties if his opponents’ obedience to them will be to his advantage’.76 Two brief examples 
support this assertion. The US, believed to be behind the unlawful cyber-attack that resulted 
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in the physical destruction of the Iranian uranium enriching centrifuges,77 explicitly argued that 
‘long-standing international norms guiding State behaviour—in times of peace and conflict—
also apply in cyberspace’.78 In a similar vein, the Russian Federation decreed its Information 
Security Doctrine is based on, inter alia, the observance ‘of the generally recognised principles 
and norms of international law in carrying out activities to ensure national information 
security’.79 This is the doctrine of the very same Russian Federation that is frequently accused 
of internationally wrongful cyber conduct.80 
4. (Non-)compliance with international law is a rational choice 
Rational States, ones with a consistent preference for security achieved through the 
maximisation of power or peace, choose their preferred behaviour by weighing costs and 
benefits. The underlying assumption of rationality is that States engage in ‘purposive, means-
ends calculation in order to attain their goals – that is, they select actions so as to maximise 
their utility’81 in their struggle for security. Once we are equipped with the understanding of the 
costs and benefits of a given situation, rational choice theory can explain past and predict 
future behaviour of the States, including their decisions on whether to comply or not to comply 
with international law. 
In the context of rational choice theory, States comply with the law when the benefits of 
compliance outweigh the associated costs, that is to say, when peace is expected to generate 
more security than unrestricted power maximisation would. Under the circumstances 
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elaborated in the preceding sections, compliance is not distinctively rational. On the one hand, 
costs of compliance with the international obligations come in the form of restrictions, severely 
limiting the ability of a State to attain security by maximisation of power. States conform to the 
restrictions because the unfulfilled potential for security is theoretically compensated for by 
international law and its function of maximising peace. However, due to the competitive 
constellation of international relations, defined by egoism and anarchy, as well as the impact 
of modern technology, benefits of compliance are uncertain, to say the least. 
Non-compliance with international law by means of inter-State cyber operations is a more 
rational strategy in attaining one’s security. The benefits of violating international law are in 
diametrical opposition to the costs of compliance elaborated above; by dismissing the 
restrictions of the law, power and security surges are faster to materialise, require investment 
of fewer resources and are not dependent on the promise of reciprocity by other rational 
egoistic States. To substantiate the assertion of rationality of non-compliance the final thing I 
must demonstrate is that costs of unlawful inter-State cyber operation are no match to these 
benefits.  
Every power maximisation effort necessitates the investment of the existing and limited 
(power) resources. For the purpose of the argument, I will label these as direct costs. 
Specifically, cyber operations may result in financial costs associated with, for example, 
recruitment, training and education of one’s cyber operators, the establishment of computer 
network infrastructure, intelligence gathering and analysis activities, as well as other 
operational steps leading to deployment. Indeed, other costs of nonfinancial nature such as 
human capital should also be considered though they are easily expressed in monetary value.  
In addition to the direct costs, internationally wrongful conduct can also attract reactive costs 
in the form of an undesired consequence, counterbalancing the benefits of the unlawful act or 
omission. If the benefits increase the power and security of the perpetrating State, the reactive 
costs have an opposite effect. In the absence of an international enforcement entity, reactive 
costs are imposed by other members of the international community. A State affected by a 
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malicious inter-State cyber operation may respond with a comparable act and thus 
counterbalance (or even surpass) the benefits the perpetrating party expected after the initial 
act. Stolen diplomatic documentation may be met by a mirroring act, depriving the initial 
perpetrator of its secrets and thus decreasing its diplomatic power, for example.  
In essence, whether the State will engage in the internationally wrongful conduct depends on 
the probability and extent of the costs associated with the unlawful act. 
Direct costs of inter-State cyber operations are unavoidable. The imposition of reactive costs 
for the non-compliance, on the other hand, is conditioned by the detection of the unlawful act. 
When assessing the potential costs, the violators will therefore take into consideration the 
probability of detection; the less likely the detection and the consequential occurrence of 
reactive costs, the more likely the non-compliance. 
As already indicated before, unlawful cyber operations can be hard to detect. The RedOctober 
operation is an excellent example of this. The State behind the violation of the international 
diplomatic law reaped significant gains in power resource, while, due to the issues with 
detection, it encountered no significant reactive costs. Whichever State got a hold of the 
archives and the correspondence of several diplomatic establishments, gained informational 
power resource. Depending on the content, these power resources may be translated into a 
greater diplomatic, economic and even military power.  
Nevertheless, issues with detection have been lessened and the probability of detection is not 
as insignificant as it used to be. In recent years American private-public partnership ventures 
‘made tremendous gains in determining – relatively quickly and with high confidence – what 
nations are responsible for cyber attacks’ the US House of Representatives heard from 
Professor Healey in 2017.82 True, States are nowadays much more comfortable voicing the 
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political attribution of unlawful cyber operations. The US, for example, has repeatedly accused 
China, Russia, North Korea and Iran of deviant cyber behaviour. China has also openly 
blamed the US for continuous intrusions of their computer networks83 and South Korea pointed 
a finger at its northern neighbour for meddling with the computer networks of their power 
infrastructure.84  
However, the vague nature of the evidence provided in support of the political attributions of 
the cyber operation aimed at, for example, Sony85 and Democratic National Committee,86 
implies the political attributions do not raise to the level of ‘high confidence’. For now, States 
are hesitant to publicly substantiate statements of political attribution with any sort of technical 
proof other than an IP address attesting to the origin or transit of the cyber operation. 
The fact that direct costs of these cyber operations are low and that non-compliance is rarely 
met with any reactive costs is the second reason behind non-compliance; ill-intended States 
will choose non-compliance when the benefits of deviation outweigh the costs.  
Unlawful cyber operations are usually not free but the direct costs are nonetheless low. In fact, 
they are too low to change the rational State calculations. Direct costs associated with the 
cyber operations in this chapter are not available but valuations of a pair of comparable 
operations may provide a point of reference. Mirai DDoS botnet, for instance, is a publicly 
available open source toolkit,87 allowing anyone with a connected computer and intermediate 
knowledge of the subject matter to trigger a large-scale DDoS attack and point it at a national 
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Internet infrastructure.88 Moreover, US intelligence budget indicates that the costs related to a 
more sophisticated cyber operation, one intended to electronically compromise remote 
computer systems, access their functions, harvest the data and perform ‘other operational 
goals’,89 average at 7,350 USD.90 Direct costs can be even lower considering that cyber 
infrastructure is a distinctively dual-use technology which can be later used for other legitimate 
activities of the State. Also, malware can be modified and reused in other internationally 
wrongful activities, as was the case with WannaCry functionality which relied on an exploit 
previously developed by (and stolen from) the US National Security Agency (NSA).91 These 
points in conjunction with the examples of cyber operations and the resulting benefits below 
validate the claim that direct costs of non-compliance in cyberspace do not surpass the 
benefits. 
Similar claims may be made about the reactive costs. In spite of the fact that States seem to 
possess some information related to the attribution of cyber operations and are quite happy to 
blame their adversaries for the wrongdoing, reactions are usually non-existent or, in the best 
case, lukewarm. If not related to the issue with detection and attribution, the reason may lie in 
the uncertainty related to the application of international law to the new domain. While States 
may have confirmed the application of international norms to inter-State relations in 
cyberspace, States are yet to agree on how exactly the law applies in the new environment. 
Also, general international law established by multilateral agreements predates cyber 
operations and it is too early to speak about the conclusive customary law. In the environment 
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of normative ambiguity caused by any significant technological leap, States sometimes cannot 
react and impose significant costs. And when they do, the reaction of the injured States is 
(self)limited to public outrage causing a decrease of the adversary’s reputation. Rejecting the 
hypothesis of Guzman, claiming that the concern over the costs to reputation is the prevailing 
motive of compliance, examples of non-compliance in the cyber domain point at the fact that 
loss of reputation is not proportional to the benefits of non-compliance and thus not an efficient 
deterrent.92 
The Shamoon virus, for example, erased more than three quarters of all the hard drives of the 
Saudi petrochemical company Aramco in 2012. It handicapped the State-owned company for 
more than a week. While the oil production did not slow down because of the virus, business 
operations had been brought to a standstill; some claims suggest it took no less than five 
months for the company to completely restore its computer network.93 Such a disruption had 
a negative effect on Saudi national economic power and, as such, a positive effect on the 
power or the State behind the operation. Considering that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
heavily dependent on its export of oil and that in 2012 Aramco, the world’s largest producer of 
crude oil by far, generated a revenue of more than one billion USD per day, accounting for 
more than 80 percent of the total of the Kingdom’s revenues and almost half of its GDP,94 a 
week of such a disruption of its business operations had significant economic consequences 
for the company as well as the State. Benefits of the wrongdoing State, interested in the 
decrease of Saudi economic power, were therefore significant, which cannot be claimed for 
the costs. A year after the incident, the US NSA privately pointed the finger at Iran.95 While, 
and probably because, no one provided any proof as to who the perpetrator behind the 
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devastation at Aramco was, the reactive costs inflicted by the international community on Iran 
were low, to say the least. Besides bad press96 inflicting a negligible decrease in the reputation 
of the State, Iran suffered no reactive costs for the cyber operation violating Saudi sovereign 
rights.  
Reputational costs were not enough to stop perpetrators from crippling Estonia with a DDoS 
operation in 2007. One of the victims was Estonia’s banking sector.97 The President 
protested98 and numerous news outlets99 reported the political attribution made by the 
Estonian government officials,100 tying the malicious cyber deeds to the Russian government. 
It undeniably made a dent into Russian international credibility but clearly not enough for 
Russia to cease maximising its power by (unlawful) cyber operations.101 This is 
understandable. The benefits in 2007 were numerous and clearly outweighed the costs. The 
economic power of Estonia, a country where 97% of all banking transactions are conducted 
electronically, was reduced.102 Not only was Russia maximising its power, but by attempting 
to coerce Estonia from moving a World War II monument to where Russia publicly opposed,103 
the primary aim of the cyber operation was a demonstration of its power over the former Soviet 
republic.  
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Infrequently reactive costs surpass the loss of reputation. The US has attempted to increase 
the costs of the perpetrating States by means of indictments under the domestic criminal law 
and issued arrest warrants for five People’s Liberation Army and People’s Republic of China 
officials in 2014 for, inter alia, ‘damaging computers through the transmission of code’,104 
which could very well constitute an unlawful cyber attack. Yet, whatever the negative effect of 
this cost was on the power of China, it was not enough to deter the State from non-compliance; 
US military officials claim China has not ceased to rely on cyber operations ‘targeting and 
exploiting US government’105 in a search for the maximisation of its power resources. 
The US administration has promised a proportional response to the unlawful cyber operations 
against its infrastructure, promised to impose ‘swift and costly consequences on foreign 
governments, criminals, and other actors who undertake significant malicious cyber 
activities’.106 It delivered on this promise in 2016, when it froze the assets of Russian 
governmental entities and several individuals for influencing the US presidential elections, 
which constituted a ‘violation of established international norms of behaviour’.107 Time will tell 
whether this was enough of a cost to deter future similar cyber operations by Russian 
authorities. Similar reactions against Iran were proposed to the US House of Representatives 
but have not materialised.108 
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5. The illusion of power gains and unlawful maximisation of security 
In spite of the fact that costs of wrongdoing may be low or non-existent, the maximisation of 
security by simultaneously reaping benefits of international law and then breaching it is an 
illusion. Loss of security by the injured State calls for unlawful reaction, likely to be imitated by 
other States and to eventually lead to the deterioration of law and thus increased insecurity of 
everyone. 
In relative terms, an increase of one’s security by the modality of power maximisation 
decreases the power and therefore security of its adversary. In spite of the apparent absence 
of a meaningful reaction from the injured States and the significant gains of the perpetrating 
State power, the former is unlikely to remain as passive as suggested above and power gains 
of the latter will sooner than later be diminished. Injured States will react by focusing on the 
lost power. In other words, they will pursue the restoration of the power relationship enjoyed 
prior to the unlawful act – either by eventually inflicting damage to the foreign power or by 
increasing their own.  
In 2012, a lesser known cyber operation forced Iran to disconnect the Kharg Island facility, its 
largest oil terminal. The destructive malware was named Flamer. In a country heavily 
dependent on its petrochemical industry, the disruption of an operation responsible for 80% of 
its daily production of crude oil109 undeniably translates into loss of economic power. Iranian 
authorities attributed the cyber operation to the US.110 A year later, however, the 
communication between NSA and British Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) pointed at the fact that Iran had not remained static. Despite official denials from Iran 
that the cyber-attack dealt any significant damage to its oil industry and even refusing to 
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impose reputational costs against the alleged orchestrators at the time of their occurrence, 
Iran has nevertheless ‘demonstrated a clear ability to learn from the capabilities and actions 
of [its adversaries]’111 and sought to decrease US economic national power through disruptive 
cyber campaigns against approximately 46 of its major financial institutions.112 ‘[A] counter 
attack by Iran against American financial institutions’,113 as classified by the US Senator 
Lieberman, intended to restore the initial economic power relationship vis-à-vis the US and 
replace the unlawful loss of power by unlawfully decreasing the power of the adversary. 
With this, the initial power equilibrium may be re-established, but consequences may be more 
significant than they appear. When the initially injured State seeks to restore the original power 
relationship, it will inevitably be lured into non-compliance. As previously noted, it is only by 
violation that an injured State can match the speed, quantity or type of unlawful power 
resource maximisation.  
And they are likely to repeat it as well. The broken windows theory, developed by 
criminologists Wilson and Kelling, argues that unaddressed violation attracts repetition; if ‘a 
window building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be 
broken’.114 In the context of international law, Fisher specifically warns of the dangers of 
internationally wrongful precedents115 as being crucial to the survival of the international legal 
rule. Not talking about cyber incidents may be prevalent but it certainly is not ‘[the] best 
international practice’,116 as stated by the representative of the International Olympic 
Committee in the aftermath of the cyber operation disrupting the computer systems during the 
2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. Violations should not be swept under the rug and left 
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unaddressed or inadequately addressed; if so, more will inevitably follow. In fact, it would 
appear Iran did indeed continue breaking the windows after the initial response to the 
disrupting cyber operation aimed at its oil industry. According to US intelligence, Iran not only 
sought to restore the initial power equilibrium with the cyber operations against the US but 
also used the Shamoon malware to unlawfully decrease the economic power of Saudi Arabia 
in 2012. What is more, it would appear the net profits of the 2012 cyber operation encouraged 
Iran to chip the power of Saudi Arabia even further in 2016 by pointing the very same malware 
at the Saudi’s General Authority of Civil Aviation, ‘erasing critical data and bringing operations 
there to a halt for several days’.117 
If the violations are not addressed and the offenders not coerced into compliance, others will 
take note and likely follow.118 Rational States, other than parties involved in the conflict, will 
observe, calculate, learn and imitate for various reasons; they will either give in to the 
temptation of opportunism, find compliance too expensive or be forced to look for alternatives 
to the security normally provided by the functional legal regime. Firstly, the so called free-rider 
problem is certainly a frustrating reality and, if the situation persists, even the States on the 
right side of the law may soon turn to opportunism and ‘eventually give in to the intensity of 
the competition between the nations’,119 where unrestricted power maximisation comes at 
such a low price. Secondly, once the aforementioned distrust in self-restraint of the 
international society has materialised, compliance becomes simply too expensive. In the 
absence of promised peace, rational States are unlikely to willingly restrain their methods of 
power maximisation. 
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And sometimes, they cannot afford to do so. When the law struggles to deliver on the promise 
of security through established frameworks of peace, States will turn to alternatives. 
Specifically, they may seek peace through a new and issue-specific legal regime. For instance, 
in 2011 and 2015 Russia, China et al tabled the International code of conduct for information 
security at the UN General Assembly.120 If the establishment of universal legal frameworks 
proves to be an overly ambitious project, States will seek peace by establishing new bilateral 
legislation. Again, China and Russia, after failing in the international setting, sought out peace 
by a bilateral treaty pledging to withhold from cyber operations in violations of each other’s 
respective sovereign rights.121  
Considering a comprehensive worldwide agreement on the interpretation of international law 
in cyberspace is unlikely to be adopted anytime soon122 and the fact that illegitimate but 
significant power maximisation comes at a minimal cost, it is more likely that States will 
substitute peace with power as a means of attaining security. Once again, to keep up with 
their non-complying counterparts, States will be forced to disobey the law. 
This leads to escalation or a spiral of conflict.123 And an ever greater frequency of delinquent 
behaviour, consequentially, leads to the deterioration of norms and decline of security. States, 
confident in the superiority of their cyber offensive capabilities,124 may be certain in their 
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immunity from the deterioration of the international normative framework but ‘though disorder 
may profit [them] today in one case it may hurt them in another tomorrow, and in the long run 
is bound to work them harm’.125 Once the number of the of non-complying power maximisers 
reaches a certain point, compliance is not rational anymore,126 and the community will 
approximate to the state of chaos. 
6. Conclusion 
In the anarchical conception of international relations, the primary concern of every State is its 
security, attained either by maximisation of power or peace. The latter, awarded by, inter alia, 
the rule of international law constrains the maximisation of power. The lack of trust among 
competitive, selfish States, as well as the development of computer science, represents 
temptations for them to deviate from legally prescribed behaviour and seek ultimate security 
– unrestricted, fast, and cheap power and peace – by compliance with the other members of 
the community. 
Whether States will violate international law depends on the cost benefit-analysis of non-
compliance. The calculations of the numerous examples listed in this chapter suggest States 
violate because cyber operations bring significant benefits at very low costs, normally only 
damaging their international reputation. The gains, therefore, outweigh the costs.  
Or so it seems. The injured States respond with the illegitimate maximisation of their power to 
make up for the newly introduced deficiency in power which causes insecurity. And by doing 
so, they encourage the spiral of conflict between the two States. Due to the aforementioned 
temptations, opportunism will attract other wrongdoers and the community will soon consider 
compliance with the underperforming law simply too expensive.  
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Injured States should, therefore, focus on the peace provided by international law and not on 
power at all costs. In order to do so, their reactions and the costs they impose on the violators 
should be within the framework of international law. The following chapter explores the role of 
the international law of State responsibility, which provides the injured State, not only the 
accountability framework for restoration of the power relationship and the cessation of the 
unlawful cyber operation but also, a mechanism of self-help which secures the present and 
future performance of the power-hungry States by altering the cost benefit calculus in the 
cyber era. 
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Chapter 3 
State responsibility, countermeasures and compliance 
1. Introduction 
While the preceding two chapters explained the issue of unlawful inter-State cyber operations 
and the motives behind non-compliance in the cyber era, the following paragraphs explore the 
legal consequences following a breach of international obligations. To this end, the chapter 
investigates the law of State responsibility and elaborates its capacity to induce compliance 
with international law, therefore to restore peace by supressing the occurrence of unlawful 
inter-State cyber operations below the use of force.  
In the context of a distinctively positive cost benefit analysis of non-compliance, the present 
chapter analyses the capacity of the law to induce compliance by imposing a trinity of 
secondary international obligations arising upon the breach of primary ones. 
The chapter also compares and examines the enforcing mechanisms of international law – 
adjudication, multilateral sanctions, reprisals, retorsion and countermeasures.  
The final part of the chapter delves into the theory of countermeasures and their role in 
enforcing compliance of the rational States. In particular, it elaborates the instrumentality and 
proportionality of countermeasures in the light of their lawfulness and effectiveness in relation 
to present and future compliance. 
2. Consequences of the breach of international law 
A breach of the international legal obligation, and the consequential denial of the 
corresponding right to its bearer, involves a legal responsibility of the party in the wrong. The 
same holds true in international law; the fact that every violation of international law by a State 
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involves responsibility,1 is ‘most strongly upheld by State practice and judicial decisions and 
most deeply rooted in the doctrine of international law’.2 
Responsibility for the violation of one’s duties or another one’s rights is essential to the legal 
character of the normative order. Legal responsibility in the international setting is based on 
the ‘actual existence of an international legal order and in the legal nature of the obligations it 
imposes on [the States]’,3 argued the ILC in their preparatory work related to the international 
law of State responsibility codification efforts. Thus, State responsibility is understood to be 
‘the necessary corollary of a right [and all] rights of an international character involve 
international responsibility.’4 
The law of State responsibility aims to restore and maintain peace in the international society 
after it has been momentarily disturbed by non-compliance. The purpose of this ‘system of 
multilateral public order’5 has been explicitly voiced by the UN General Assembly, declaring 
that ‘it is desirable for the maintenance and development of peaceful relations between States 
that the principles of international law governing State responsibility be codified’.6 The law of 
State responsibility does so by seeking the restoration of compliance, which is vital to the 
performance of law and thus the manifestation of peace and security.7  
The contemporary system of international responsibility seeks to impose compliance and 
restoration of power relationship by the operation of law. Specifically, responsibility for the 
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internationally wrongful conduct gives rise to the secondary obligations of cessation and non-
repetition, explicitly commanding present and future compliance with the primary obligations 
of international law. It also gives rise to the secondary obligation of reparation, which, in the 
context of the rational choice theory, imposes a restoration of the power relationship that 
existed prior to the violation of the international obligations, hence altering the cost benefit 
analysis of the wrongdoers and rendering current and future non-compliance irrational.  
In the event that the secondary obligations fail to persuade the responsible State to respect 
the primary obligation, the law of State responsibility authorises injured States to take matters 
into their own hands and utilise one of many legal enforcement mechanisms. Much like 
reparation, legal enforcement mechanisms represent an infliction of a reactive deprivation of 
power of the wrongdoing State. Instead of relying on the power of legal obligations, 
enforcement mechanisms allow States to impose costs on the non-complying party, to collect 
the debt due by the responsible State. Akin to reparation, these enforcement mechanisms 
erase the benefits of the violation, alter the cost benefit analysis of the wrongdoer and render 
the non-compliance irrational. 
The following paragraphs discuss these law-enforcing consequences of State responsibility in 
detail.  
3. Inducing compliance by operation of the law of State responsibility 
The system of international responsibility seeks to impose compliance and restoration of the 
previous power relationship by the operation of law. Specifically, it materialises in the 
secondary obligations of cessation, non-repetition and reparation, dictating compliance and 
restoration of the power relationship that existed prior to the violation of the law by cyber 
means. 
The secondary duty of cessation aims to restore compliance with the primary obligation. 
Aimed at the re-establishment of the rule of law, the duty seeks to revert the loss of peace and 
neutralise the insecurity introduced by the unlawful cyber operation. It requires the wrongdoing 
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State to put a stop to the continuing unlawful conduct at will and comply with the primary 
obligation.8 This may involve a discontinuation of an unlawful act or a positive action to remedy 
the unlawful omission. The introduction of this secondary obligation does not render the pre-
existing, primary obligation moot. This is clearly expressed in article 29 of the Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), emphasising the 
‘continued duty of the responsible State to perform the obligation breached.’9 
On the contrary, the obligation of cessation emphasises the duty of performance. Indeed, the 
primary obligation and the secondary obligation of cessation are in close relationship10 and 
the latter is hardly an entirely new obligation. By imposing an obligation to restore compliance, 
the duty of cessation is a reiteration of the ‘non-optional or obligatory’11 nature of the primary 
obligation. While this may seem to be contradictory to the position of the ILC, which decided 
to separate said obligations in the ARSIWA, it was the very same ILC that, in the context of 
the international responsibility of international organisations and building on the previous 
codification of State responsibility, opined:  
When the breach of an obligation occurs and the wrongful act continues, the main 
object pursued by the injured State or international organisation will often be 
cessation of the wrongful conduct. Although a claim would refer to the breach, what 
would actually be sought is compliance with the obligation under the primary rule. 
This is not a new obligation that arises as a consequence of the wrongful act.12 
From the vantage point of the rational choice theory, the obligation of cessation imposes the 
duty to restore, through law, the levels of peace that States enjoyed prior to the breach in 
question. Peace, a product of a functioning legal regime marked by mutual compliance, will 
provide the States with the security they enjoyed before the occurrence of the wrongdoing.13  
 
8 UNGA Res 56/83 ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (12 December 2001) UN Doc 
A/RES/56/83 (ARSIWA) art 30 
9 ibid art 29 
10 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions 
(OUP 2011) 142–143 
11 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon 1994) 82  
12 ILC, ‘Draft articles on the responsibility of international organisations, with commentaries 2011’ (2011) II(2) Ybk 
of the ILC UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 2), art 30 cmt 2 
13 See ch 2 
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In spite of the fact that the obligation of cessation is only relevant in relation to a continuous 
violation, the significance of the obligation of cessation stretches beyond the present. Since a 
breach poses a danger to the effectiveness, the validity and, potentially, the very existence of 
the primary rule, a swift restoration of compliance is an important warning signal to States 
wishing to imitate these illegitimate power maximisation methods in the future. Instead of 
contributing to the deterioration of the legal regime and exacerbating insecurity by encouraging 
similar deviant behaviour of the other States, the injured State should therefore take note of 
the law and invite the wrongdoing State to comply with its international obligations and restore 
peace. Even though the obligation of cessation is established by operation of law and as such 
does not require the injured State to call upon the wrongdoing party to cease the operation, 
practical considerations may indeed require this step to be taken to achieve the restoration of 
the situation prior to the breach.14 
Under these conditions and after being called upon to fulfil the duty of cessation, the 
wrongdoing State is thus required to put an end the continuing unlawful act at will. To comply, 
the wrongdoing State can, for example, terminate the ongoing operation of a malicious 
program by activating the so-called kill switch,15 which was how the Stuxnet cyber attack came 
to an end. Two years after inflicting physical damage to the Iranian nuclear uranium enriching 
centrifuges, Stuxnet ceased to propagate its malicious code because the orchestrating State 
stopped updating the malware’s protocols and, through this deliberate refrain, triggered the 
kill switch and disabled its further functionality.16  
 
14 ARSIWA (n 8) art 34 cmt 2 
15 An example of a kill switch definition: ‘A kill switch is a mechanism for turning off a device or a piece of 
software remotely – and abruptly – in an emergency, such as when it has been stolen or accessed without 
authorisation. In malware, a kill switch is a way for the operator to terminate their connection to the software to 
prevent authorities from discovering their identity.’ Adrian Winckles, ‘Kill switches, sinkholes and how to stop a 
cyber attack’ (Anglia Ruskin University, 19 May 2017) <http://www.anglia.ac.uk/news/kill-switches-sinkholes-and-
how-to-stop-a-cyber-attack> accessed 28 July 2019 
16 William Jackson, ‘Stuxnet shut down by its own kill switch’ (GCN, 26 June 2016) 
<https://gcn.com/Articles/2012/06/26/Stuxnet-demise-expiration-date.aspx> accessed 28 July 2019 
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Another continuous and State orchestrated cyber operation that ceased operation after its kill 
switch was triggered is known as Flamer.17 The malware infiltrated Iranian computer networks 
and, among other things, caused a significant loss of data on several computer systems,18 
forcing the authorities to disconnect some of its biggest oil terminals, thus inflicting damage to 
Iran’s economic power.19 Operational between May and June 2012 and in violation of the 
international legal principle of sovereignty, this cyber operation qualifies as a continuous 
wrongful act. Flamer ceased to function when the orchestrator issued a remote command, 
instructing the malware installed on the hosting and affected machines to simply delete itself 
as well as all traces of its operation.20 Considering that the obligation of cessation is only 
relevant when the breach is continuous, the State responsible for the Flamer cyber operation 
was under the obligation to cease the unlawful conduct between May and June 2012. 
Sometimes the temporal characteristics of the unlawful act are not as easily established. 
Although the primary unlawful character of Stuxnet lies in its contravention of the international 
legal prohibition of the use of force, I use it below to illustrate the argument. Considering that 
the obligation of cessation is relevant and arises only in the context of a continuing violation 
of international law and that Stuxnet, by amounting to an instantaneous21 violation of the 
prohibition of the use of force, did not extend in time, one may argue that the responsible State 
was not under the secondary obligation of cessation. However, one point that is often 
overlooked is that the State legally responsible for the Stuxnet operation was not only 
responsible for the internationally wrongful cyber attack; by retaining its active presence in the 
 
17 ‘sKyWIper (a.k.a. Flame a.k.a. Flamer): A complex malware for targeted attacks Laboratory of Cryptography 
and System Security’ (CrySyS, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, v1.05 (31 May 2012) 3 
<http://www.crysys.hu/skywiper/skywiper.pdf> accessed 28 July 2019 
18 MAHER, ‘Identification of a New Targeted Cyber-Attack’ (28 May 2012) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20131105160213/http://www.certcc.ir/index.php?name=news&file=article&sid=1894
> accessed 28 July 2019 
19 See ch 2 
20 Symantec Security Response, ‘Flamer: Urgent Suicide’ (Symantec, 6 Jun 2012) 
<https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/flamer-urgent-suicide> accessed 28 July 2019 
21 Stuxnet damaged the Iranian nuclear infrastructure in 2009 or 2010. David Albright, Paul Brannan & Christina 
Walrond, ‘Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant?’ Institute for Science and 
International Security Report (22 December 2010) <http://goo.gl/yM4Wy> accessed 3 August 2018 
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various computer systems years after the incident at Natanz nuclear facility, Stuxnet also 
violated the sovereign rights of Iran. From this perspective, the violation did have a continuous 
character and involved the obligation of cessation for as long as the functional malware was 
present in the sovereign Iranian computer network.  
While the investigation of the possible technical measures leading to cessation is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, it should be noted stopping a continuing wrongful cyber operation is not 
always as simple as triggering the kill switch. This is particularly true in the case of DDoS 
operations, which, once launched, flood the network systems with data from a great number 
of various sources and the orchestrator does not always control the participants once the 
operation is underway. To make things even worse, these sources are not always personal 
computers; in October 2016, a previously mentioned DDoS operation coming from more than 
10 million Internet connected cameras seriously disrupted several major commercial web 
services.22 A target could very well be the governmental systems of Estonia, for example. 
While there is no indication that this was indeed a State-orchestrated operation, it illustrates 
the potential issues with the performance with the legal obligation of cessation.  
Cessation is only the first step towards compliance and peace. In addition to the termination 
of an ongoing violation, the obligations consequential to the State responsibility seek to secure 
compliance also in the future. Depending on the circumstances, the wrongdoing State may 
accordingly be required to provide assurances or guarantees of non-repetition.23 Assuring 
future compliance contributes to the rebuilding of trust and strengthens the rule of law, which 
in turn provides peace and security.  
 
22 Symantec Security Response, ‘Mirai: what you need to know about the botnet behind recent major DDoS 
attacks’ (Symantec, 27 October 2016) <https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/mirai-what-you-need-know-
about-botnet-behind-recent-major-ddos-attacks> accessed 28 July 2019 
23 ARSIWA (n 8) art 30 
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Shelton24 and the ARSIWA commentary25 list examples of State practice where non-repetition 
guarantees or assurances were demanded and both sources offer a similar conclusion; the 
situations requiring assurances or guarantees of non-repetition are defined by a significant 
risk of repetition. Considering that technological advancement democratised and simplified 
the act of breaching international obligations and considering that the risk of repetition is 
indeed high, the State responsible for the wrongdoing should promise or guarantee non-
repetition. Particularly when the responsible State has either a track record of similar 
violations26 or is in possession of offensive cyber capabilities. In addition to the significant risk 
of repetition, logic would dictate that the duty to assure or guarantee non-repetition also in the 
case of instantaneous wrongdoing that has already concluded or ceased. Since in the case of 
the concluded unlawful act the duty of cessation is irrelevant, the least the wrongdoing State 
could do is offer an apology in the form of a guarantee to comply with the law in the future. 
Assurances of non-repetition that an injured State may demand can take the form of verbal 
declarations while the guarantees should amount to something more tangible. As pronounced 
by the ICJ in the LaGrand case,27 the form of the guarantee is left to the discretion of the 
responsible State although an injured State may be able to demand specific measures. 
An effective dissolution of the governmental cyber group responsible for the wrongful 
operation is one example of a guarantee of non-repetition. Handing over the details of the 
vulnerabilities exploited in the unlawful inter-State cyber operation would also be an 
appropriate guarantee of non-repetition since it would give the injured State an opportunity to 
patch the exploitable software features and thus prevent future operations using the same 
 
24 Dinah Shelton, ‘Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility’ (2002) 96(4) AJIL 833, 
845 
25 ILC, ‘Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (UN Legislative Series, 2012) 
UN Doc ST/LEG/SER B/25, art 30 cmt 9 
26 Considering that China, Russia and Iran are suspected to be responsible for almost three quarters of all the 
publicly known State-sponsored cyber operations, non-repetition assurances and guarantees can be rightfully be 
demanded from one of those frequent wrongdoers. See Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Cyber Operations Tracker 
data’ <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/export-incidents?_format=csv> accessed 28 July 2019 
27 LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Merits) [2001] ICJ rep paras 124–125 
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vectors of system breach. Moreover, handing over a web domain hosting malware could 
constitute a partial guarantee of non-repetition in the context of cyber operations. To illustrate, 
three web domains were crucial for the performance of Shamoon. In particular, http://mol.com-
ho.me was used in the initial phishing operation, which lured the Aramco employees into the 
installation and execution of said malware. As of January 2017, it was still targeting Saudi 
public entities. According to IBM, ‘an anonymised registrant’ registered the domain28 but if the 
American attribution of the operation to the Iranian authorities is credible, the Iranian 
authorities may give the guarantee in the form of handing over the domain to Saudi Arabia. 
This would halt the propagation of the malware using the current malware injection 
methodology but not also completely disable Iran from distributing the Shamoon malware in 
the future.  
The issue, however, is that promises are easily broken, especially in cyberspace where 
operations go frequently undetected. What is more, guarantees of non-repetition can easily 
be circumvented29 and a State determined to seek illegitimate power through cyber operations 
against another nation can hardly be stopped. Considering the State’s decision to pursue 
illegitimate power maximisation in the first place and the fact that denial of attribution or 
responsibility by the wrongdoing State is common, it is unlikely the obligation of cessation and 
non-repetition will have any effect on its behaviour.  
In addition to the obligations of cessation and non-repetition explicitly dictating present and 
future compliance or restoration and maintenance of peace, the law of State responsibility also 
relies on the operation of law to restore the prior power relationship and alter the non-
compliance cost benefit calculation of the wrongdoers. This is the function of the third 
secondary obligation – the one of reparation.  
 
28 Kevin Albano & Limor Kessem, ‘The Full Shamoon: How the Devastating Malware Was Inserted into Networks’ 
(IBM, 15 February 2017) <https://securityintelligence.com/the-full-shamoon-how-the-devastating-malware-was-
inserted-into-networks> accessed 28 July 2019 
29 By registering a new, similar domain and continue with the phishing and infection stages of a cyber operation, 
for example. 
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The fact that a breach of international duties warrants reparation is, as per the PCIJ Factory 
at Chorzów judgment, ‘a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law’.30 
What is more, during the preparatory deliberations leading to the codification of the law of 
State responsibility, the ILC considered reparation to be a central obligation of the international 
responsibility of the wrongdoing State.31 The position was heavily influenced by Anzilotti, 
whose oft-cited theorising of the international law of State responsibility focused on the 
obligation of reparation and eluded the questions of inducing compliance. After the 
commission of the unlawful act a new legal relationship emerges ‘between the State to which 
the act is imputable (that State being under a duty to make reparation) and the State with 
respect to which there exists an unperformed obligation (this State having a claim to 
reparation)’32 argued Anzilotti. The prominence of reparations as a main consequence of the 
State responsibility for the violation of its international duties is also apparent in the 
aforementioned Chorzów case, adjudicated in the time of Anzilotti’s presidency to the Court 
in 1928. For him, reparation was not about compliance since ‘the ultimate reason why States 
comply with the rules set by their common will is not a legal reason, but an ethical idea.’33  
While it is said that Anzilotti ‘liberated the international law of State responsibility from the 
question of enforcement’,34 reparation is in fact an important mechanism of inducing 
compliance. It should, as much as possible, ‘wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act’.35 
In the context of the theoretical underpinnings set in the previous chapter, the reversal of the 
benefits derived from the violation and the re-establishment of the material situation as it 
existed prior to the occurrence of the violation renders the cost benefit calculation of the non-
 
30 Chorzów Factory Case (n 4) 29 
31 ILC, ‘Report on International Responsibility by Mr. F.V. Garcia-Amador, Special Rapporteur’ (1956) II Ybk of 
the ILC UN Doc A/CN.4/96, 180–181 
32 Dionisio Anzilotti, Corso di Diritto Internationale (vol 1, 3rd edn, Athenaeum 1928) 416 cited in F.V. Garcia-
Amador, Recent Codification of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Brill 1974) 9 
33 Dionisio Anzilotti, Scritti di Diritto Internazionale Pubblico (CEDAM 1956–7) 243 cited in Giorgio Gaja, 
‘Positivism and Dualism in Dionisio Anzilotti’ (1992) 3 EJIL 127 
34 Georg Nolte, ‘From Dionisio Anzilotti to Roberto Ago: The Classical International Law of State Responsibility 
and the Traditional Primacy of a Bilateral Conception of Inter-state Relations’ (2002) 13(5) EJIL 1083, 1087 
35 Chorzów Factory Case (n 4) 48 
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compliance irrational. Indeed, there is no point in unlawful maximisation of power resources if 
it should be promptly reversed or compensated for. The consequences of the reparation in full 
should, in theory, have the same effect as the reactive violation States pursue to regain the 
lost power but without the side-effect of normative deterioration.  
Because an unlawful inter-State cyber operation is not a self-serving act of rebellion but a 
means of increasing the State power,36 wiping out the newly introduced imbalance of power 
is an important aspect of accountability and the only truly effective method of inducing 
compliance. For example, the termination of RedOctober and the consequential cessation of 
unlawful appropriation of diplomatic archival documentation would not be a sufficient 
consequence of legal responsibility to induce future compliance if the wrongdoing State would 
get to retain the illegitimate relative gains of power in a form of the harvested diplomatic 
secrets. Violation would still be a profitable outcome for the perpetrating State and a rational 
choice in the future. Restoration of power balance, on the other hand, would change the 
rational choice of the perpetrating State and therefore provide peace and security by rendering 
present and future non-compliance irrational. 
Three forms of reparation are recognised by the law of State responsibility – restitution, 
compensation and satisfaction. All of them constitute undesired costs attached to the 
illegitimate power maximisation, counterbalancing the benefits of non-compliance and thus 
theoretically eliminating the benefits of the unlawful cyber conduct. Although the law of State 
responsibility emphasises the priority of restitution, reparation must be done in full,37 
regardless of the (combination of) method(s). Only reparation in full will erase the benefits of 
the unlawful conduct and be effective in changing the rational choice of the wrongdoing party 
and induce future compliance. 
 
36 See ch 2 
37 ARSIWA (n 8) art 34 
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Restitution, ‘being the re-establishment of the situation which existed before occurrence of the 
wrongful act’38 is the preferred39 reparation method. It dictates the reversal of the illegitimate 
power gains, thus rendering violation a waste of time and resources. Restitution is not always 
possible nor is it practical simply because the status quo ante cannot always be restored. If a 
foreign national is killed due to the unlawful conduct of the State, restitution cannot be 
achieved, for example.40 While it may very well be an appropriate reparation method in the 
context of this thesis, attributes of cyber operations may inhibit the restitution from fulfilling its 
role as a fitting reparation method. Specifically, when the cyber operation erases computer 
data, as it did in the case of the Shamoon malware, restitution in kind is not a viable form of 
reparation. Also, one of the examples of restitution offered by the ARSIWA commentary is the 
return of unlawfully acquired documents.41 While, in the context of cyberspace, this may be as 
easy as the click of a mouse, it cannot always be considered an appropriate and sufficient 
reparation. Archives taken during the RedOctober operation, for example, were never really 
removed from the storage drives of the targeted diplomatic establishments; the wrongdoing 
State copied the content and transferred it to a remote location, therefore increasing its power 
by gaining knowledge of the other State’s secrets, duplicating documents etc. Even if the 
documents were returned, the damage is irreparable, and restitution cannot re-establish the 
power relationship between the parties to the conflict.  
When restitution is not possible, reparation can take the form of compensation, satisfaction or 
both.42 Intended to erase the ‘financially assessable’43 loss of power sustained by the injured 
State, compensation aims to make amends for the damages by a proportional44 repayment 
 
38 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) [2010] ICJ rep para 273 
39 Chorzów Factory Case (n 4) 48; ILC (n 25) art 35 cmt 3 
40 In its memorial to the ICJ, Paraguay argued that in case it’s national is executed pursuant to the local 
judgement in the US. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United States of America) (Request 
for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 9 April 1998) [1998] ICJ Rep para 8 
41 ILC (n 25) art 35 cmt 5 
42 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (n 39) para 273. See also Chorzów Factory Case (n 4) 48 
43 ARSIWA (n 8) art 36(2) 
44 Mixed Claims Commission (United States and Germany) (Opinion in the Lusitania Cases) [1923] VII UNRIAA 
(No. 1956.V.5) 32, 39 
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with interest.45 Considering the context of this thesis is cyber operations below the use of force, 
damage consequential to the unlawful cyber operation is likely to result in decreased economic 
power, rendering compensation a suitable reparation method. As already explained, Iran as 
well as Saudi Arabia sustained significant economic damages due to the disruption of their oil 
industries by their respective cyber operations. A similar conclusion can be made in the case 
of the 2007 DDoS operation and the economic consequences it had on the Estonian banking 
sector. In addition to the neutralisation of damage, compensation should also reimburse the 
expenses incurred during the mitigation and reconstruction phases of the cyber incident. Once 
again, if the intention of the wrongdoing State is to minimise the economic power of the 
adversary, adequate compensation would revert the effects of the unlawful act.  
Not all unlawful cyber operations however result in a financially assessable injury and can be 
compensated for. When restitution and compensation fail to provide acceptable reparation, 
injured States can request satisfaction. As per Special Rapporteur Ruiz, ‘apologies, with the 
implicit admission of responsibility and the disapproval of and regret for what has occurred; 
punishment of the responsible individuals; a statement of the unlawfulness of the act by an 
international body’46 or similar appropriate modalities of satisfaction may successfully make 
amends for the nonmaterial injury caused by the wrongdoing. Indeed, the ICJ has repeatedly 
argued that its judgment in favour of the applicant serves as a form of satisfaction.47 
Satisfaction is therefore a symbolic reparation, imposing reputational costs, thus decreasing 
the soft power of the responsible State. A regretful apology, diminishing the State’s 
international reputation, would be an effective and proportional satisfaction for a cyber 
operation that caused nothing but reputational damages of the injured State. As such, it would 
 
45 ARSIWA (n 8) art 38 
46 ILC, ‘Second report on State responsibility, by Mr. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Special Rapporteur’ (1989) II(1) Ybk 
of the ILC UN Doc A/CN.4/425 & Corr.1 and Add.1 & Corr.1, para 139 
47 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43; Application of the Interim Accord of 13 
September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v Greece) [2011] ICJ Rep 644. Mind that, a 
judgment of an international tribunal usually also institutes the restoration of relative power through its imposition 
of reparation or of an award of damages. 
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neutralise the illegitimate soft power gains obtained by the wrongdoing State. For a breach 
causing anything beyond the loss of ‘honour, dignity and prestige’,48 on the other hand, 
satisfaction can only be considered an adequate reparation when complemented by 
compensation or restitution. 
4. Enforcing mechanisms and international law 
In the absence of a central enforcement authority and in the light of a positive cost benefit 
calculus of the wrongdoing, a State in breach of its primary obligation is unlikely to be 
compelled into compliance and restoration of the power relationship as demanded by State 
responsibility. The secondary obligations of cessation, non-repetition and reparation assume 
a certain degree of agreement between the injured State and the wrongdoing State in regard 
to the acts in breach of international responsibilities. They assume the acceptance of 
responsibility by the allegedly perpetrating State. 
As of 2018, instances of accepting the international responsibility, in the context of unlawful 
cyber operations, have not been publicly recorded; we are yet to see a situation where a State 
admits to a internationally wrongful cyber operation let alone complies with the secondary 
duties of cessation and reparation. Investigation of the cyber operations aimed at the 
disruption of US electoral systems in 2016 indicates that the American administration indeed 
reached out to the Russian Federation and demanded cessation. The latter not only denied 
the allegation but the operation has not ceased.49 In the anarchical community of distrust, 
assurances of non-repetition are of questionable value as well. This is particularly true in the 
case of cyber operations. Rational States must be well aware of this inefficiency of the 
secondary obligations to provide restoration of power relationships and to advance the rule of 
 
48 Nina HB Jorgensen, ‘A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages in International Law’ (1997) 68(1) British Ybk of Intl L 
247, 264 
49 Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, ‘Russian Hacks on U.S. Voting System Wider Than Previously Known’ 
(Bloomberg, 13 June 2017) <https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-06-13/russian-breach-of-39-
states-threatens-future-u-s-elections> accessed 28 July 2019 
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law. This is why, as explained previously, ill-intended States see the imposition of costs as 
improbable. And this is why the injured parties seek to regain power and security by reactive, 
unlawful cyber operations.50  
Restoration of the previous power relationship and compliance with international law should 
therefore be lawfully enforced. If Anzilotti considered reparations to be the primary 
consequence of State responsibility, Kelsen was a firm believer in the concept of law as a 
coercive order. He promoted the idea of enforcement,51 a reactive and lawful interference in 
the sphere of the wrongdoing State’s interests, as the most important consequence of an 
established State responsibility. Taking the form of reprisals and war, the aim of an 
enforcement mechanism is to coerce the responsible State to adhere to the prescribed, 
socially desired conduct. Kelsen was very adamant about the fact that such mechanisms can 
assume the role of an enforcement mechanism only when they may be accompanied by the 
‘admissibility of employing physical force’.52  
Under the contemporary international law, a State, whose rights were violated by a conduct 
below the use of force, is not permitted to induce compliance of the State responsible for the 
unlawful (cyber operation) by way of force. Nevertheless, international law does offer a number 
of non-forceful enforcement mechanisms, all of which rely on the imposition of undesired costs 
and therefore the alteration of the cost benefit calculation of the wrongdoing States to induce 
compliance.  
First and foremost, compliance can theoretically be enforced by way of international 
adjudication. Indeed, States have generally responded to the ICJ decisions with compliance, 
which indicates its relative efficiency in resolving issues of non-compliance with international 
 
50 See ch 2 
51 Which he called sanctions. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (Lawbook Exchange 2003) 5–33 
52 Kelsen (n 51) 
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law.53 The reason behind this lies in the inflation of the non-compliance costs and the 
consequential alteration of the rational choice of the wrongdoer, imposed on it by the tribunal’s 
decision. Although I have previously shown that reduction of reputation is not enough for a 
rational State to reconsider its unlawful cyber behaviour,54 a cost to reputation55 administered 
not by an injured State lacking any tangible attribution evidence but by an authoritative and 
impartial tribunal with a strict adherence to the established principles and standards of 
international law, would appear to be an exception to this rule. In addition to cost to reputation, 
international adjudication imposes the reduction of economic power or complete reversal of 
the power gains though an order of reparations and award of damages, which render the non-
compliance irrational.  
However, due to the aforementioned lack of common ground between the parties to a cyber 
conflict and the requirement of consensual jurisdiction, the success of the international 
judiciary to secure compliance of the States responsible for the unlawful cyber operations is 
unlikely. Specifically, the supreme status of sovereignty in international law prevents the ICJ 
from judging on the case without the consent of the involved parties.56 In the Case of the 
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, the ICJ stated that ‘to adjudicate upon the 
international responsibility of Albania without her consent would run counter to a well-
established principle of international law embodied in the Court's Statute, namely, that the 
Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent’.57 
 
53 See eg Constanze Schulte, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of Justice (OUP 2004) 436 & 
437; Sara Mitchell & Paul Hensel, ‘International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements’ (2007) 51(4) 
American J of Political Science 721, appendix (published at <http://www.paulhensel.org/comply.html> accessed 
28 July 2019) 
54 See ch 2 
55 As argued by the court, ICJ judgment itself provides satisfaction, a form of reparation, to the injured State. See 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (n 47) 239; 
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (n 47). Satisfaction, as I have argued previously is an 
imposition of reputational costs. 
56 Statute of the International Court of Justice (San Francisco, 24 October 1945) art 36 
57 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and United States of America) (Judgment) [1954] ICJ Rep 19, 32 
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Compliance may also be achieved by way of sanctions. While “sanctions” seems to be a 
popular choice of terminology by either political theorists,58 journalists59 or sometimes even 
governmental entities60 in labelling the positive and negative reactions of a single State or a 
collective of them against the wrongdoing State(s), contemporary legal terminology classifies 
sanctions as (institutionalised) collective enforcement measures employed by a specialised 
international machinery61 or ‘an organ legally empowered to act in the name of the society or 
community’.62 As Pellet and Miron put it, ‘[f]or the sake of clarity it seems therefore more 
appropriate and operational to define sanctions as socially organised acts of constraint’.63 
Aimed at the non-performing State, these include peaceful as well as forceful reactions with 
punitive or compliance-inducing function.64 The UN Security Council and its broad mandate to 
impose measures ‘to give effect to its decisions65 comes to mind, for instance. Much like other 
compliance-inducing measures, sanctions constitute a deprivation of power in order to alter 
the cost benefit calculation of a rational wrongdoer. The previously mentioned reaction of the 
EU freezing the assets of Russia in response to the unlawful ‘annexation of Crimea and 
deliberate destabilisation of a neighbouring sovereign country’66 is an example of a sanction. 
It aimed to reduce the economic power of Russia and alter the cost benefit calculation of the 
unlawful territorial expansion in order to force Russia’s hand into compliance.  
 
58 See Kelsen (n 51); David Baldwin, ‘Inter-Nation Influence Revisited’ (1971) 15(4) J of Conflict Resolution 471, 
477; Karl W Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Prentice–Hall 1968) 18 
59 Jeff Mason, ‘Obama sanctions Russia for intervening in 2016 election’ (Reuters, 29 December 2016) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-cyber-obama-idUSKBN14I1W2> accessed 29 July 2019 
60 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Cyber-related Sanctions: Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging 
in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (Executive Order 13694), as amended’ (29 December 2016) 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_other.aspx#cyber> accessed 29 July 2019 
61 Nigel D White & Ademola Abass ‘Countermeasures and Sanctions’ in Malcolm D Evans, International Law (4th 
edn, OUP 2014) 554 
62 Georges M Abi-Saab ‘De la sanction en droit international’ in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International 
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The fact that UN Security Council sanctions can form a lawful enforcement mechanism, also 
in the context of the cyber operations constituting ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression’,67 has already been convincingly demonstrated by Roscini.68 Also, from the 
standpoint of rational choice theory, the methodology of inducing compliance by way of 
multilateral sanctions is also effective; sanctions can inflict, for instance, undesired financial 
costs and reduce the economic power the wrongdoing State, rendering the unlawful cyber 
operation irrational.  
Nevertheless, the present chapter argues against the multilateral or institutional enforcement 
measures for a very particular reason. Considering that sanctions imply an agreement 
between various States, depend ‘on the existing political consensus within that body and on 
various configurations of power and State interests’69 and frequently serve ‘as a symbol of 
international unity and resolve in the face of lawless conduct,’ 70 the prospect of these criteria 
being met in the cyber era is questionable. Specifically, there is no international unity in the 
matters of inter-State cyber operations and the scope of the application of international law to 
the new domain. Granted, agreement on collective sanctions may be more likely in the context 
of homogenous international communities, for example, the EU, though we are yet to see 
them. Moreover, the selfish behaviour of States in the cyber era and the consequential lack of 
unity of the interests between States renders the institutional enforcement mechanisms 
improbable. Intergovernmental organisations do not operate with a mind of their own but act 
upon the decisions of the collective membership. As former US Secretary of State Albright 
puts it, ‘effective enforcement depends less on what institutions do than on what the members 
of those institutions have the will to do. And what States have the will to do will depend on 
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what it is in their interests to do’.71 Considering the arguments above and the fact that 
sanctions take time to negotiate, the feasibility of timely reactions in the context of blazingly 
fast cyber operations is highly questionable.  
Under these circumstances, I turn to compliance inducing measures of self-help. Firstly, 
reprisals were once thought to be the main instrument of enforcing compliance in the event 
of a breach of international obligations. The classic understanding of the concept of reprisals 
is found in the Naulilaa Incident Arbitration of 1928, which was tasked to resolve a dispute 
between Germany and Portugal. The court defined reprisals as ‘a measure of self-help taken 
by the injured State in reply to an act contrary to the law of nations on the part of the offending 
State’ with the objective ‘to compel the offending State to make reparation for the injury or to 
return to legality, by avoiding further offences.’72 In spite of the fact that the court limited the 
application of reprisals as being ‘by the experiences of humanity and by the rules of good 
faith’73 it has not ruled out the use of force as part of the reprisals. The notion of potentially 
forceful reprisals aimed at enforcing compliance with the primary legal obligations as well as 
the obligation of reparation for the consequences of the wrongs has been further promoted by 
the scholarship, namely Kelsen74 and Oppenheim.75 However, later developments of the 
international law have outlawed reprisals involving the use of armed force in the absence of 
Security Council authorisation. Reprisals are nowadays understood as belligerent reprisals 
and the term is reserved to designate the ‘action taken in time of international armed conflict’.76 
The fact that the investigation of this thesis is limited to the non-forceful inter-State cyber 
operations should be a sufficient reason why this text does not consider reprisals to be an 
appropriate compliance enforcement methodology. 
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Inflation of costs consequential to the unlawful conduct and thus enforcement of compliance 
with international law can be achieved also by way of retorsion, which constitutes a reaction 
of unfriendly77 nature and as such does ‘not interfere with the target State’s rights under 
international law’.78 Measures qualifying as retorsion may include, inter alia, severance of 
diplomatic relations,79 official protests or withholding foreign aid.  
Because the gravity of the reaction in the form of retorsion is far from the gravity of the initial 
injury, effects of the action and the reaction on power of the parties to the conflict exhibit similar 
symptoms of disparity. Being the mildest form of the self-help measures, retorsion will often 
inflict damage to the reputation of the responsible State. Particularly so when the official 
protests are public. Yet, as indicated in the preceding chapter, reputational costs inflicted by 
the injured State do not exhibit a proportional relationship with the injury cyber operations 
normally cause and thus have no tangible effect on compliance with international law.  
For this very reason, official protests, a common form of retorsion, have previously proven to 
be futile. For example, in 2013 the US Congress acknowledged that ‘numerous computer 
systems around the world, including those owned by the US government, continued to be 
targeted for intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese 
government and military’80 and President Obama publicly boasted about the official protests 
with Chinese government over the unlawful inter-State cyber operations.81 In spite of that, two 
years later the Chinese Ministry of State Security, so claims the US Congressional report, 
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infiltrated the US Office of Personnel Management and got a hold of ‘fingerprints of 5.6 million 
people, some of which could be used to identify undercover US government agents or to 
create duplicates of biometric data to obtain access to classified areas’.82 In other words, the 
disparity between the action and reaction resulted in a disparity between their consequences; 
the US traded US government computer data for a dent in Chinese international reputation in 
2013; China, satisfied with this exchange rate, thus proceeded with the unlawful enterprise. 
This should come as no surprise; the fact that only reciprocal self-help measures hold the 
potential to effectively induce compliance has already been proven by the experimentation of 
game theorists. In the context of a bilateral Prisoner’s Dilemma, a form of game theory 
employed to predict the behaviour of rational actors, reciprocity of countermeasures is the key 
factor in determining the effectiveness of their instrumentality in enforcing compliance. With 
the help of 63 game theorists and computer simulations, Axelrod set to determine what kind 
of behavioural strategy brings the biggest rewards to the rational participant in the bilateral 
game of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Briefly, this derivative of the rational choice theory aims to 
determine the optimal behaviour83 of the actor(s) in bilateral strategic relationships where two 
actors (for example, States) are presented with two choices – to cooperate (to comply with the 
law) or to defect (to violate the law). In the matrix of four possible outcomes (defect – defect; 
cooperate – defect; defect – cooperate; cooperate – cooperate) each of the actors is awarded 
a scenario-specific utility.84 The investigation of compliance with the help of game theory is 
particularly useful when the actors ‘pursue their own self-interest without the aid of [a] central 
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authority to force them to cooperate with each other’,85 which happens to be a definitive 
characteristic of anarchic international relations.86 
As one can imagine, there are a number of possible strategies players can choose to follow 
in the iterative game. But the one that deserves special attention in the previously outlined 
theory of international relations and the context of compliance in the cyber era is the Downing’s 
descriptive87 strategy, marked by a selfish and pragmatic maximisation of outcomes. This 
strategy, corresponding to the behaviour of a selfish State focused on power-maximisation, 
tries to understand the reactions of the adversary and base its conduct in the bilateral game 
on this. The strategy judges the responsiveness of the other player; the actor utilising this 
strategy seeks maximum individual utility by estimating the probability of the other party to 
cooperate in the case of its own cooperation or defection. Based on this premise, the player 
will ‘try to get away with whatever it can by defecting’88 or, in the present context, by violating 
international law. To ensure compliance of these selfish utility maximisation actors, Axelrod’s 
experiments have shown, that they must be met with a reaction or change in strategy; 
defecting actors will continuously choose defection when no alteration of strategy is observed 
on the other end.89 The sooner the reaction, the better.90 And what is most important in this 
context is that a successful strategy ensuring compliance of the selfish Downing’s approach 
to Prisoner’s dilemma is reciprocal. In the realm of game theory known as Tit-for-Tat, the 
reciprocity strategy is straightforward – a player utilising this strategy starts cooperatively and 
then meets each choice of the opponent thereafter with the equivalent response or put simply, 
the player will ‘do whatever the other player did on the previous move’.91  
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Following the recipe of Axelrod, States injured by the cyber operation must therefore not 
remain passive but react to the selfish maximisers. To be effective in inducing compliance or 
cooperation of the wrongdoer, reactions must not only be swift but also reciprocal or equal to 
the initial wrongdoing; a violation must be met with a violation. Only reciprocal consequences 
will erase the power benefits of the unlawful act.  
5. Countermeasures, their instrumentality and proportionality 
Countermeasures, the final enforcement mechanism to be considered in this chapter, are the 
only feasible, lawful and effective enforcement mechanism having the potential to enforce 
compliance with international law in the event of the unlawful inter-State cyber operation below 
the use of force. Three arguments are put forward in support of this reasoning. Firstly, 
countermeasures are measures of self-help and, in contrast to international adjudication and 
multilateral sanctions, are unrestrained by the divisive state of international cyber affairs. 
Secondly, and unlike retorsion, countermeasures epitomise a reciprocal strategy advocated 
for by game theory, and are proven to be effective in inducing compliance of the rational, 
selfish actors in an anarchical international community. A reciprocal strategy, a violation for a 
violation, is truly effective insofar that it leads to the restoration of prior relative power 
relationship and hence renders non-compliance irrational. To achieve that, deprivations of 
power inflicted by countermeasures must be commensurate with the benefits enjoyed by the 
wrongdoer. However, because strict reciprocity is not practical nor a requirement of the law, 
countermeasures can also be proportional. Thirdly, being an established legal instrument of 
the restoration of power precluded from wrongfulness, proportional countermeasures are an 
instrument, employed to induce compliance without contributing to the erosion of law and 
escalation of the conflict. This cannot be claimed for the currently practiced restoration of 
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power by States injured by a cyber operation.92 After a brief introduction to the doctrine of 
countermeasures, the following paragraphs explain the last pair of arguments in detail. 
Countermeasures are an established compliance inducing mechanism of the international law 
of State responsibility; in the context of this chapter, countermeasures are not a technical 
measure intended to stop, deflect or even punish cyber perpetrators although there is 
admittedly a practical overlap between the two concepts of countermeasures. For the purpose 
of this thesis and in the context of international law, a countermeasure is a reciprocal conduct 
in contravention of the international rights of the responsible State, the wrongfulness of which 
is precluded by the preceding breach of obligations by that very State. Plainly, 
countermeasures are the reciprocal reactions of a State deprived of its legal right – a breach 
for a breach, a denial of the international legal rights for a denial of the international legal 
rights. Just what the game theory prescribed. 
Countermeasures are an instrumental deprivation inflicted upon the internationally 
responsible State, employed by the injured State to procure compliance. This means they may 
not serve the punitive aim. Forming an enforcement mechanism through deprivation of legal 
entitlements, countermeasures are highly reminiscent of punishment93 and analogous with the 
punitive enforcement methodology employed by domestic legal systems. While the 
deprivation inflicted by the countermeasures ‘will come close to being a penalty inflicted by 
the injured State’,94 international customary law is clear – countermeasures are neither in 
service of retribution nor are to be employed for the purpose of punishment. Due to the primacy 
of the principle of sovereign equality of the States95 and the nature of international law ‘as a 
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law between, not above, sovereign States’,96 punishment is not an appropriate form of self-
help.  
The instrumental character of countermeasures also dictates that such measures are 
precluded from their wrongfulness only when ‘carried out – after an unfulfilled demand – in 
response to an act contrary to the law of nations by the offending State’.97 If not taken in 
reaction to a prior unlawful conduct, they constitute a violation of the international obligations; 
‘[t]hey would be illegal if an earlier act, contrary to the law of nations, had not furnished the 
motive’.98 The requirement of the pre-existing unlawful conduct has been confirmed by the Air 
Service Agreement99 and Gabčikovo Nagymaros100 and Cysne cases. In the latter case, the 
arbitration tribunal was explicit – countermeasures, ‘which constitute an act in principle 
contrary to the law of nations, are defensible only insofar as they were provoked by some 
other act likewise contrary to that law’.101 Following this rationale, normally unlawful State 
conduct becomes lawful; ‘the wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an 
international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act 
constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State’.102 Thus, otherwise unlawful 
coercion or compulsion of a responsible State in the form of countermeasures becomes a 
permitted enforcement method. In spite of the similarity in methodology and their shared 
objective, the lawful nature of countermeasures is what distinguishes them from the usual law-
eroding reactive violations of international law currently practiced by the States injured by 
cyber operations.103 In contrast to the popular reactions by the injured States indicated in the 
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preceding chapter, countermeasures, the instrumentality of which is communicated with the 
responsible State,104 will not perpetuate the conflict or weaken the rule of law.  
Although the ARSIWA provides that countermeasures are instrumental, and thus lawful, when 
taken with the objective of inducing compliance of the responsible State with its secondary 
obligations of cessation, non-repetition and reparations,105 the exact mechanics of how 
compliance with secondary or primary obligations comes about is not addressed by the 
Articles or the accompanying commentary. 
However, in the context of rational choice theory, instrumental countermeasures are a 
temporary and reciprocal denial of legal rights allowing the injured State to inflict a deprivation 
of power on the responsible State and restore the power relationship between the parties that 
existed prior to the conflict. By doing so, countermeasures change the cost benefit calculation 
of the responsible State and render non-compliance irrational, which forces the rational 
wrongdoing State to cease the unlawful conduct, thus restoring peace and security.  
To claim that the inducement of the secondary obligations arising from State responsibility is 
the primary consequence of lawful countermeasures, is therefore a simplistic understanding 
of the instrumentality of countermeasures, ignoring the modalities of the rational actors’ 
behaviour in anarchical international relations. It is hereby submitted that, by effectuating the 
aim of reparations, countermeasures induce compliance with the cessation and non-repetition 
thus ensuring present and future compliance with the primary obligations under the 
international law. In other words, by way of inflation of the costs of the wrongdoing State 
through countermeasures, the injured party itself fulfils the aim of reparations, which induce 
present and future compliance with the primary obligations, which is what the secondary 
obligations of cessation and non-repetition attempt to achieve. 
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Game theory prescribes reciprocal reactions because it is presumed that the countermeasure 
depriving the initially wrongdoing State of the equal legal right should indeed result in an equal 
deprivation of relative power and therefore effectively render the non-compliance irrational. It 
is presumed that qualitatively reciprocal countermeasures will result in quantitative reciprocity 
of the countermeasures, indeed wiping out all the relative power benefits initially claimed by 
the wrongdoing State during the unlawful cyber operation for which it is internationally 
responsible for. 
If game theory prescribes reciprocity of countermeasures in the name of effectiveness, 
international law favours reciprocity in its effort to limit potential abuse of the legal instrument 
and prevent punitive or non-instrumental reactions by the injured State. The international legal 
doctrine indicates that the reciprocity of countermeasures – ones which ‘correspond to, or are 
directly connected with, the obligation breached’106 – is their preferred107 characteristic. It is 
assumed that a reactive denial of the same international rights as violated by the initial 
wrongdoing will also bring about a relative power deprivation equal to the relative power gains 
of the wrongdoer. And nothing more.  
Yet absolute reciprocity may hinder the effectiveness of countermeasures, a fact recognised 
also by the international customary law. Since it is not always possible or even permissible, 
strict reciprocity is not a necessity under the law of State responsibility; ‘[t]here is no 
requirement that States taking countermeasures should be limited to suspension of 
performance of the same or a closely related obligation’.108 The State injured by RedOctober, 
for example, is not permitted to respond by way of reciprocal countermeasures and withhold 
the performance of its obligations part of the international diplomatic law related to the 
inviolability of foreign official agents, premises, archives and documents, which are considered 
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to be a self-contained regime and therefore not to be targeted by countermeasures.109 
Additionally, the game theory experimentation is of binary nature and hardly reflects every 
effective option of law enforcement. In the real world, absolute reciprocity of countermeasures 
may hinder their effective instrumentality if they do not result in a deprivation of power that has 
any significance to the wrongdoing State. And, frankly, the situation in which the reciprocal 
countermeasures inflicting power deprivations equal to the deprivations sustained during the 
unlawful cyber operation has more to do with fiction than reality; a violation of sovereignty in 
return for a violation of sovereignty, for example, may result in as small as a stolen PDF file or 
as large as a severe economic loss.110 
Because of these shortcomings, international law permits a degree of flexibility and does not 
dictate absolute reciprocity of reactions or countermeasures but their proportionality. The 
requirement of proportionality has been stipulated in the several international adjudications111 
and was finally codified in the ARSIWA article 51. From a legal standpoint, limitation of 
proportionality is installed in order to prevent countermeasures from assuming the role of 
punishment and to avoid escalation of the conflict. The ‘principle of proportionality and the 
other limitations placed on the injured State's faculte of [countermeasures] should be adequate 
to prohibit any qualitative or quantitative overreaction on the part of the injured State’,112 which 
would designate the punitive aim of the State employing them. In contrast to reciprocity, the 
principle of proportionality does not dictate strict equality between the countermeasures and 
the wrongful act which furnished the lawful motive for employing them but indicates harmony 
between them.113 
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Since ‘there is no uniformity […] in the practice or the doctrine as to the formulation of the 
principle’114 at hand, proportionality of countermeasures is said to be ‘an inexact science.’115 
Certainly, a universal definition or legal standard of proportionality cannot be precisely 
determined in a theoretical setting and should depend on the particular circumstances of the 
conflict. Be that as it may, a common denominator of proportionality conceptualised by 
international jurisprudence and the scholarly contributions is a delicate balance between the 
effectiveness of countermeasures and prevention of abuse of this self-help mechanism. 
Franck, on one hand, argues that proportionality governs the relationship between the 
countermeasures and the initial wrongful act.116 This approach, the primary concern of which 
is that countermeasures are not excessive117 or punitive in their nature, is supported by the 
codification of the law of State responsibility by the ILC118 and the international jurisprudence. 
Accordingly, considerations related to the proportionality must go beyond the quantitative 
assessment of their consequences on the State power or the consequences of the initial 
wrongdoing; besides the material aspects of the material injuries suffered, the State wishing 
to employ proportional countermeasures should take into account the scope of the legal injury 
or the contextual importance of the obligation breached.119 In this sense, countermeasures 
and the initial violation ought to exhibit not only qualitative but also qualitative proportionality. 
This has been clearly expressed by the Air Services arbitration120 and by the ICJ in the 
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Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case,121 where Czechoslovakia’s countermeasure, breaching 
a well-established legal principle protecting every State’s ‘right to an equitable and reasonable 
share of the natural resources’,122 was considered to be disproportionate when put against the 
initial Hungarian violation of the bilateral treaty regulating the joint construction project on the 
Danube river. 
In deliberating the qualitative and quantitative aspects of proportionality in countermeasures, 
the former takes precedence. Accordingly, quantitative disproportionality between the 
consequences inflicted by the initial wrongful act and the consequences of countermeasures 
does not necessarily result in disproportionate, thus unlawful, countermeasures. As stipulated 
in the Air Services arbitration award and reiterated in the ARSIWA commentary, 
countermeasures are proportional ‘even if they were rather more severe in terms of their 
economic effect’123 than the initial violation. What is more important is the approximate ‘legal 
equivalence between the breach and response’124 or, in other words, that the importance of 
the rights targeted by countermeasures is proportional to the importance of the rights protected 
by the initially violated obligation.  
This is not to say that quantitative proportionality should be neglected; in the interest of 
effectiveness, consequences of countermeasures must be in fact proportional with the 
consequences of the initial wrongdoing, ‘taking into account [not only the rights in question but 
also] the gravity of the internationally wrongful act’.125 Since the real benefit of non-compliance 
is an inexpensive and fast inflation of State power, the injured State must make sure to fully 
effectuate the aim of the obligation of reparation, therefore depriving the wrongdoing State of 
the relative power gains consequential to the breach of international law by way of a cyber 
 
121 ‘[T]he effects of a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking account of the rights 
in question.’ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hunngary/Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep para 85 
122 ibid 
123 ILC (n 25) art 51 cmt 3  
124 Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures’ (2001) 12(5) EJIL 
889, 900 
125 ARSIWA (n 8) art 51 
111 
operation. It can only do so by way of countermeasures in quantitative proportion with the 
relative loss of power incurred during the cyber operation. 
Therefore, lawful and effective countermeasures will be qualitatively and quantitatively 
proportional with the initial breach of the obligations by way of a cyber operation; it will deprive 
the responsible State of its legal right in proportion to the legal injury the targeted State 
sustained as well as of its relative power in proportion to the reduction of power caused by the 
initial breach. Only then will a countermeasure constitute an undesired cost of the rational 
State commensurate with the benefits of the breach, non-compliance with the law will lose the 
appeal and become irrational. 
When the consequences of countermeasures are proportional with the consequences of the 
initial breach, they are also proportional with their purpose. As a matter of fact, a group of 
prominent scholars advanced the idea that proportionality does not denote the relationship 
between the violation and countermeasures but between the purpose of countermeasures and 
the countermeasures themselves. Zoller,126 Elagab,127 Riphagen,128 Cannizzaro,129 
Dawidowicz130 and Cassese are some of the authors emphasising the supreme importance of 
the effective instrumentality of countermeasures. Cassese, for example, argued that ‘the 
proportionality must be appraised by establishing whether the countermeasure is such to 
obtain [the] purpose’131 of compelling the wrongdoer to comply with its international 
obligations. In contrast to the position of the ILC,132 the fact that the purpose of 
countermeasures, i.e. inducement of the restoration of legal and material relationship, is a 
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130 Martin Dawidowicz, Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law (CUP 2017) 362–365 
131 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 306 
132 ILC (n 94) para 56 
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factor in determining the proportionality of the instrument is supported by several ILC 
members, opinio juris of States as well as State practice.133 
Even though the difference between the theoretical approaches seems to be apparent, from 
a standpoint of a rational choice theory, the two are not all that dissimilar. Countermeasures 
that exhibit quantitative proportionality between the initial wrongdoing and the reactive 
deprivation of rights and power resources, revert the newly-established change of power ratio, 
rendering the non-compliance irrational and thus living up to their purpose of instrumentality. 
In other words, countermeasures that are quantitatively proportional with the initial wrongdoing 
are also effectively instrumental and therefore proportional with their purpose – to induce 
compliance. 
Although some have argued that smaller States will find it nearly impossible to inflict 
sufficiently proportional deprivation of power resources to effectively coerce the hegemons to 
comply,134 cyber means and the flexible nature of the principle of proportionality alleviate this 
concern. Due to the fact that cyber operations are a distinctively asymmetrical threat, they do 
allow even weak States to employ quantitatively proportional countermeasures and therefore 
inflict a proportional deprivation of power and secure compliance of the hegemon. These 
normative limitations on the scope of countermeasures do not need to be a disadvantage of 
the injured State but an opportunity to reactively withhold the performance of the obligation of 
its own choosing, one that not only corresponds to its (cyber) capabilities and resources but 
also holds superior potential to induce compliance of the wrongdoer. Additional flexibility and 
an opportunity to employ efficient countermeasures against the responsible State regardless 
of its might is a notable absence of a prescription dictating a particular form of 
countermeasures. This means that an inter-State cyber operation does not need to be 
countered by cyber means. Such interpretation of the law in the cyber domain finds support in 
 
133 Dawidowicz (n 130) 362–363 
134 Eliza Fitzgerald, Helping States Help Themselves: Rethinking the Doctrine of Countermeasures’ (2016) 16 
Macquarie L J 67, 81 
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the British opinio juris.135 For instance, if the consequences of the initial cyber wrongdoing are 
a decrease of economic power, the injured State may consider appropriation of assets from 
the responsible State. In such cases, however, quantitative considerations in establishing 
proportionality become important and an injured State must make sure the consequences of 
countermeasures approximates136 proportionality with the consequence of the initial violation 
and therefore alter the rational choice calculation of the non-compliance. 
The momentary restoration of peace and relative power relationships is however not enough, 
especially if the breach has already concluded. Fortunately, countermeasures have the 
capacity to not only induce compliance but also deter violations of primary obligations 
therefore assuring peace provided by the rule of law also in the future. As such, 
countermeasures, by way of restoration of power relationship, do not only induce present 
compliance with the primary obligations of international law but also ensure non-repetition; 
regular employment of countermeasures and the subsequent cost inflation of the non-
compliance should provide more assurance of the future behaviour of the rational States in 
comparison with their promises and guarantees consequential to the compliance with the 
secondary obligation of non-repetition. Until one day countermeasures become a ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecy’137 and are no longer needed. 
As explained in the second chapter, it is not only the extent of costs but also the likelihood of 
incurring costs which determine whether the rational State will comply with its international 
obligations or not. Thus, a functional mechanism of countermeasures can have a deterrent 
effect on States wishing to pursue illegitimate power; ‘a desire to avoid [the] costs is what 
provides the incentive to comply with the international law’.138 Because the rational actors 
 
135 ‘[T]he UK could respond to a cyber intrusion through non-cyber means, and vice versa.’ Jeremy Wright, 
‘Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century’ (23 May 2018) <gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-
international-law-in-the-21st-century> accessed 12 August 2019 
136 ‘[J]udging the "proportionality" of countermeasures is not an easy task and can at best be accomplished by 
approximation.’ Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France (n 
99) para 83 
137 Michael W Reisman, ‘The Enforcement of International Judgments’ (1969) 63(1) AJIL 1, 7 
138 Andrew T Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (OUP 2010) 55 
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deciding whether to comply or not consider the potential of the costs to incur based on, inter 
alia, historical experience with the opposite side,139 fear of negative consequences stemming 
from the established enforcement mechanism reinforced by the past behaviour of the target 
State ‘will normally be a factor in the cost benefit-analysis of a State’140 when considering an 
internationally wrongful act or omission. And established mechanism they are. As indicated in 
the previous chapter, States repeatedly claim application of international law in cyber domain 
and there is no real reason why the law of countermeasures would be excluded. In fact, the 
decision of the Council of the EU, for example, argues that ‘clearly signalling’141 the likelihood 
of countermeasures for the internationally wrongful cyber operations ‘influences the behaviour 
of potential aggressors in cyberspace thus reinforcing the security of the EU and its Member 
States’.142  
Due to the emergence of new technology-enabled methods of violations and consequential 
normative uncertainty, however, only employed mechanisms will fully assume the form of a 
deterrent. If employed regularly, countermeasures will aid in ‘creating future expectations of 
effective enforcement in the international community’.143 As already explained, rational States 
opt for non-compliance not only because of low costs but also because the possibility of 
incurring proportional costs is currently very low or not practiced by the injured States. Once 
the countermeasures in reaction to the unlawful inter-State cyber operations will be 
(consistently) employed, once countermeasures will move from theory to practice, their 
deterrence function will materialise. This will impact not only States wishing to repeat the 
unlawful maximisation of utility through cyber operations but also the ones considering taking 
this shortcut for the first time. By addressing the very motive behind the internationally wrongful 
 
139 Downing (n 87) 373 
140 Giegerich (n 78) 
141 Council of the European Union, ‘Draft Council Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic 
Response to Malicious Cyber Activities ("Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox") – Adoption’ (Brussels, 7 June 2017) 
9916/17, 5 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9916-2017-INIT/en/pdf> accessed 17 May 2019 
142 Ibid 
143 Simma & Pulkowski (n 109) 509 
115 
act, countermeasures as a deterrent, have a greater impact on the future rule of law than 
promises and doubtful guarantees of non-repetition. 
6. Conclusion  
Unlawful cyber operations negatively affect the relative power of the injured State and prompt 
the deterioration of the relevant international norms and the decline of peace. The present 
chapter finds a solution to both consequences from the international law of State responsibility, 
which, upon the occurrence of the unlawful breach of international obligations, imposes two 
corresponding secondary obligations, cessation and reparation.  
The former is more or less a restatement of the requirement of present and future performance 
with the primary obligations breached by the unlawful cyber operation, while the latter aims to 
re-establish the power relationship between the parties prior to the conflict. Experience, 
however, indicates that the wrongdoing States are unlikely to admit the wrongdoing, let alone 
comply with the secondary obligations.  
To enforce the obligations, the injured State has several lawful inducement mechanisms at its 
disposal. The chapter established that, only countermeasures are a feasible and appropriate 
compliance-inducing mechanism in the context of this thesis.  
Countermeasures are not a punishment but an instrument to induce compliance with the 
international obligations. Whether they are reciprocal or proportional, the key is that they 
effectuate the objectives of the secondary obligation of reparation, therefore reverting the 
change in power relationship between the States consequential to the unlawful cyber 
operation and therefore altering the calculation of the non-compliance, rendering it irrational. 
Additionally, lawful countermeasures must also exhibit qualitative proportionality and as such 
be in approximate equivalence with the importance of legal rights violated by the initial breach. 
By altering the cost benefit calculus of the wrongdoing States, proportional countermeasures 
remove the incentive of violation and thus enforce compliance with the primary legal 
116 
obligations of the nonperforming State. And, if employed regularly, even assume the role of a 
deterrent and promote the rule of law in the future. 
This chapter centres more on the content and the corollary duties of State responsibility and 
less on the issues of implementation. This issue is addressed extensively in the following 
chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Attribution of cyber operations 
1. Introduction  
With the intention to induce compliance with international law, nations injured by internationally 
wrongful cyber conduct should turn to countermeasures. In the context of the rational theory 
of international relations, this legal self-help mechanism, previous chapters have established, 
is instrumental in reducing the profits of the perpetrating State and, consequentially in 
decreasing the occurrence of unlawful cyber events endangering peace and security. 
In order to employ countermeasures, a cyber operation must be directly or indirectly attributed 
to a particular (group of) State(s). Following successful attribution of the cyber operation in 
question, the injured State has to establish the operation’s unlawful character. There can be 
no exceptions to this dual structure of State responsibility for the internationally wrongful act.1  
The following paragraphs contextualise and expose the limits that the established doctrine of 
the international law of State responsibility imposes on the injured State in the endeavour to 
employ countermeasures in reaction to the unlawful State sponsored cyber conduct. In other 
words, the present text evaluates whether the current legal framework allows for the attribution 
of unlawful inter-State cyber conducts. 
Getting attribution right is important. Sophisticated malicious tools and techniques ‘increase 
the risk of mistaken attribution and unintended escalation’2 and countermeasures based on 
misattribution constitute a breach of international obligations. To avoid escalation, attribution 
must be supported by evidence. To establish what kind of evidence would satisfy the 
 
1 ILC, ‘Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (UN Legislative Series, 2012) 
UN Doc ST/LEG/SER B/25, art 2 cmt 9 
2 UNGA ‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’ (24 June 2013) UN Doc A/68/98, 7 
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requirements of current relevant legal frameworks, the present text evaluates the existing 
interpretations – burden of proof, forms of evidence, reasoning by inferences and standards 
of proof – against the unlawful cyber operations.  
2. Doctrine of attribution 
Attribution3 has attracted extensive legal debate4 and the evolution of legal standards 
pertaining to State responsibility has been anything but painless.5 What is more, the 
introduction of malicious inter-State cyber operations on the everyday agenda of international 
relations puts pressure on the existing doctrine to accommodate this new environment. 
Attribution indicates an ascription of an unlawful act of a natural person to a State.6 The State 
is an abstract concept and a social construct. To the jurist, it is ‘commonly defined as a 
community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political 
authority’.7 As such, a State cannot conduct an unlawful act without the intermediate 
involvement8 of individuals. Attribution is therefore the legal process of establishing whether a 
given conduct ‘of a physical person […] is to be characterised […] as an act of State’;9 legal 
attribution seeks to establish the responsibility in law. 
 
3 The analysis of the evolution of the doctrine reveals early texts spoke of the imputability rather than of 
attribution. See eg ILC, ‘Second report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur—The 
origin of international responsibility’ (1970) II Ybk of the ILC, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add.1, 189: ‘the term 
"imputability" has no other meaning than the general meaning of a term linking the wrongful action or omission 
with its author’. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep paras 51, 53, 54. ‘Attribution’ is the preferred term of the modern 
international law. Crawford argued that, in order ‘to avoid any suggestion that the legal process of connecting 
conduct to the State was a “fiction”’, ‘[t]he term “attribution” should be retained.’ ILC, ‘First report on State 
responsibility, by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur’ UN Doc A/CN.4/490 and Add. 1–7, 33. 
4 Eg Antonio Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in 
Bosnia’ (2007) 18(4) EJIL 649–668 
5 See eg James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 141–161 
6 See Luigi Condorelli & Claus Kress, ‘The Rules of Attribution: General Considerations’ in James Crawford, Alain 
Pellet & Simon Olleson (eds), The law of international responsibility (OUP 2010) 221 
7 Alain Pellet, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of 
Peoples’ (1992) 3(1) EJIL 178, 182 
8 Crawford (n 5) 113 
9 Condorelli & Kress (n 6) 221 
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The following paragraphs offer an insight into the process and challenges of legal attribution 
of cyber operations and attempt to elaborate why this particularly challenging task10 remains 
‘one of the most significant challenges to deterring malicious operations in cyberspace’.11 
2.1. Identification of the actors – reverse engineering of the cyber operation 
Legal literature discussing attribution of cyber operations has largely focused on the theoretical 
association of the perpetrating entity with a State. While this is, due to the aforementioned 
cumulative double structure requirements of the international law of State responsibility, of 
absolute necessity, identification of the (group of) natural person(s) conducting the operation 
is a task of a significant if not higher importance. This is a first step in the attribution process, 
as the individuals are the ones that, by utilising a computerised system, create and/or send 
information packets with the intention to achieve a desired malicious action in a foreign 
computer network system.  
While the establishment of such claims for the purpose of legal attribution in the context of 
State responsibility for the unlawful cyber operation may be achieved through different 
methods of proof,12 State practice on this matter tends to rely mostly on the outcomes of 
technical analysis.13 The attribution methodology in the following paragraphs shall follow suit 
 
10 Different legal scholars acknowledge the issue but do not discuss the matter in great detail. See eg Michael N 
Schmitt & Liis Vihul, ‘Proxy Wars in Cyberspace: The Evolving International Law of Attribution’ (2014) 1(2) 
Fletcher Security Rev 54; Scott Shackelford & Richard Andres, ‘State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: 
Competing Standards for a Growing Problem’ (2014) 42(4) Georgetown J of Intl L 971; Katharine C Hinkle, 
‘Countermeasures in the Cyber Context: One More Thing to Worry About’ Yale (2011) 37 Yale J of Intl L Online 
17 <https://bit.ly/33I55TN> accessed 12 August 2019; Susan W Brenner, ‘“At Light Speed”: Attribution and 
Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare’ (2007) J of Crim L & Criminology 379. See also UNGA (n 2) 6 
11 ‘Multinational Experiment 7 Outcome 3 – Cyber Domain Objective 3.3: Concept Framework’ [MNE7] (Version 
3.0, 3 October 2012) 19 [on file with the author]. The document is a product of Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Republic of Korea, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United States and NATO. 
12 See the discussion on evidentiary issues below. 
13 US Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, used the technical analysis outcomes to establish the 
individuals from Democratic People's Republic of Korea were behind the cyber operation which crippled Sony in 
2014. FBI National Press Office, ‘Update on Sony Investigation’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 19 December 
2014) <https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation> accessed 1 April 2016. 
Furthermore, US used ‘verifiable and attributable data’ of technical nature to attribute the cyber espionage to five 
members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. US Department of Defence, ‘The Department of Defense 
Cyber Strategy’ (April 2015) 12 
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as well as present various attribution models sometimes considered an alternative to computer 
science. 
In order to determine the natural person behind the cyber operation one needs to, first, identify 
the tool or the computer used to produce and launch the malicious operation, which is usually 
established by tracking the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses14 or Autonomous System Number 
(ASN). 
Transfer on the internet is conducted through the transmission of packets of data, each up to 
65 kilobytes in size.15 The properties information of each data packet contains, inter alia, the 
source and destination addresses. These are given as IP addresses where the first three 
numbers indicate the network number, while the following three number segments point to a 
participant at a local network.16 Given that an IP address reveals (an approximate) 
geographical location of the network participant17 as well as the identification of the 
corresponding Internet service provider (ISP), cyber operations are usually traced back to the 
author through this identifier.18 Other methods, such as tracking the ASN, may point to the ISP 
and territory of origin but not the actual computer behind the operation. 
 
14 Harry Henderson, Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology (Infobase Publishing 2009) 468 
15 Information Sciences Institute University of Southern California, ‘DOD Standard: Internet Protocol’ (Prepared 
for US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, January 1980) 21 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc760> 
accessed 1 April 2018 
16 ibid 7 & 14 
17 There are different technical approaches to this. See eg Chuanxiong Guo et al, ‘Mining the Web and the 
Internet for Accurate IP Address Geolocations’ in 2009 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM (Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers April 2009) 2841; Ethan Katz-Bassett et al, ‘Towards IP geolocation using delay and 
topology measurements’ in IMC '06 Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM (ICM October 2006) 71; Brian 
Eriksson et al, ‘A learning-based approach for IP geolocation’ in Arvind Krishnamurthy & Bernhard Plattner (eds), 
Passive and Active Measurement (Springer 2010) 171; Yong Wang et al, ‘Towards Street-Level Client-
Independent IP Geolocation’ in Proceeding NSDI'11 Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Networked 
systems design and implementation (USENIX March 2011). Examples of commercial applications of IP-based 
geolocation data include Google location-specific services 
(https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/1696588) and Microsoft Windows location aware applications 
(http://goo.gl/KWJoKo). 
18 Don Cohen & K Narayanaswamy, ‘Survey/Analysis of Levels I, II, and III Attack Attribution Techniques’ (Cs3, 
April 2004) 6 
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IP address was used, for example, to officially attribute a cyber operation aimed at Sony.19 
Similarly, the United States (US) Department of Justice relied on the IP address when 
attributing various malicious cyber operations to members of the China’s People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) in the indictment of 2014.20 Moreover, private security company Mandiant accused 
PLA members of ‘systematic cyber espionage and data theft’21 based on the fact that 98% of 
the IP addresses that accessed the perpetrator controlled systems were Chinese and used by 
the PLA cyber Unit 61398.22 Attribution claims based on the IP address of the cyber operation 
controlling system are particularly popular among journalists.23 Similar reliance on the IP 
information for the purpose of attribution is present in a number of relevant academic 
writings.24 
Be that as it may, besides the issues of potentially falsified IP information and a number of 
other ways25 in which the source of the unlawful cyber operation can be decoupled from the 
IP address, the IP address of a computer changes, depending on the network participation. In 
the era of mobile computing and widely available public wireless connectivity, identification of 
a source computer based on IP tracing is especially problematic as IP information points at 
 
19 FBI National Press Office (n 13) 
20 US v Wang Dong et al (Indictment, No. 14–118 W.D. Pa., 1 May 2014) <https://goo.gl/RHm0Fh> accessed 1 
April 2016 
21 Mandiant, ‘APT1 – Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units’ (Mandiant, February 2013) 7 
<http://goo.gl/H3IkzR> accessed 1 April 2016 
22 ibid 40 
23 See eg AP, ‘South Korea traces cyber-attacks to Chinese IP address’ Guardian (21 March 2013) 
<http://goo.gl/7FUKia>; Kim Zetter, ‘Everything We Know About Ukraine’s Power Plant Hack’ (Wired, 20 January 
2016) <http://goo.gl/DkScZ2>; Michael Gold, ‘Taiwan a “testing ground” for Chinese cyber army’ (Reuters, 18 
July 2013) <http://goo.gl/tJ7Psp>; Nicole Perlroth, ‘Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months’ New 
York Times (30 January 2013 <http://goo.gl/OMxZ4u>; ‘Estonia says cyber-assault may involve the Kremlin’ New 
York Times (Tallinn, 17 May 2007) <http://goo.gl/tSSlxx>; ‘China IP address link to South Korea cyber-attack’ 
BBC (21 March 2013) <http://goo.gl/aL0NP7> all accessed 1 April 2016 
24 See eg Earl Boebert, ‘A Survey of Challenges in Attribution’ in National Research Council, Proceedings of a 
Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy (The National 
Academies Press 2010) 44–45; Marco Roscini, ‘Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State 
Responsibility for Cyber Operations’ in Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern & Claire Finkelstein (eds), Cyber War 
(OUP 2015) 235–237; Michael Schmitt, ‘“Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures 
Response Option and International Law’ (2014) 54(3) Virginia J of Intl L 698, 708 
25 For an overview of such techniques see eg Jeffrey Hunker, Robert Hutchinson & Jonathan Margulies, 
‘Attribution of Cyber Attacks on Process Control Systems’ in Papa M & Shenoi S (eds), Critical Infrastructure 
Protection II. ICCIP 2008 (vol 290, Springer 2008) 15 
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the geographical location of the network infrastructure used in the operation and not 
necessarily the computer utilised. Finding a specific computer used in a cyber operation is 
also problematic in denial of service (DoS) attacks, employed for example in 2007 to bring 
down the governmental systems of Estonia,26 even though spoofing is usually not practiced in 
this type of cyber operations.27 In a DoS attack, the so-called zombie machine28 controlled by 
the perpetrator floods the target system with excessive data traffic and, by doing that, renders 
the target machine useless.29 Advanced operations of such nature utilise a large collection of 
compromised computers or zombie machines, commonly known as botnet,30 working in 
concert to overburden the targeted system. Quantity of participating machines in what is 
known as distributed DoS (DDoS) makes establishing the true origin of operation particularly 
difficult. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the efforts to identify the computers used 
to conduct the Shamoon, RedOctober operations as well as the distributed DDoS launched 
on Estonia in 2007 provided no substantial outcomes.  
In spite of the fact that Shamoon was an overt31 cyber operation and, as such, rather unique, 
the authors of the operation left behind only an IP address of the proxy to the Command and 
Control server (CCS) and a computer network of 30,000 unbootable, unusable systems.32 A 
malware module, reporting back to the CCS every five minutes33 was connected to the 
 
26 See eg Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis & Anna-Maria Talihärm, ‘Estonia after the 2007 cyber attacks: Legal, 
strategic and organisational changes in cyber security’ in Matthew Warren (ed), Case Studies in Information 
Warfare and Security for Researchers, Teachers and Students (Academic Conferences 2013) 73 
27 Jelena Mirkovic & Ezra Kissel, ‘Comparative Evaluation of Spoofing Defenses’ (2009) 8(2) IEEE Transactions 
on Dependable and Secure Computing 218, 218 
28 Susan Brenner, Cyber Threats – The Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State (2009 OUP) 1 
29 Erik Rodriguez, ‘HOWTO - Spoofed DoS Attacks’ (Skullbox, 21 March 2011) <http://goo.gl/kwbq4K> accessed 
1 April 2016 
30 ‘Botnet’ (Radware) <http://goo.gl/hcGg3Z> accessed 1 April 2016 
31 Instead of hiding the malicious code and its operation, the malware deleted portion of the computer disks, 
including all the information that would lead to the authors. 
32 Paul Roberts, ‘Whodunnit? Conflicting accounts on ARAMCO hack underscore difficulty of attribution’ (Sophos, 
30 October 2012) <https://goo.gl/R8opxE> accessed 1 April 2016 
33 McAfee, ‘W32/DistTrack, W64/DistTrack’ (17 August 2012) 5 <https://goo.gl/mAZRTR> accessed 12 April 
2016 
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machine internal34 to the injured enterprise. Researchers believe the malware was introduced 
to the system via a removable media35 while the alleged perpetrators claimed the operation 
was conducted remotely.36 The aforementioned internal computer was therefore only a proxy 
and the address or location of the perpetrators’ computer remains unknown. 
More IP related information is known in relation to the RedOctober operation. Researchers 
were able to establish partial information related to the progression of the cyber operation 
while, as the following lines are being drafted, the identity of the perpetrators behind 
RedOctober still remain unknown. What is known however is that the perpetrators were likely 
to be Russian speaking individuals and that the malicious CCS domains were registered by 
email addresses of Russian origin. The IP addresses of some CSSs indicate that these 
machines were located in Germany and Russia37 but only assumed the role of proxy CCSs; 
the location of the computer perpetrators actually operated from cannot be identified.  
Similarly, the investigation into the exact computer source of the DDoS attack on Estonia 
proves to be a dead end. While the Tallinn government refrained from openly accusing the 
Russian authorities, its ‘foreign ministry has published a list of IP addresses where the attacks 
were made from’38 many of them pointing at cyber infrastructure located on Russian territory. 
Subsequent technical analysis indicates that the attacks came from no less than 20,000 
computers spread across 178 different countries.39 Considering the nature of the DDoS attack, 
IP addresses flooding the Estonian systems are of no definitive value when attempting to 
 
34 Dmitry Tarakanov, ‘Shamoon The Wiper: Further Details (Part II)’ (Kaspersky Lab, 11 September 2012) 
<https://goo.gl/7wPP44> accessed 1 April 2016 
35 US Department of Homeland Security, ‘ICS-CERT Monthly Monitor’ (September 2012) 
<https://goo.gl/ZzuDNZ> accessed 1 April 2016 
36 ‘Untitled’ (Pastebin, 17 August 2012) <http://pastebin.com/tztnRLQG> accessed 1 April 2016 
37 Global Research & Analysis Team, ‘“Red October” Diplomatic Cyber Attacks Investigation’ (Kaspersky Lab, 14 
January 2013) <securelist.com/red-october-diplomatic-cyber-attacks-investigation/36740/> accessed 19 April 
2018 
38 ‘The cyber raiders hitting Estonia’ BBC (17 May 2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6665195.stm> 
accessed 1 April 2016 
39 Roland Heickerö, ‘Emerging Cyberthreats and Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information 
Operations’ (Swedish Defence Research Agency, 30 March 2010) 41 <http://goo.gl/bG6ljJ> accessed 1 April 
2016 
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discover the exact source the aforementioned attack. While the initial IP address analysis 
designated that one of the attacks originated from Russian governmental network structures, 
the seemingly incriminating IP address ‘could have just as easily been a spoofed address or 
[the machine was] compromised’.40 
Even if the computer used to perpetrate an internationally wrongful cyber operation is 
successfully identified, according to the aforementioned prescribed legal process, attribution 
requires the identification of the natural person behind the keyboard. This is one of the most 
significant hurdles in establishing attribution to invoke State responsibility. 
Since actions conducted through a computer do not include an identifier of a natural persons’ 
authorship,41 the link between a computer and the author of a cyber operation is formed 
through computer forensics which seeks to establish ‘who was using the device at the time 
and whether they were in control of the device and responsible for actions taken on it’42. 
Relevant techniques include analysis of email natural language, keystroke timing analysis of 
the malware code and others.43 Objects of a forensic analysis may be retrieved locally or 
remotely.  
This stage in the attribution process is particularly problematic in the context of 
countermeasures; it is hard to imagine that the injured State would have the means to conduct 
a comprehensive forensic analysis on a computer network system located in the suspected 
wrongdoing State. Granted this may be performed remotely44 but only with a limited degree of 
effectiveness.45 
 
40 Gadi Evron, ‘Bating Bonets and Online Mobs’ (2008) Winter/Spring, Georgetown J of Intl Affairs 121, 125 
41 Cyber actions are, therefore, again a unicum. Unlike, for example, US Supreme court judgment (Federal 
Republic of Germany et al vs. United States et al, 526 U.S. 111), which, according to the ICJ (LaGrand (Germany 
v United States of America) (Merits) [2001] ICJ rep paras 472–473) triggered a violation of international 
obligations, malware, as a tool of unlawful conduct, is not (explicitly) signed by the author. 
42 Andy Jones, T Martin, ‘Digital forensics and the issues of identity’ (2010) 15(2) Information Security Technical 
Report 67, 69 
43 Cohen & Narayanaswamy (n 18) 73 
44 See eg Jacob Pennock, Damon Smith & Geoffrey Wilson, ‘Design and Implementation of a Remote Forensics 
System’ (Mcafee Foundstone, 2 May 2005) <http://goo.gl/4eB7Bo> accessed 1 April 2016 
45 ibid 
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Attribution methodology does not need to be limited to technical analysis; there are a number 
of alternatives to attribution by means of computer science and related forensics. Tsagourias, 
for example, argues that attribution is a multifaceted process, which includes legal, technical 
and political aspects. According to the aforementioned scholar, these aspects combine 
technical investigation with intelligence and political assessments to form an attribution model 
fit for the cyber realm.46 The attribution methodology includes the assessments of the political 
climate of the political entity suspected of the cyber operation orchestration and determines 
‘who benefited from the attack’.47 Similar recognition of the political aspects of the attribution 
can be found in the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.48 
Beyond legal scholarship, the science of cyber security indeed offers a number of 
sophisticated threat agent modelling theories which, among many of the attack(er) 
parameters, also consider the political gains of the cyber operation orchestrator. For example, 
political attribution has been proposed by the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis. The 
approach focuses on the existing relationship between the perpetrator and the victim State 
and the motive of the perpetrator. The attribution is driven by the analysis of the social-political 
needs and aspirations of the perpetrator and the corresponding intentions of the malicious 
cyber operation in a wider political context.49 
Furthermore, in seeking to attribute a cyber operation to a particular actor, Rid and Buchanan 
proposed the Q attribution model consisting of the technical, strategic and operational 
elements of the cyber operation. The political aspect of the attribution is apparent in the latter 
two elements, which include an evaluation of inter alia geopolitical context, examining ‘specific 
regional, historical, and political knowledge about specific actors and their organisation’.50  
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However, these attribution attempts reach beyond the boundaries of political, technical and 
legal aspects. The aforementioned Q and Diamond models, in their pursuit of the attribution 
of cyber operations, take into account parameters such as targeting, infrastructure used in the 
operation, attributes of the malicious code and intrusion process, scope and stages of the 
operation as well as capability of the adversary. 51 Similarly, Vidalis and Jones developed an 
attribution model where the identification of the perpetrators follows the assessment of the 
nation State capability, opportunities and motivation.52 Yet another example is the Threat 
Agent Library, a taxonomy of eight attributes which led the scholars to categorise 22 unique, 
theoretical perpetrators.53 The classification of the agents was conducted after determining 
the intent and the access of the attacker, the outcome of the cyber operation (for example, 
theft, damage etc.), legal and ethical limits observed by the agent, human resources of the 
orchestrator, skill level, objective and visibility of the operation.54 
States also seem to have recognised the attribution methodology not limited to technical 
analysis and computer science. The UN Group of Governmental Experts argued ‘the 
perpetrators of [cyber] activities can only be inferred from the target, the effect or other 
circumstantial evidence’.55  
Further analysis of the models, however, is of no significance. What is important are the 
outcomes or results the models offer. A combination of the aforementioned strategies may 
indeed lead to the specific State or natural person. And since inter-State cyber operations do 
not happen in a vacuum, political contextualisation is indeed a tempting attribution 
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methodology. For instance, the 2007 DDoS operation was conducted in the wake of a political 
dispute between Estonia and the Russian minority, cyber operations targeting Georgia 
occurred during time of armed conflict with Russia, the attack on the Natanz uranium enriching 
facility accompanied the lasting conflict between the US, Israel et al and Iran concerning the 
latter’s nuclear weapons ambitions. The political context in which the BlackEnergy malware 
erased a number of computer storage facilities pertaining to the Ukrainian electrical power 
industry56 also provoked speculations that the operation had been consequential to the conflict 
between Ukraine and Russia and was thus attributed to the latter. 
The limitations of the alternatives to technical attribution should however be noted. In fact, the 
inconclusive nature of the results has been recognised by the model authors themselves, 
leading many to claim attribution is more of an art than a science.57 In particular, Intel’s 
approach to attribution utilising the cross-referencing of the operations’ attributes and the 
classified threat agents is limited to ‘[aiding] risk managers [to] identify which agents are 
relevant’ and is not intended to identify individuals or to be used for investigating actual 
security events.58 Rid and Buchanan, on the other hand, speak of high- and low-quality59 
attribution, but do not place their trust in their Q model to identify the perpetrators. And socio-
political method results have been specifically criticised by the authors of Diamond model.60 
In fact, the shortcomings of the various attribution models have also been recognised by the 
Swiss national cyber security strategy, emphasising that the unambiguous legal attribution 
and conclusion on the motives of the perpetrators ‘based on [various attribution] methods and 
tools, […] is often impossible’.61 Socio-political methods of attribution can therefore point at 
the State that is in fact responsible for the unlawful cyber operation, at the State that in fact 
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conducted or sponsored cyber operation and by doing so reaped the benefits in terms of 
relative power inflation. What socio-political approaches to attribution cannot reliably establish 
is the natural person behind the cyber operation. 
Aside from the fact that results of non-technical attribution are of questionable quality, they 
can also be a product of subjective assessment and thus inappropriate in establishing legal 
responsibility. Since the international environment is populated by different cultures, values 
and factual perceptions, the socio-political approach to attribution is not a bias-free one. 
Consequently, countermeasures based on one’s strategic assessments ‘will often look like 
serious or hysterical misjudgement to some actors and like either cynical or self-deluded, 
naked aggression to others’.62 Relying on the objective and neutral, science-based legal 
attribution has the potential to assure the otherwise self-interested and inherently biased 
injured States avoid misattribution and therefore unlawful countermeasures.63 
Regardless of the methods employed, the decision whether to trust the outcomes of the legal 
attribution and to take countermeasures is ultimately on the injured State. Although socio-
political attribution may indeed be useful and in fact frequently serves as a basis for taking 
measures of retorsion – unfriendly acts against the what is believed to be a responsible State 
– it is not an appropriate attribution method preceding the employment of countermeasures 
as it bears a serious potential to perpetuate and escalate the conflict. Since false attribution 
will result in unlawful countermeasures, it is of paramount importance that the injured State 
stays within the limits of the law. This means that the conclusions of any kind of attribution 
need to be evaluated against the legal framework of the attribution, including the law of proof 
to which I return shortly. 
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2.2. Establishing the nexus between the perpetrating actor with a State 
Putting the aforementioned struggles of identifying the author of the unlawful cyber operation 
aside, the unlawful act of the (group of) individual(s) needs to be associated with a State before 
proceeding with countermeasures. As a ‘general rule, the conduct of private persons is not 
attributable to the State’64 and, as international jurisprudence indicates, ‘a certain factual link 
between the State and the actor is required in order to attribute to the State acts of that actor’.65 
Generally speaking, an unlawful cyber operation is attributable to a State if performed by an 
organ of the State, by actors exercising elements of governmental authority or organs placed 
at the disposal of a State by another State. This includes ultra vires acts. Additionally, a breach 
of international obligations performed by a movement, later becoming new government, and 
a conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own also gives rise to State 
responsibility.66 
In a world where ‘the tendency for those in power to achieve their ends through private or non-
State actors, thereby avoiding attribution’67 is prominent, the establishment of the association 
of the perpetrating action with the State is especially important. In the light of this, special 
attention is paid to the attribution of unlawful conduct directed or controlled by a State.68 
As established by international customary69 law, the codification of the international law of 
State responsibility provides that ‘[t]he conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act 
of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, 
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judicial or any other functions’.70 Such status shall be ascribed to a particular actor in 
accordance with the internal law pertaining to the State in question.71 On this premise, the ICJ 
ruled that neither Republika Srpska nor its army, the perpetrators of the massacres in 
Srebrenica, ‘were de jure organs of the [Former Republic of Yugoslavia], since none of them 
had the status of organ of that State under its internal law’.72  
In that particular case, the contentious nature of the internal law and State organ definitions 
arose. The Court came to the abovementioned conclusion in spite of the fact that the 
Constitution of the Republika Srpska declared itself to be a part of Yugoslavia (later Serbia 
and Montenegro) and pronounced its citizens as nationals of Yugoslavia. The court argued 
perpetrators cannot be considered as organs of Yugoslavia in spite of the fact that the officers 
responsible for the atrocities were administered, paid and under the full control of the 
authorities of Yugoslavia.73 All things considered, the conclusions the court arrived to were, 
according to Judge Mahiou, surprising and questionable.74 
Several lessons can be learned from this. First and foremost, judicial standards indicate that 
internal legal provisions ought to be explicit in their recognition of the specific actor as the 
State organ. Additionally, control of the perpetrators by a particular State does not mean the 
actors in question are to be considered de jure organs of that State. Moreover, while the 
internal law includes ‘laws and regulations adopted within the framework of the State, by 
whatever authority and at whatever level’,75 these legal provisions should be internal to the 
State the injured party is seeking to attribute an act to. In the abovementioned case Republika 
Srpska considered itself to be a part of Yugoslavia, although a reciprocal declaration was 
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absent from the law internal to the latter. For this very reason, the army of the Republika 
Srpska cannot be ascribed the status of an organ of Yugoslavia. 
Taking into account the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(ARSIWA) guidance on the subject matter, the Genocide decision of the ICJ may not be 
surprising after all. The ILC’s codification commentary provides that the organs of a State are 
‘all the individual or collective entities […] of any territorial governmental entity within the State 
on the same basis as the central governmental organs of that State’.76 Given the fact that 
Republika Srpska was part of Bosnia and Herzegovina77 at the time of the Srebrenica 
massacres, its army could not have been an organ of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
In the cyber context, internationally wrongful injurious acts performed by, for instance, the 
(members of the) US Army Cyber Command, a de jure organ established by the US Secretary 
of Defence Memorandum,78 would give rise to the State responsibility of the US. Such agency 
could not however be established for the Cutting Sword of Justice, a group claiming 
responsibility79 for the Shamoon operation. In spite of the absence of technical evidence,80 
submissions that Iranian authorities are to blame for the Shamoon operation have been 
proposed by scholars,81 the abovementioned group does not enjoy the membership of the 
State apparatus and is not recognised by the legislation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 
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group is nothing more but a self-proclaimed ‘anti-oppression hacker group’.82 As a matter of 
fact, Iran has explicitly denied83 involvement in the cyber operation.  
Similar absence of official inclusion in the State apparatus of the perpetrating entity can be 
assigned to the Russian government-sponsored non-governmental organisation84 Nashi, 
suspected to have orchestrated the 2007 DDoS attacks on Estonia.85 In spite of the fact that 
the organisation was conceived ‘by Kremlin political technologists, patronised by leading 
figures in the presidential administration, and personally endorsed by President Putin’,86 Nashi 
cannot be labelled a de jure instrument of the State. Firstly, in the words of the Iran–US Claims 
Tribunal, the fact that ‘the formation of the [perpetrating entity] was initiated by the State does 
not in itself imply that the [entities] were to function as a part of State machinery’.87 Secondly, 
Nashi does not enjoy the same status and does not exhibit any degree of State authority as 
did the Foundation of the Oppressed in 1984 Iran.88  
On the other hand, if it were true – in spite of the fact that the technical analysis does not 
provide for such evidence89 – that the operation was conducted by the State Duma Deputy 
assistant Konstantin Goloskokov,90 the responsibility of the Russian Federation may be 
established. This however remains subject to certain conditions. Before pointing 
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countermeasures at Russia, Estonia would have to be able to present the evidence that 
Goloskokov, being an assistant91 to the Duma deputy, was actually acting in the capacity of 
the Lower House of Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, regardless of the fact if he 
was acting ultra vires or not.92 Detailed analysis of the Russian internal law, proving that the 
Duma deputy assistant is indeed a State organ, would be essential. If the Russian Federation 
desired to avoid responsibility for the unlawful DDoS, it would have to prove that Goloskokov 
not only acted ultra vires but also that the State had no means to control his actions.93 In 
reality, Goloskokov’s claims of responsibility seem closer to provocative self-promotion rather 
than the truth. 
Even when the perpetrator of the unlawful act cannot be equated with an organ of a particular 
State machinery, State responsibility may arise. This is well-established by the international 
customary law94 as well as the relevant codification. Specifically, in 1996 the ILC recognised 
the State responsibility in the deeds of the perpetrating organs ‘acting in fact on behalf of the 
State’.95  
When internal law provides no indication of the nexus between the perpetrating entity and the 
allegedly responsible State, but the former is in complete dependence of the latter, attribution 
may still be established, and State responsibility claimed.  
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As pronounced by the ICJ in its 2007 judgment in the Genocide case, unlawful acts conducted 
by actors ‘which are not formally recognised as official organs under internal law but which 
must nevertheless be equated with State organs because they are in a relationship of 
complete dependence on the State’96 is sufficient to establish attribution to the State. In this 
particular judgement, the ICJ relied on the prior judgement of the same Court in the case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.97 In the context of this 
thesis and in accordance with the public information, neither the Cutting Sword of Justice nor 
Nashi exhibit complete dependence on the Iranian or Russian State. Acts of these non-State 
actors therefore cannot be attributed to either of the States.  
In addition to the scenario where the perpetrating actor is de jure State organ or in complete 
dependence of the State, an unlawful act can be attributed to a particular State if it can be 
established that the perpetrating actor acted under the directions or control of that very State. 
This customary legal rule on attribution was codified in the final text of the ARSIWA; the article 
8, believed to be ‘particularly relevant in the cyber context’,98 asserts: 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.99 
The State responsibility may be invoked, it follows, when conditions of instruction, direction or 
control are fulfilled; the direction and control need to be integral to the unlawful act and not 
only ‘incidentally or peripherally associated’.100 
Judicial decision concerning State responsibility consequential to the State’s instructions can 
be dated back to 1925. In the Zafiro case the court attributed an act of a civilian to the US on 
the basis of the fact that the ship captain was ‘not to interfere particularly with the details of 
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the ship's routine, but to receive the Admiral's orders for the ship and see them carried out’.101 
Instructions imply orders in other decisions as well. Militants in Iran, for example, would be 
considered to be acting on behalf of the State of Iran should they have been ‘charged by some 
competent organ of the Iranian State to carry out a specific operation’.102 To raid the US 
embassy in Tehran and consulates in Shiraz and Tabriz that is. It follows that the instructions 
are given in relation to the specific act. The reasoning was explicitly confirmed by the ICJ in 
2007; the State responsibility arises on the occasion when an organ of the State giving ‘the 
instructions or [providing] the direction pursuant to which the perpetrators of the wrongful act 
acted’.103 In the same vain Judge Ago spoke of the actors being ‘specifically charged by the 
[State] authorities to commit a particular act’.104 Instructions therefore ‘establish an ad hoc 
relationship’105 between the perpetrating party and the State.  
Similar to an instruction, a direction involves a direct and specific order to perform a certain 
conduct.106 Direction ‘does not encompass mere incitement or suggestion but rather connotes 
actual direction of an operative kind’107 yet it does not, like in some other languages than 
English, assume complete power over the actor.108 According to Crawford it ‘implies a 
continuing period of instructions, or a relationship between the State and a non-State entity’.109 
Although slight differences therefore exist, Courts have repeatedly chosen to impose direction 
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and control as a single standard of attribution,110 and similar approach has been taken by 
various academics.111 
There is no reason for a deviation in reasoning in the cyber context; State responsibility would 
arise if the perpetrating entity conducted the specific act on the basis of instruction or direction 
from that particular State. Instructions or directions in the cyber realm are likely to take the 
form of provisions of contract of hire or the subsequent instruction of the commanding State 
party designated in such contract.112 No public information substantiating the existence of any 
specific ad-hoc instructions or prolonged directions to Nashi or the Cutting Sword of Justice 
provided by Russia or Iran substantiates that. Note that encouragement of the unlawful cyber 
behaviour by Russia113 in the case of 2007 DDoS, does not constitute instructions.114 
In addition to the aforementioned situations, the responsibility of a State may arise when the 
author of the injurious act is subject to the effective or overall control of that State. Considering 
past prominent judicial decision on the subject matter, the first standard that arose was of the 
effective variety. In the Nicaragua case, the so called contras were not a de facto organ of the 
accused US since they did possess a certain degree of independence and were not under the 
effective control of the US.115 For such actions to be attributed to the State though the test of 
effective control, the State should have ‘directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts 
contrary to [international] law’.116 In other words, ‘specific instructions concerning the 
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performance of each action were required in order to attribute the action to the instructing 
state’.117  
The second standard evident in the international jurisprudence is the so-called overall control 
standard of attribution. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), a non-State actor may be regarded a de facto State organ and its unlawful 
conduct can be attributed to that State not only when the State is found to have equipped and 
financed the perpetrator but also when it coordinated or helped in the general planning of the 
activity118 or ‘[provided] operational support to that group’.119 
The ICTY argued that the overall control standard is more appropriate in the context of the 
acts of ‘armed forces or militias or paramilitary units’120 and international humanitarian law as 
opposed to the general rules on State responsibility. Also an inspiration for the Tallinn Manual, 
the degree of organisation seems to be the main distinction criterion between the two control 
standards in the Tadić case. The effective control standard may be used in the deliberation of 
the attribution of the acts performed by the ‘unorganised group of individuals’,121 while the 
overall control standard is to be used in situations where ‘individuals [make] up an organised 
and hierarchically structured group, such as a military unit or, […] armed bands of irregulars 
or rebels’.122 An organised group is different from the individuals ‘in that the former normally 
has a structure, a chain of command and a set of rules as well as the outward symbols of 
authority’123 to which the member conforms. Both, ‘practice and case law’124 support the 
distinction, argued Cassese. 
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Several authors have discussed the application of the two standards in the cyber domain. 
Shackelford attempts to solve the issue of attribution in the cyber realm by adopting the less 
stringent, less rigid control standard deriving from the ICTY jurisprudence. According to 
Shackelford, the attribution of the cyber operations, by adopting the overall State control over 
the perpetrator, would become more achievable because it does not require the unrealistically 
high standards of proof. Embracing the overall control standard would prevent the 
governments from ‘hid[ing] their information warfare operations under the effective control 
standard’.125 An argument in favour of the overall control standard based on inter alia the 
evidentiary considerations has also been made by Cassese.126 Tsagourias, on the other hand, 
adopts a pragmatic control standard theory in the context of cyber attacks and questions of 
self-defence. ‘Any form or degree of control by a State over a non-State actor that goes on to 
attack another State will suffice as for the victim State to use force by way of self-defence 
against the host State’127 argues the author. The Tallinn Manual, on the other hand, does not 
go beyond the description of both standards though it argues that the overall control standard 
is not applicable to the conduct of individuals and insufficiently organised128 or unorganised 
groups.129 
In the context of unlawful inter-State cyber operations below the use of force, the injured State 
wishing to employ countermeasures against the State sponsoring a cyber operation should 
be able to prove effective State control for the purpose of attribution. A few reasons 
substantiate this argument. 
First, the ICTY has not devised the overall control standard in order to answer the question of 
State responsibility but to establish whether an armed conflict was international or internal.130 
As the ICJ declared in the Genocide case, the ICTY ‘was not called upon in the Tadić case, 
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nor is it in general called upon, to rule on questions of State responsibility, since its jurisdiction 
is criminal and extends over persons only’.131 
Second, accepting a lower standard of control with the intention to make it ‘less difficult’132 to 
attribute an act to a particular State, proposed by the two aforementioned scholars, may very 
well be convenient but not necessarily prudent. Legal standards should not be lowered just 
because evidence is more difficult to obtain. In the Corfu Channel case, the court did not allow 
for a lower standard of proof only because the United Kingdom faced issues in collecting the 
evidence held under the exclusive control of Albania.133 What is more, in the Genocide case, 
the ICJ argued in favour of the effective control standards as it deemed the overall control 
standard to be ‘unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection 
which must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international 
responsibility’.134 Indeed, attribution in the context of countermeasures needs to be correct, 
not easier, or else the self-help measures of the injured State will be unlawful and escalation 
of the conflict may occur. 
It is not hard to imagine a State organ providing specific instructions for conduct of an unlawful 
cyber operation.135 It is quite possible, for example, that the Cutting Sword of Justice was a 
recipient of specific instructions for conduct relating to the unlawful Shamoon cyber operation 
against Aramco. It is also possible that the instructions came from Iran. Nevertheless, public 
information does not support that and whether Saudi Arabia can prove that and employ 
countermeasures remains unknown. Furthermore, in spite of the connections to the Russian 
authorities elaborated beforehand, there are no indications that the Nashi group was 
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completely dependent on the State nor that it received specific instructions to conduct the 
DDoS operation. 
This certainly does not mean that the overall control standard should be dismissed altogether. 
On the contrary, this standard may be useful in attempting to establish State responsibility for 
acts conducted by hierarchically organised armed groups. This implies a conduct of forceful 
nature, something that the present text is not concerned with. After all, the ICTY did argue that 
the overall control standard is appropriate when attempting an attribution of the acts of ‘armed 
forces or militias or paramilitary units’,136 a language clearly of international humanitarian law 
origin.137 In the context of self-defence and cyber attacks, information warfare or perpetrators 
in the form of terrorist groups (argued by Tsagourias, Shackelford and Cassese 
respectively)138 advocating for the overall control standard is therefore an understandable 
position.  
While it remains unknown who orchestrated the cyber operations under consideration, the 
acts, which are the subject of this text, were not of forceful nature139 and labelling the 
perpetrators orchestrating cyber operations below the use of force as organised armed groups 
would be dangerous. None of the suspected groups behind the cyber operations analysed in 
the present text constitute an armed group. Nashi, the alleged perpetrating party behind the 
2007 DDoS operation, for example, is a self-proclaimed ‘socio-patriotic movement’ with the 
mission of spreading ‘ideological influence among the younger generation’140 and not a military 
unit, armed band of irregulars or rebels. Moreover, the Cutting Sword of Justice is, as already 
mentioned, an anti-oppression hacker group which cannot be equated with an organised 
 
136 Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (n 118) para 137. The view is shared with Cassese ((n 4) 654), asserting the 
‘effective control test, to the extent that it is also applied to organised armed groups, is inconsistent with a basic 
principle underpinning the whole body of rules and principles on state responsibility.’  
137 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (Geneva, 8 June 1977) art 43 
138 See Tsagourias (n 46); Shackelford & Andres (n 10); Cassese (n 4) 
139 See ch 1 on distinction between a cyber operation and cyber attack. 
140 Danya Spencer & Michael Smeltzer, ‘Nashi: Russian Youth Movement’ (translation, School of Russian and 
Asian Studies, 6 December 2011) <http://goo.gl/FNRTXK> accessed 1 April 2016 
141 
armed group with outward symbols of authority, what would justify utilising the overall control 
standard. The same can be argued for the similar cyber groups such as CyberBerkut, behind 
the attack on German governmental systems.141 What is more, empirical research has shown 
malicious cyber groups lack the structure of ‘traditional, hierarchical organised crime 
groups’.142 
All things considered, the overall control standard is not an appropriate legal standard when 
considering the control of a State for the purpose of the attribution of a cyber operation below 
the use of force.  
3. Evidentiary issues plaguing efforts to prove the breach and the 
attribution of an unlawful cyber operation 
The injured party to the dispute needs to be able to prove both elements of State responsibility 
– the occurrence of the unlawful act as well as attribution to the State.143 While evidentiary 
issues related the former are unlikely to arise, the same cannot be said for the exercise of 
proving the latter.144  
While evidence and proof are rarely subjects of deliberation outside of the context of 
international adjudication, in the attempt to attribute an unlawful cyber conduct, an injured 
State must not only resort to principles of the international law of State responsibility but also 
to take into account the law of evidence. To avoid taking wrongful countermeasures, the 
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attribution should be evaluated in the light of the legal framework governing proof, especially 
the burden and standards of proof, as well as the permitted forms of evidence and 
methodology of reasoning. For this reason, the following paragraphs focus on burden, 
methods and standards of proof in support of the attribution of the unlawful cyber operation.  
There is however no coherent international treaty law to which one could turn for guidance on 
matters of proof and evidence. What is more, there is also no well-established, uniform 
customary evidence law to speak of145 and codification of the law of State responsibility in a 
form of the ARSIWA offers very limited guidance on the subject of evidence and proof.146  
Consequently, the focus of the following paragraphs is on other sources of international law, 
namely judicial decisions and the writings of notable international legal scholars. These 
sources, provided by the impartial parties in various of contexts, offer a neutral, value-free 
framework which is crucial in the context of self-help measures, especially considering that 
the intention countermeasures is to induce compliance and not to escalate the conflict. With 
the passage of time, State practice and opinio juris will undoubtedly contribute to the gradual 
development of the international customary law governing proof and evidence in the context 
of countermeasures.  
3.1. Burden of proof 
The burden of proof or ‘the obligation on a party to show that they have sufficient evidence on 
an issue to raise it in a case’,147 generally rests on the injured party alleging State 
responsibility.148 In other words, the State injured by the cyber operation bears the burden of 
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proving that the act in question is attributable to another State as well as its unlawful character. 
A number of international lawyers support this assertion; Roscini argues that the reversal is 
unlikely to be allowed in the international adjudication process,149 while Gervais argues that 
the ‘burden of proof should remain with the targeted State’.150 This is particularly true when an 
injured State is attempting to justify the countermeasures, acts in contravention of the 
international rights of the responsible State.151 
In the latter case, the injured party invoking State responsibility has no obligation to in fact 
produce or disclose proof substantiating its allegation, although it must be ready to do so in 
case its assertions of attribution are disputed by the allegedly perpetrating State that is the 
target of countermeasures. Being able to produce proof (meeting the appropriate legal 
standards) prevents the injured State from taking countermeasures against a State that is not 
responsible for the cyber operation after all and from taking a course of action that would 
constitute a violation of its own international duties.  
This rule, however, is not an absolute one.152 In fact, it has been proposed that shifting the 
burden of proof ‘from the investigator and accuser to the nation in which the attack software 
was launched’153 would solve evidentiary issues in the cyber context, since burden of proof 
‘shifting has been used in dealing with international crime and with terrorism’.154 While the 
authors of this proposition do not offer a more in depth explanation of the argument, the 
reversal of the burden of proof doctrine does indeed occur in the international legal 
scholarship.  
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Reversal of the burden of proof has been recognised in certain human rights cases. Namely, 
European law provides that it ‘shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no 
breach of the principle of equal treatment’.155 A confirmation of this may be found in a number 
of cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union156 and the European Court of 
Human Rights. For example, in the case of Ribitch v Austria, the Republic of Austria bore the 
burden of proving that the ‘applicant’s injuries were caused otherwise than – entirely, mainly, 
or partly – by the treatment he underwent while in police custody’.157 The principle has been 
confirmed by the UN Human Rights Committee, rejecting the argument of Cameroon that the 
burden of proof for the allegations of torture lies with the victim.158 The rationale behind the 
aforementioned cases where the burden of proof reversal was allowed lies in the fact that the 
individual was unable to substantiate violations conclusively, since the evidence was 
exclusively controlled by the State.159 It is not hard to see that the context of the above 
instances is significantly different from the context of inter-State cyber operations below the 
use of force. Besides, evidence of cyber operations is not exclusively controlled by the 
perpetrating State. 
Reversal has also been proposed in the context of the precautionary principle160 and its 
potential to address ‘scientific or technological uncertainty [for] managing cyber-based 
activities’161 has been recognised. The principle, not yet part of the international customary 
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law,162 encourages pre-emptive actions (of protection) even when the scientific evidence 
supporting the unacceptable risk or anticipated harm is inconclusive.163 It challenges the 
traditional legal doctrine ‘by proposing to shift the burden of proof towards those whose actions 
may seriously threaten the public health or the environment’.164 While the application of the 
precautionary principle to cyber incidents is certainly tempting, its origins are particularly 
associated with situations likely to inflict damage to the ‘environment, human, animal or plant 
health’.165 The principle found its way also into the Declaration of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development166 and Framework Convention on Climate Change.167  
Consequences of cyber operations below the use of force by definition do not pose a threat 
to any of the aforementioned categories. Thus, the application of the principle routed in the 
international environmental law is hardly appropriate. Even if we disregard its evident 
environmental origins, the Pulp Mills judgment by the ICJ rejected the argument of Argentina 
that the precautionary approach implies a reversal of the burden of proof.168 
Under those circumstances, States whose infrastructures were targeted by the RedOctober169 
and wish to employ countermeasures, are the ones having the responsibility to prove the 
attribution of the operation to a particular State. Moreover, when attempting to attribute the 
Shamoon and 2007 DDoS cyber operations, it is Saudi Arabia and Estonia, respectively, which 
need to be able to provide proof in support of their claims. 
In judicial settings, once the injured party has discarded its burden of proof it is up to the 
respondent to produce evidence of rebuttal. In the courtroom ‘the burden of producing 
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evidence may shift back and forth throughout’170 the progress of the case. This is certainly not 
always the case in the context of countermeasures and particularly so when an injured State 
decides to employ urgent countermeasures – unilateral self-help measures which may be 
initiated without any notification to the targeted State.171 
3.2. Standard(s) of proof 
The standard of proof, a decisional threshold,172 is the quantum of evidence necessary to 
substantiate the factual claims made by the party.173 Even in the case of circumstantial proof, 
the inference must lead ‘logically to a single conclusion’174 or leave ‘no room for reasonable 
doubt’.175 Therefore, a differentiation between the effects of direct as well as indirect evidence 
on the standard of proof should not be attempted.176 Nevertheless, insisting on the standard 
beyond reasonable doubt in the cyber realm would be premature, particularly without further 
investigation. 
Legal scholarship, including the investigations of cyber operations,177 has been recently 
discussing the standard of proof, seeking a rigid, unequivocal framework to be applied in the 
context of the new environment. However, this certainly is not a simple task and, what is more, 
it is likely to fail.  
As a matter of fact, flexibility governs the international legal approach to the standard of 
proof.178 The consistent or uniform international standard of proof has yet to be established by 
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jurisprudence.179 Whether this is desirable is questionable. In the words of Judge Higgins, 
proof is ‘to an extent in the eye of the beholder; what was a fact for one person was not a fact 
for another’.180 Furthermore, evaluation of evidence is an intellectual process dependent on 
the specific circumstances181 of an individual case and an ‘attempt to itemize broad principles 
governing such subjective mental activity must perforce be somewhat hazardous.’182  
In a quest to resort to extrajudicial measures of self-help, the State injured by an unlawful 
cyber operation finds itself in a curious position. The State in question is not only the victim 
but also the judge as well as the aspiring executioner. Being a victim, it is naturally inclined to 
be a liberal and subjective judge and hasty executioner or to be overly concerned with the 
aggregate fact-finding cost versus the risk of error.183 As a victim and the executioner, it is 
inclined to accept the lower standard of proof, disregard the authenticity and reliability issues 
or find proof in evidence of questionable quality, with questionable chain of custody or 
corroborated with evidence of questionable format. In a desire to employ (urgent) 
countermeasures during an unlawful cyber act – which can cease or change the attributes in 
an instant – the danger is especially prominent.  
High standards should be self-imposed at least for two reasons. First, the State interested in 
employing countermeasures must be certain of its claims or face countermeasures itself for 
the ill-founded and consequently unlawful countermeasures it subjected onto another State.184 
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What is more, abiding by the standards set by the international case law would protect the 
State in a potential subsequent adjudication.185 
Three standards have been recognised in most common law jurisdictions; beyond doubt, clear 
and convincing proof and the balance of probabilities. While the first two standards are usually 
found in criminal cases, the latter is common to civil litigations.186  
Presuming the intention to avoid unlawful countermeasures, the balance of probabilities 
standard receives no attention below. Should we choose to avoid ‘specious claims and false 
or erroneous attribution’,187 State responsibility for an unlawful cyber operation should be 
proved beyond the threshold of balance of probabilities which requires the injured State to 
produce evidence proving that a particular State is ‘more likely than not or more probable than 
not’188 responsible for the cyber operation. 
The other extreme end of the spectrum is occupied by the standard which requires a fully 
conclusive189 proof beyond reasonable doubt.190 The standard requires the probability of the 
alleged attribution and unlawful character of cyber operation to approach certainty or the 
‘elimination of all evidenced and case-specific […] scenarios’191 in which the allegedly 
perpetrating State is not responsible for the alleged cyber violation of international law. The 
origins of the standard may be found in the criminal proceedings of common as well as civil 
law. For example, the German legal system ‘always requires persuasion beyond reasonable 
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doubt’192 and similar assertion may be made for English193 and international194 criminal law. 
The rationale behind this high standard of proof lies in the fact that ‘although it may mean that 
some guilty people go unpunished, it is more important that the innocent are not wrongly 
convicted’.195 Clearly, establishing State responsibility is not about criminal liability of an 
individual, let alone about sending anyone behind bars. It is perhaps why States are not 
particularly inclined to consider this standard to be relevant in cyber space; only Italy has come 
on the record arguing in favour of this most exacting standard of proof, conditioning attribution 
of an inter-State cyber operation by unequivocal196 and ‘irrefutable digital evidence’.197 
Also, for the purpose of the present research, and potentially even for cyber context in 
general,198 this standard is overly demanding. Where the allegation is responsibility for an 
unlawful cyber operation short of producing physical damage or injury to human being, this 
standard is in contradiction with the principle that the proof has to be ‘appropriate to the 
seriousness of the allegation’.199 Accordingly, the international jurisprudence indicates that 
fully conclusive proof may only be required when testing charges ‘of exceptional gravity 
against a State’,200 which cyber operations below the use of force certainly are not. 
Because the balance of probabilities standard exposes the State wishing to take 
countermeasures to a risk of aiming at the wrong State and because the beyond reasonable 
doubt standard is inappropriate in the context of this thesis, the argument for a third standard 
of proof is put forward.  
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The third international legal standard of proof required to substantiate the allegations of 
attribution is the one requiring sufficiently clear and convincing proof. It has been recognised 
by the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua201 as well as the Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo202 ICJ judgments. Furthermore, other international 
judicial conclusions confirm the standard,203 which is also maintained by various legal scholars 
discussing the standard of proof in the context of cyber operations.204 State practice is 
supportive of this. The US Air Force Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations asserts that 
attribution should be proved with ‘sufficient confidence and verifiability’, 205 while American 
opinio juris points at the standard of proof requiring a ‘definitive’206 proof when attempting to 
establish attribution of a cyber operation. Similarly, Dutch official records require ‘sufficiently 
certain’207 attribution while the UK House of Lords indicated that successful attribution of cyber 
operations would require a ‘conclusive analysis’.208 For the aforementioned reasons, injured 
States wishing to take countermeasures against the State responsible for an unlawful cyber 
operation below the use of force should be able to provide sufficiently clear and convincing 
proof substantiating the attribution claims. 
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3.3. Classification and forms of evidence 
Evidence, an ‘information, medium or means by which the facts tend to be proved or 
disproved’,209 comes in a direct or indirect form. Due to the clandestine nature of cyber 
operations, the latter one deserves special attention. Indirect or circumstantial evidence, 
‘admitted in all systems of law, and […] recognised by international decisions’,210 constitutes 
‘facts which, while not supplying immediate proof of the charge, yet make the charge probable 
[…] with the assistance of reasoning’.211 
In the attempt to attribute the unlawful cyber operation to a particular State, proof stemming 
from a combination of circumstantial evidence and reasoning by inferences should not be 
neglected.212 Indeed, it is expected that the State injured by a cyber operation will consider 
filling the inevitable gaps of direct evidences by drawing inferences. However, international 
judiciary has ‘demonstrated an increasing resistance to the drawing of inferences’213 and some 
noncumulative and considerable limitations should be observed; inferences are to be 
appreciated only in the absence of the rebuttal by the alleged perpetrator or in the exercise of 
proving the knowledge of the existence of the wrongful conduct and not attribution of the 
wrongful conduct itself. 
Reasoning by inferences has been utilised previously by the Iran–US Claims Tribunal and 
other international tribunals. However, the practice was always out of the framework of 
countermeasures and the tribunals allowed for inferences only ‘when the respondent has 
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offered no evidence in rebuttal’,214 be it due to silence or failure to submit satisfactory 
counterevidence.215 This has ‘been largely accepted as fair’.216 Nevertheless, States regularly 
reject responsibility for cyber operations; Russia has repeatedly rejected their involvement in 
2007 DDoS against Estonia, for example.217 What is more, in a quest for urgent 
countermeasures, the State accused of the wrongdoing has no opportunity to offer a rebuttal 
evidence. In these two cases, reasoning by inferences would be unfair. 
Furthermore, inferences may be drawn from indirect evidence pointing at the territory of origin. 
Provided that one choses to trust in the technical evidence pointing at the location of the 
original perpetrator’s machine, exclusive control over the territory or information 
communication infrastructure may be indicative218 of the State’s knowledge of the unlawful act 
but it does not establish a responsibility of that State for the unlawful (cyber) conduct.219 
Accordingly, a combination of an indirect evidence and inferences has been previously utilised 
by the ICJ to prove Albanian knowledge of unlawful act of mine-laying.220 The principle has 
also been recognised by the authors of the Tallinn Manual, arguing that the ‘fact that a cyber 
operation has been launched or otherwise originates from governmental cyber infrastructure 
 
214 William A. Parker (U.S.A.) v United Mexican States [1926] IV UNRIAA 39. See similar claims made also in 
Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v Islamic Republic of Iran [1982] Iran-US CTR 457; Combuslion Engineering, Inc., et al 
and The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al [1991] (Partial Award No 506-308-2) 26 Iran-US CTR para 70. 
215 See, generally, Howard M Holtzmann, ‘Fact-finding before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal’ in Richard 
Lillich (ed), Fact-finding before international tribunals (Transnational Publishers 1992) 126–128 
216 Jamison Selby, ‘Fact-finding before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: The View from the Trenches’ in 
Richard Lillich (ed), Fact-finding before international tribunals (Transnational Publishers 1992) 143 
217 Ian Phillips & Vladimir Isachenkov, ‘Putin: Russia doesn’t hack but “patriotic” individuals might’ (Associated 
Press, 1 June 2017) <https://apnews.com/281464d38ee54c6ca5bf573978e8ee91/Putin:-Russian-state-has-
never-been-involved-in-hacking?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP> accessed 
13 August 2019 
218 ‘[I]t cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory […] that that 
State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein.’ Corfu Channel case (n 
133) para 18 
219 This narrative has been affirmed by the ICJ, refusing to attribute the attack on Sea Isle City to Iran even 
though the missile was fired from the territory under the control of the aforementioned State. Oil Platforms (n 178) 
para 61. Or succinctly put by Crawford: ‘Under international law, the fact that something occurs on the territory of 
a State, or in some other area under its jurisdiction, is not a sufficient basis for attributing that event to the State, 
or for making it responsible for any injury caused.’ ILC (n 3) 33 
220 ‘[I]t has been established by means of indirect evidence that Albania has knowledge of minelaying in her 
territorial waters’: Corfu Channel case (n 133) para 22 
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is not sufficient evidence for attributing the operation to that State’221 as well as other 
scholars.222 For instance, circumstantial evidence including a technical report223 asserting that 
certain cyber operations originated from a Chinese network, evidence of a nationwide 
monitoring on the ISP level,224 the two million State-employed individual Internet monitoring 
agents225 and elaborate network monitoring activities of the PLA specialised departments,226 
leads to a logical conclusion that the People's Republic of China knew of the cyber operations 
in question. Similarly, considering the mandate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian 
Federation Information Security Center is to monitor Russian Internet networks and identify 
threats ‘using hardware and software installed at Russian [ISPs], Internet access points, and 
Internet exchanges’,227 public statements of acknowledgement of the DDoS attack by the 
Russian official Goloskokov and a list of IP addresses pointing at the fact that majority of 
attacks came from the Russian systems, leads to a rational deduction that Russia was aware 
of the 2007 DDoS operation against Estonian governmental systems. In both cases, 
knowledge of the undergoing internationally wrongful cyber activity however does not 
establish a State responsibility for the act itself.  
Evidence may come in all forms and sizes;228 documents, witness and expert testimony, 
official statements and official enquiry outcomes have been historically considered by 
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international judicial entities as evidence. Similar forms of evidence can be used by the injured 
party to assert attribution of an inter-State cyber operation.  
In the context of the present research, it is worth noting that documentary evidence, defined 
as ‘anything in which information of any kind has been recorded’229 includes digital formats.230 
The ICTY has confirmed the assertion in the Orić Trial judgment.231 Interestingly enough, 
scholars have opined that documentary evidence includes ‘published and unpublished 
diplomatic correspondence’232 which would include the diplomatic records published by the 
notorious WikiLeaks.  
Given the nature of electronic documentation, I feel compelled to spend a few lines discussing 
the authenticity and reliability of this type of evidence. For the (electronic) document to be 
considered sufficiently authentic an indication of reliability must be provided. In order to 
achieve that, ‘consideration may be given to factors including the extent to which the 
document’s content is corroborated by other evidence, the location where it was obtained, 
whether it is an original or copy, […] or certified [in] any way’.233 When considering a reliability 
test, however, one ‘is to establish whether a piece of evidence is what it purports to be’.234 
Considering that electronic information may be easily manipulated, that technical means for 
the attribution of a cyber operation ‘are inherently limited’,235 that they rely on unreliable 
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traceback via IP address or on limited remote computer forensics, the requirement of 
corroboration seems to be especially prominent in the context of this thesis. When considering 
the employment of self-help measures, the presumption of authenticity and reliability236 is 
certainly a dangerous principle to live by. 
Various news outlets are often quick to point fingers but the weight of news reports has 
attracted mixed feelings by the international judiciary. In the Armed Activities on the Territory 
of the Congo judgment the ICJ considered various news reports, ‘unreferenced and 
unsourced’237 extracts from a specific book, ‘certain internal military intelligence documents, 
[lacking] explanations as to how the information was obtained’,238 oral pleading claims without 
citing a source,239 and unsigned reports internal to the claimant240 to be not ‘weighty and 
convincing’241 or unsatisfactory.242 Furthermore, in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ judged that the 
evidence consisting of ‘no more than newspaper reports’243 does not successfully establish 
attribution. On the other hand, the US–Iran Claims Tribunal accepted news stories as proof 
attributing the acts of the Iranian Revolutionary guards to the newly formed government244 and 
considered an interview published in the press in assigning the governmental control over the 
Foundation of the Oppressed.245 Regardless, if an injured State desires to consider news 
reports as appropriate evidence in the struggle to attribute a cyber operation to a particular 
State, it should be conscious of the fact that public sources ‘are by definition secondary 
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evidence; […] and an indication of what was the original source, or sources, or evidence on 
which the public sources relied’,246 would be required.  
Electronic evidence and newspaper sources indeed attributed Shamoon, although their value 
to the injured State is insignificant. For instance, Shamoon was explicitly attributed to Iran by 
the New York Times on at least one occasion,247 and the assertion was supported by some 
commentators arguing that ‘Iran is at the center of every significant aspect of this attack’.248 
Others, on the other hand, maintained that the operation was conducted by Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or the United Arab Emirates.249 Given these claims, it is not hard 
to recognise the speculative character of the listed evidence; none offer a source of 
information to corroborate the assertions and as such cannot be labelled as a satisfactory 
evidence for establishing attribution in line with the law of State responsibility. Electronic 
evidence provides even weaker proof of attribution. Not one but two perpetrating groups 
claimed responsibility for the Shamoon operation online – Cutting Sword of Justice250 and Arab 
Youth Group.251 The information was published on the Pastebin website, frequently used by 
various cyber groups to anonymously ‘store pieces of sources code or configuration 
information’252 and communicate with the general public. In a legal context, such evidence 
enjoys even less trust than newspaper articles. 
Last but not least, there seems to be an appreciation for evidence produced by private entities. 
The Flexi-Van and General Motors judgment was based on reports compiled by an 
independent certified public accountants firm and an annual report of the New York Stock 
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Exchange, a private entity.253 Under these circumstances, an injured State may very well use 
the reports of private entries such as Mandiant or Kasperski Lab to assist in building a case in 
favour of the employment of countermeasures. States indeed seem to be interested in private 
attribution capabilities. The US Defence Department, for example, announced they ‘will 
continue to collaborate closely with the private sector and other agencies of the US 
government to strengthen attribution’.254 The private sector’s role has been reiterated by US 
officials stating that ‘[g]overnmental and private sector security professionals have made 
significant advances in detecting and attributing cyber intrusions’.255 
This development is certainly in line with the modernisation of international relations as well 
as international law where States remain the key actors but surely not the only actors.256 The 
reports are however inevitably subjective in their analysis and hardly contribute to the proof of 
convincing value. Private security company FireEye, for example, attributed various cyber 
operations to the so called ATP28 cyber group based on attributes such as ‘targeting, malware 
[properties], language, and working hours [of the perpetrating group]’.257 Similarly, Mandiant 
concluded PLA was behind a plethora of cyber operations based on circumstantial technical 
evidence and the similarity in ‘mission, capabilities, and resources’258 of the perpetrating group 
and the Chinese army. Such conclusions, if incorrect, have no impact on private companies 
besides reputational and consequential financial costs yet may profoundly worsen the 
relationship between the two States if presented as a proof of attribution and used as a 
foundation for countermeasures. 
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4. Conclusion  
It will be up to the injured State to decide whether the evidence at its disposal amounts to the 
standard of convincing proof and allows for the attribution and employment of 
countermeasures. But, as an observant reader may have noticed, sufficiently clear and 
convincing proof for all three cyber operations is non-existent – as established above, 
technical evidence is unreliable or misleading while attribution provided by the socio-political 
threat agent modelling remains subjective and, at best, useful only in determining the State in 
fact responsible for the cyber operation in question.  
This has a profound effect on legal attribution. Due to the clandestine nature of cyber 
operations as well as of the perpetrating groups, direct or indirect legal attribution appears to 
be impossible. No convincing evidence establishing the fact that any of the discussed 
perpetrating cyber groups are indeed de facto or de jure State organs exists.  
News reports, webpage entries, private entity reports and various circumstantial evidence 
certainly do not amount to convincing proof. These more often than not rely on anonymous or 
unverified sources, can easily be created or altered by anyone and heavily rely on socio-
political analysis as well as circumstantial evidence. In fact, all of the evidence in support of 
the attribution of unlawful inter-State cyber operations available to the public nowadays is of 
circumstantial nature. Establishing proof would therefore require reasoning by inference, 
which is only appreciated in establishing knowledge of an unlawful act and in the absence of 
a rebuttal. 
Without attribution there is no State responsibility. And without State responsibility there are 
no countermeasures. In the absence of countermeasures, the profits of the perpetrating State 
remain disproportionally high compared to the costs and an alarming frequency of unlawful 
inter-State cyber operations is a rational consequence. 
For this very reason, the following chapter investigates the potential of the attribution of 
toleration instead of the attribution of orchestration. It moves from a State responsibility for 
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unlawful cyber operations to the responsibility for the omission of diligent behaviour States 
owe to the international community. In contrast to the attribution of an unlawful of cyber 
operation, a violation of the due diligence obligations of prevention and termination will likely 
be a more attainable task for the injured State, allowing it to take countermeasures and thus 
restore security by inducing compliance with international law.  
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Chapter 5 
State responsibility for violation of the due diligence obligations in 
cyberspace 
1. Introduction 
To change the rational calculation of the unlawful cyber operations and thereby compel the 
wrongdoing State into compliance with its international legal obligations and restore security, 
injured States should invoke State responsibility and employ countermeasures against the 
internationally responsible State for its malicious cyber conduct. Due to the state of technology 
and the legal requirement of attribution, employment of countermeasures is most often 
impossible. This has been established in the preceding chapter, which sought to establish 
State responsibility on the basis of agency, consequential to the unlawful operation conducted 
by either the State (agents) or non-State actors controlled or directed by the latter.  
Based on the premise that the State in fact responsible for the unlawful cyber operation has 
also failed to diligently prevent or terminate it, the objective of this chapter is to establish that 
State responsibility can be invoked, and countermeasures undertaken, in response to 
violations of the obligations of due diligence contained within the customary international law.  
The first part introduces the well-established international legal principle of due diligence, 
which includes the obligations of prevention and termination. It presents a plethora of State 
sources indicating that due diligence and the corresponding obligations are becoming a part 
of customary international law in cyberspace. Since due diligence obligations are obligations 
of conduct, this part also explains the flexible nature of the standard of due diligence, revealing 
the factors that affect this standard and argues in favour of an international minimum standard.  
The second part applies due diligence and the corresponding obligations to inter-State cyber 
operations. It presents a theory of a diligent State and exposes the international minimum 
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standards of compliance. In other words, it explains what States can do and what they should 
do to abide by their due diligence obligations. 
The third part places due diligence in the context of the law of State responsibility. It argues 
that the invocation of State responsibility and the employment of countermeasures against the 
State for the known cyber operation which it occasioned by its non-diligent performance is, in 
comparison to the failed invocation of State responsibility on the grounds of agency presented 
in the previous chapter, significantly more feasible.  
This is due to the fact that an injured State, wishing to establish State responsibility for the 
non-diligent performance, is not required to establish attribution; instead, it must be able to 
prove actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the allegedly non-diligent State and the 
fact that the resulting cyber operation emanated from the territory of that State. While this is 
by no means an easy task, it is certainly more likely to be established in the current legal and 
technological landscape. The injured State can then proceed to taking countermeasures 
against the non-diligent State and to restoring power, peace and security. 
2. The principle of due diligence 
In accordance with the principle of due diligence, States are not only to refrain from violating 
the rights of other States but also to do their utmost to thwart the subjects under their 
jurisdiction from doing so. Put in the context of this thesis, States should not only abstain from 
unlawful selfish utility maximisation but also attempt to prevent and terminate the 
internationally wrongful minimisation of other States’ power and security. The investigation of 
the principle is rationalised by the fact that every State which utilises cyber means to break 
the international rule to abstain from, for example, intervening in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of another State, is equally responsible in fact for violating the obligation to prevent 
or terminate the acts denying the sovereign rights of the other State. 
Due diligence is a well-established international legal principle and early scholarly 
pronouncement of due diligence can be dated back to the 18th century, initially argued for as 
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a means of protection of aliens abroad.1 The doctrinal concern with the diligent protection of 
aliens persisted in the following decades, even centuries, but with a decline of State power 
and the rise of global civil society,2 due diligence has seen in kind adaptations and reached a 
status of, as Lauterpacht illustrated while discussing the State responsibility for acts of private 
entities, the cornerstone of the system of mutual international assurance.3  
Under the conditions of anarchical constellation of the international relations where no central 
enforcement entity exists, principle of due diligence imposes a proactive, decentralised and 
reciprocal protection of legal rights of States by States, thus reinforcing the rule of law and 
promoting peace and security. In the contemporary world order, which is organised around 
the idea of nations being united in the virtues of peaceful cohabitation, scholarship and the 
international judiciary have recognised the potential of the due diligence principle to ensure 
the accountability of States, even when the perpetrators have no apparent connection to the 
governments and the traditional models of State responsibility struggle to accommodate the 
changing reality of international relations.4 Due diligence, therefore, goes beyond restricting 
the maximisation of power by way of unlawful cyber operations conducted by the States; it 
imposes a responsibility to not only refrain from illegitimate power deprivation by way of cyber 
operations but also to make sure no one under its jurisdiction does so. As such, due diligence 
prevents the States to hide their illegitimate power maximisation activities behind the non-
State actors, which has been an increasingly more prominent international practice in cyber 
era.5 
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The principle of due diligence has been conceptualised in several international judgments. 
One notable judicial decision based on the due diligence principle was the Island of Palmas 
case of 1928. Judging on a territorial dispute between the Netherlands and US, the arbitration 
held that there is no such thing as absolute territorial sovereignty; the latter is indeed limited 
by the sovereign rights of other nations. The arbitrator Max Huber held that the ‘[t]erritorial 
sovereignty … has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of 
other States’.6 What is more, in the oft cited Corfu Channel case, the ICJ reached similar 
conclusions in support of the principle of due diligence. Tasked to judge the dispute between 
Albania and the United Kingdom and to provide an answer on whether the former incurred 
State responsibility for the act performed not by its agents but on its territory, the Court argued 
that it is ‘every State’s [customary] obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States’.7 And most recently, judging the dispute between 
Argentina and Uruguay, on the other hand, the ICJ asserted a State is ‘obliged to use all the 
means at its disposal in order to avoid [injurious] activities which take place in its territory, or 
in any area under its jurisdiction’.8  
Accordingly, due diligence does not concern itself with the question of who perpetrated the 
unlawful act but with the jurisdictional origin of the unlawful act. Because, as previously 
established, the natural person behind the cyber operation is more likely than not to remain 
unknown, this thesis centres on the territorial jurisdiction. The concept of territorial jurisdiction 
may however seem in contradiction with the idea that cyber operations occur in ‘an abstract 
realm of data representation’,9 in the mythical and notional10 domain called cyberspace, which 
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is a global common and a domain where national jurisdictional concepts do not apply.11 In 
reality, cyberspace consists of more than a virtual dimension; it is a ‘set of interconnected 
information systems and the human users that interact with these systems’.12 And cyber 
operations occur through the utilisation of cyberspace elements being inter alia servers, 
working stations, routers, switches and firewalls, satellites and all its elements which are 
physically present in a specific territory. Territory does nevertheless constitute ‘all those 
spaces where the sovereign exercises formal jurisdiction or factual authority.’13 
While the injured State may not be able to identify the particular natural person behind the 
malicious cyber operation and establish the connections to the responsible State as required 
by the stringent legal standards of attribution, the evidence of jurisdictional origin of malicious 
cyber operations is more often than not available. This is the source of the potential utility of 
due diligence in establishing accountability for the unlawful minimisation of power and security 
of the injured State and the subsequent employment of compliance-inducing 
countermeasures. Perhaps this is why several scholars recognised and attempted to apply 
the principle of due diligence to cyberspace. Tsagourias, for example, asserts that due 
diligence ‘places an obligation on states to interfere with private actors and private conduct 
within their jurisdiction in order to streamline their behaviour in line with the State’s 
international law obligations’14 while Schmitt argues that it imposes taking ‘measures to ensure 
[State’s] territories are not used to the detriment of other states’.15 A similar characterisation 
 
11 See eg Mark Barrett et al, ‘Assured Access to the Global Commons Final Report’ (NATO 2011); Gerald Stang, 
‘Global commons: Between cooperation and competition’ (2013) 17 European Union Institute for Security Studies 
Brief 1; US Department of Defense, ‘Home and Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept’ (version 2.0, 
1 October 2007) ES-3 
12 Rain Ottis & Peeter Lorents, ‘Cyberspace: Definition and Implications’ in Proceedings of the 5th International 
Conference on Information Warfare and Security, Dayton, OH, US, 8-9 April (Academic Publishing Limited 2010) 
267–270 
13 Al-Skeini v UK [2011] ECtHR 55721/07 
14 Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Economic cyber espionage and due diligence’ (Syracuse University, May 2015) 1 
<http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Tsagourias_Due_Diligence.pdf> accessed 7 January 2018 
15 Michael Schmitt, ‘In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace’ (2015) 125 Yale L J Forum 68  
165 
is offered by Sklerov.16 In fact, these definitions are analogous to the Tallinn Manual, affirming 
States ‘shall not knowingly allow the cyber infrastructure located in its territory or under its 
exclusive governmental control to be used for acts that adversely and unlawfully affect other 
States’.17 States too have been more and more vocal in supporting (at least in theory) the 
existence of due diligence in cyberspace. The UN Group of Governmental Experts on 
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security (GGE) agreed that nations ‘should seek to ensure that their territory is 
not used by non-State actors to commit [internationally wrongful acts using ICTs]’.18 Similarly, 
the Council of the EU argued in 2017 that ‘[States] should not knowingly allow their territory to 
be used for internationally wrongful acts using [information communication technology 
(ICT)]’.19 Additionally, a Multinational Experiment 7 (MNE7) Outcome 3, a product of 16 States 
and NATO, declared that tolerance, passiveness and indifference towards the malicious 
(group of) individuals, even if not under the control of the government, ‘implies that the State 
does not respect the duties of due diligence over activities on its territory’.20 Individual States 
have also spoken in favour of the requirement of due diligence in cyberspace. Australia argues 
that, as much as ‘a state enjoys the right to exercise sovereignty over objects and activities 
within its territory, it necessarily shoulders corresponding responsibilities to ensure those 
objects and activities are not used to harm other states’.21 Furthermore, the US Cyber 
Diplomacy Bill, (only) introduced in the Congress in 2017, affirms ‘[c]ountries should take all 
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The assertion has been restated in Michael Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Operations (CUP 2017) 
18 UNGA ‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’ (22 July 2015) UN Doc A/70/174 13 
19 Council of the European Union, ‘Draft Council Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic 
Response to Malicious Cyber Activities ("Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox") – Adoption’ (Brussels, 7 June 2017) 
9916/17, 4 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9916-2017-INIT/en/pdf> accessed 17 May 2019 
20 ‘Multinational Experiment 7 Outcome 3 – Cyber Domain Objective 3.3: Concept Framework’ (MNE7) (Version 
3.0, 3 October 2012) 8 [on file with the author] 
21 Australia, ‘Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy’ (Annex A: Australia's position on how 
international law applies to state conduct in cyberspace, 4 October 2017) 91 
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appropriate and reasonable efforts to keep their territories clear of intentionally wrongful acts 
using ICTs in violation of international commitments’.22 In a similar vein, Germany argued 
nations are to ‘take all necessary measures to ensure that their territories are not used’23 for 
the purpose of an unlawful cyber operation against other State(s). India recognised States’ 
responsibility to ensure that their ICT is not utilised ‘to target or attack the ICT infrastructure of 
another nation’.24 Similarly, the Russian Federation argued States ‘bear responsibility at 
international level for [the unlawful] actions in information space, carried out directly, under 
their jurisdiction or in the framework of international organisations of their membership’.25 
Finland,26 Spain,27 France28 and the Netherlands,29 echoing the Corfu Channel judgment text 
and Tallinn Manual definition, also recognised the principle of due diligence in the cyber space. 
2.1. Due diligence obligations to prevent and to terminate 
Due diligence imposes upon States an obligation to prevent and an obligation to terminate the 
known unlawful acts emanating from their territories. The existence of this pair of obligations 
is supported by international jurisprudence. In the Alabama Claims arbitration, for example, 
 
22 HR 3776 Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2017, 115th Congress (2nd Sess 2018) SEC.3 (5)(c) 
23 UNGA ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security’ 
(9 September 2013) UN Doc A/68/156/Add.1, 9 
24 Cited in Sean Kanuck, ‘Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International Law’ (2010) 88 Texas L 
Rev 1591 
25 Ibid. Note also the statement by Andrey Krutskikh, the Russian representative to the UN: ‘States should not 
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another state.’ Government of Finland, ‘Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy - Background Dossier’ (Government 
Resolution 24 January 2013) 33 <http://www.yhteiskunnanturvallisuus.fi/en/materials/doc_download/48-
finlandas-cyber-security-strategy-background-dossier> accessed 4 June 2019 
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communications technologies] technologies.’ UNGA ‘Developments in the field of information and 
telecommunications in the context of international security’ (19 July 2016) UN Doc A/71/172, 19 
28 François Delerue & Aude Géry, ‘France's Cyberdefense Strategic Review and International Law’ (Lawfare, 23 
March 2018) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/frances-cyberdefense-strategic-review-and-international-law> 
accessed 9 June 2019 
29 Netherlands called for an ‘examination of ‘the question of the application of the principle of due diligence, i.e. 
not to knowingly allow a State’s territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.’ Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international 
security’ (Resolution 69/28, 2015) 4 
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the British Government was found to have failed to exhibit due diligence in relation to the 
performance of its obligation of neutrality. Britain, the decision reads, failed to ‘take in due time 
any effective measures of prevention’30 and consequently violated the principle of due 
diligence, ‘a diligence proportioned to the magnitude of the subject and to the dignity and 
strength of the power which is to exercise it’.31 The ICJ reiterated the due diligence and the 
corresponding obligation of prevention in the Corfu Channel Case judgment, where the Court 
held Albania responsible for its failure to take all necessary steps to prevent the internationally 
wrongful act of mine laying.32 Further international judicial decisions,33 international 
agreements34 as well as the legal scholarship,35 substantiate the prominence of the due 
diligence principle and the accompanying obligation of prevention in the modern international 
legal system. A significant doctrinal development of the principle of due diligence can be 
observed in the domains of international humanitarian, investment, criminal, environmental 
and maritime law.  
The principle of due diligence also dictates an obligation of termination; once the unlawful act 
materialises, States are under the due diligence obligation to terminate or stop the violation of 
the rights of the other State. For instance, Iran, which had an obligation to prevent the violation 
of the US’ rights granted by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, was found to be 
 
30 Alabama Claims of the United States of America Against Great Britain [1871] UNRIAA XXIX 130 
31 Alabama case (United States of America v Great Britain) (decision of 14 September 1872) in John B Moore, 
History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party (vol I, GPO 1898) 
572 
32 Corfu Channel case (n 7) 23 
33 See eg Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep; Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 
34 Eg ILC ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International 
Law (Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities)’ (2001) II (Part Two) Ybk of the ILC, UN Doc 
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35 Eg Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Due Diligence in the International Law of Liability’ in OECD, Legal Aspects of 
Transfrontier Pollution (OECD 1977) 369–379; Barnidge (n 4); Jan Hessbruegge, ‘The Historical Development of 
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internationally responsible by the ICJ because it did not make any efforts ‘to stop or impede’36 
the militants from overrunning the American embassy in Tehran. 
A wealth of national and international pronouncements suggest that States indeed recognise 
the existence of the aforementioned due diligence obligations also in cyberspace. In fact, a 
study conducted by ENISA and the European Parliament noted that ‘[m]ost norm proposals 
from governments and international organisations’37 recognise the obligation of prevention as 
part of the applicable principle of due diligence in cyberspace. Also, a group of States under 
the umbrella of the MNE7 argued ‘States have a duty to prevent cyber attacks as a matter of 
law’,38 while China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan have recognised ‘the need to prevent the potential use of information and 
communication technologies for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of 
maintaining international stability and security’.39 The requirement of prevention in the context 
of due diligence in cyberspace has been further recognised by Finland,40 Belarus,41 Estonia42 
and Spain.43  
Opinio juris also suggests that due diligence requires more than an attempt to prevent an 
unlawful cyber operation in violation of the rights of other States; it requires the States to do 
utmost to terminate an ongoing cyber operation. The Council of Europe (COE), for example, 
 
36 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep para 
18 
37 European Parliament, ‘Cybersecurity in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – Challenges 
and risks for the EU’ (2017) EPRS/STOA/SER/16/214N 18 
38 MNE 7 (n 20) 7 
39 UNGA ‘Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
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January 2015) UN Doc A/69/723, 3 
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entities.’ Government of Finland (n 26) 19 
41 Belarus submitted that the international information security depends on the ‘the need to prevent the possible 
misuse of information and communications technology (ICT) so as to undermine national security and stability 
and international security. UNGA ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context 
of international security’ (11 August 2017) UN Doc A/72/315, 6 
42 Kersti Kaljulaid, ‘President of the Republic at the opening of CyCon 2019’ (Office of the President of Estonia, 
29 May 2019) 
<https://president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/> 
accessed 4 August 2019 
43 UN Doc A/71/172 (n 27) 19 
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maintained that the due diligence principle in the cyber domain encompasses not only the 
requirement to prevent the unlawful cyber operations emanating from one’s territory but also 
to ‘respond to disruptions or interferences, or to minimise risk or consequences’.44 Additionally, 
Australia noted that even though prevention is not always possible, States are to do their 
utmost ‘to put an end to the harmful activity’.45 
Prior to discharging the obligations of prevention and termination when the circumstances 
demand, due diligence principle dictates the development of capacity, enabling the States to 
do so. In other words, due diligence requirements are twofold – States are to develop the 
capacity of performance prior to the occurrence of the cyber incident and to utilise the 
capacity or to act when circumstances demand or when the actual cyber operation is 
underway. Even from a standpoint of terminology, as understood by the UN Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction, prevention indicates ‘the intention to completely avoid potential adverse 
impacts through action taken in advance’.46 According to Pisillo Mazzeschi, an obligation to 
prevent requires the States to develop ‘a legal and administrative apparatus normally able to 
guarantee respect for the international norm on prevention’47 as well as to utilise the 
aforementioned apparatus when the need arises. The same holds true for the obligation of 
termination: discussing due diligence in the context of the law of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses, the ILC argued "[t]he State may be responsible ... for not enacting 
necessary legislation, for not enforcing its laws ..., or for not preventing or terminating an illegal 
activity’.48 In other words, States are legally bound by the due diligence duties before, as well 
as, during the occurrence of the unlawful cyber operation. Although this may be true, the need 
 
44 Council of Europe, ‘International and multi-stakeholder co-operation on cross-border Internet’ (Directorate 
General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, 2010) para 73 
45 Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy (n 21) 
46 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction’ 
(May 2009) 22 [emphasis added] 
47 Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of 
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Minn., American Law Institute Publishers 1987) 105, section 601(d) 
170 
for capacity building goes beyond the legislation and administrative apparatus. Dupuy, for 
example, claimed States are required to possess not only a legal system but also the material 
resources necessary to comply with the obligations of due diligence.49 Also, to be able to 
prevent or terminate the unlawful acts emanating from their territory, States are required to 
diligently control the cyber infrastructure on their territory or under their jurisdiction. As 
maintained by Judge Alvarez in his dissenting opinion in the Corfu Channel case, it is the 
obligation of every State ‘to preserve in its territory such order as is indispensable for the 
accomplishment of its international obligations’50. In other words, States are to do their utmost 
to develop and possess jurisdictional capacity51 which will in turn allow the performance of the 
obligations stemming from the due diligence principle.  
There is no real reason to limit oneself to legislative and administrative measures, material 
resources or territory control or monitoring when considering the requirement of capacity 
building in terms of due diligence for what it prescribes are obligations of conduct and not the 
methodology of performance. For instance, in the Alabama Claims award the tribunal did not 
specify the measures required to comply with the obligation of prevention; Great Britain was 
found to be responsible for failing to employ ‘measures adequate to prevent the violation of 
[its international obligations]’.52 The relevant ICJ judgments similarly made no attempt to 
restrict the due diligence capacity building requirement to legislative and administrative 
measures.53 Also, in the cyber context, the UN General Assembly argued ‘States should 
ensure that their laws and practice’54 do not incite unlawful cyber behaviour.  
 
49 Dupuy (n 35) 373: ‘Government or a State should possess on a permanent basis, a legal system and material 
resources sufficient to ensure the fulfilment of [its] international obligations under normal conditions.’ 
50 Corfu Channel case (n 7) (Dissenting Opinion by Judge Alvarez) 44  
51 Tsagourias (n 14) 2 
52 Alabama Claims (n 30) 131 [emphasis added] 
53 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (n 36) 12; Corfu Channel case (n 7) 23; Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia 
and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ Rep para 292 
54 UNGA Res 55/63 (22 January 2001) UN Doc A/RES/55/63 para 1(a) 
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Additionally, writings of several prominent scholars recognised the due diligence obligations 
of prevention and termination as well as their dual structure in the cyber context. Tsagourias 
rightly argues that States are, firstly, expected to build institutional, resource and jurisdictional 
capacities. Specifically, States are expected to prevent malicious cyber operations by 
developing the ‘legal, administrative and institutional mechanisms’, assuring ‘human, financial 
and technical resources’ and, subject to resources available, to exercise control over the 
activities within its territory.55 Secondly, the aforementioned capacity is to be employed 
through act of termination when the specific situation arises. Buchan similarly contends that 
States are to ‘equip themselves with the means to detect, prevent, mitigate and punish 
[internationally wrongful] conduct by non-state actors within their territory’56 as well as attempt 
termination when a cyber threat occurs. Bannelier, discussing the international law of low-
intensity cyber operations, claims the States are to employ best efforts to prevent and stop 
malicious cyber operations emanating from one’s territory, which includes enacting preventive 
domestic normative measures, protecting cyber infrastructure (from misuse) and reacting to 
the occurrence of such operation by way of investigating and punishing the authors.57 The 
clear dual structure of due diligence in cyberspace that dictates the development as well as 
the deployment of the capacity to prevent and terminate has been emphasised by other 
scholars.58 Other, less structured approaches to due diligence in cyberspace are also 
available. Due diligence in the cyber context, so argues Sklerov, can be decompiled into 
several duties – enacting ‘stringent criminal laws, conducting vigorous investigations, 
prosecuting attackers, and […] cooperating with the victim-states of cyberattacks that 
originated from within their borders’.59 Lastly, focusing exclusively on the obligations of 
 
55 Tsagourias (n 14) 2 
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developing capacity, Kolb argues States are under the obligation to ‘create and maintain’60 an 
effective system of internal security (supplied with necessary personal, financial, and technical 
instruments), to adapt the enabling and appropriate legislation, and to seek international 
cooperation and information exchange. 
2.2. The condition of knowledge 
Due diligence is conditioned by knowledge of an emanating conduct in contravention to the 
legally protected international rights of another State. In other words, the omission of the 
appropriate prevention and termination steps constitutes a violation of international law only if 
the non-diligent State of emanation had or ought to have had knowledge of the unlawful cyber 
operation in question. To illustrate, Iranian authorities ‘were fully aware’61 of their obligation to 
exhibit diligence in the efforts to prevent and terminate the violation of the foreign diplomatic 
premises as well as the urgency of the situation, established the United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran case. In fact, the requirement of knowledge as the precondition for 
the materialisation of the obligations of due diligence was previously emphasised also in the 
Alabama Claims arbitration and Corfu Channel case. Specifically, the ICJ in the Corfu Channel 
case asserted that ‘the laying of the minefield which caused the explosions could not have 
been accomplished without the knowledge of the Albanian Government’.62 Under these 
circumstances, the ‘knowledge of the minelaying as such imposed on the Albanian authorities 
the duty to act. Knowledge was the test of imputability of unlawful omissions.’63 Generally, 
scholars of international law in the context of cyberspace have not disputed the idea that 
knowledge is what triggers the obligation of due diligence. A State ‘had or ought to have had 
the knowledge and the means to avert the situation’ argues Bannelier.64 Similar assertions 
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were made by many other legal scholars.65 CoE also confirmed the reasoning by stipulating 
that the States are under no obligation to prevent or terminate the cyber operations of which 
they have or had no knowledge. 66 
Doctrinal development points in two different directions – a State is responsible for failing in 
its due diligence obligations either because it knew or because it should have known of the 
cyber operation against the rights of another State. For State responsibility to arise, therefore, 
‘actual or, at least, constructive knowledge on the part of the [State] is essential’.67 On one 
hand, the authors of the Tallinn Manual conditioned the duty of due diligence with the actual 
knowledge of the malicious cyber operation.68 The obligation arises only if State organs ‘have 
detected a cyber operation […] originating from its territory or if the aggrieved party to the 
conflict has credibly informed the [State] that a cyber operation has originated from its 
territory’.69 The responsibility for lack of vigilance in the prevention or termination efforts was 
established on the basis of actual knowledge in the case of Alabama Claims arbitration70 and 
the ICJ Teheran Hostages case,71 where the United Kingdom and Iran were, respectively, 
informed of the lack of prevention and termination measures or the danger of the unlawful act 
by the parties injured in the course of the contentious events.  
Nevertheless, a widely held understanding holds that State responsibility will arise also on the 
basis of constructive knowledge. ‘To incur responsibility on this basis it is enough that the 
State was aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that [the unlawful 
act] would be committed’72 argued the ICJ in the Genocide case. Formulated on the reasoning 
 
65 See Buchan (n 56) 16; Tsagourias (n 14); Kolb (n 59) 123–124; Christian Walter, ‘Obligations of States Before, 
During, and After a Cyber Security Incident’ (2016) 35 GYIL 67, 74 
66 Council of Europe (n 44) 74 
67 Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘The Principle of International Responsibility (087)’ in Hague Academy of 
International Law (ed), Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (Brill Nijhoff 1955) 352 
68 Schmitt 2013 (n 17) rule 5 (10) 
69 ibid rule 93 (5) 
70 Alabama Claims (n 30) 
71 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (n 36) 
72 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (n 53) 
174 
offered by the ICJ in the latter as well as the Corfu Channel case, Buchan, Tsagourias, Pirker73 
and Heintschel von Heinegg74 recognised the prevalence of the theory arguing in favour of the 
permissive constructive knowledge sufficiency in establishing State responsibility for the 
omission of prevention and termination. CoE offered similar view.75 
In determining the appropriate test of knowledge, one has to, however, take into consideration 
the circumstances of the omission76. Placing the dispute in the context of countermeasures 
for the violation of the due diligence leads to the appreciation of both – actual as well as the 
constructive knowledge test.  
Considering that countermeasures are only to be employed after the injured party has notified 
the responsible State of its intentions to do so and has invited it to fulfil its international 
obligations,77 the targeted entity has the opportunity to make the non-diligent State actually 
aware of the malicious unlawful act emanating from its territory. A notification, and with it the 
potential to reduce the benefits of the unlawful conduct, is likely to induce the responsible 
State to attempt to terminate the outgoing cyber operation. Depending on how diligent the 
State was in the development of its performance capacity, this scenario could compel the 
wrongdoing State into compliance with international law. If, on the other hand, the responsible 
State persists with the non-diligent behaviour related to the obligation of termination or has 
not reached the minimum standard pertaining to the development of the termination capacity, 
countermeasures can follow. 
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On the other hand, States may wish to employ urgent countermeasures and omit the prior 
notification of the allegedly responsible State. The condition of knowledge, however, persists 
and the inured States wishing to take urgent countermeasures against the non-diligent State 
should examine the existence of the constructive knowledge. Founded on the Corfu Channel 
case reasoning, the constructive knowledge test is determined upon the consideration of two 
aspects – a general attitude of the State towards acquiring knowledge of similar events and 
the feasibility of acquiring knowledge of the particular event. In a first deliberation the Court 
concluded that, inter alia, the past Albanian actions and diplomatic communication in support 
of its surveillance of the Corfu strait, confirm Albania was normally aware of the happenings 
in the area. Secondly, the Court established that, upon conducting a practical test, the 
occurrence of the unlawful act in the area ‘could hardly fail to have been observed by the 
Albanian coastal defences’.78 In other words, the Court sought to determine the general 
attitude of the State towards acquiring knowledge of similar events and the theoretical 
feasibility of it acquiring the knowledge of the particular event. 
As already established, the first element of the constructive knowledge test is a prerequisite 
for discharging the due diligence obligations of prevention and termination, which expects 
States to diligently control and monitor their respective territories and the cyber infrastructure 
under their jurisdictions. It is no secret that regular monitoring of computer networks is indeed 
an established practice among States. Particularly in the cyber era, States do normally exhibit 
vigilant observance of the activities in their respective cyber “channels”.  
The second part of the constructive knowledge test is of a more technical nature and therefore 
not detailed here. Suffice to say, the State wishing to attribute constructive knowledge to a 
particular nation, must be certain of the fact that the latter has the capacity to spot the specific 
(or comparable) outgoing malicious cyber operation. Even though not all cyber operations are 
alike, a well-developed general capacity to acquire the knowledge of an outgoing cyber 
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operation would nevertheless imply the ability of a State to do so also in specific 
circumstances. Recently, former US Secretary of State Tillerson argued that a well-developed 
intelligence apparatus of a State can indicate the existence of a constructive knowledge which 
puts the State under the obligation to terminate a conduct in violation of the rights of another 
State. After several members of the US diplomatic corps in Havana were injured, the Secretary 
of State said: ‘[w]hat we've said to the Cubans is: small island. You've got a sophisticated 
intelligence apparatus. You probably know who's doing it. You can stop it, it’s as simple as 
that.’79 As a matter of fact, many States do commit to the development or the utilisation of 
exiting capabilities of detection, the analysis of national cybersecurity strategies indicates. 
Hungary, for example, vowed to develop ‘efficient capabilities to prevent, detect, manage 
(react), respond to and recover any malicious cyber activity, threat, attack or emergency’.80 
Singapore, on the other hand, committed to ‘upgrading of existing detection and analysis 
capabilities and strengthening preventive and recovery measures’,81 while the Norwegian 
CERT already does operate the Early Warning System for Digital Infrastructure and has ‘the 
ability to prevent, detect and analyse data related to serious incidents on the Internet’.82 The 
implied knowledge of the malicious interstate cyber operation would have been even more 
apparent when the national legalisation requires ISPs to report such incidents to one of the 
organs of the State and thus aid the State in its capacity to acquire knowledge. Theoretically, 
technology is not a limitation here and particularly so in the case of DDoS attacks; computer 
science scholarship provides that ISPs can indeed spot not only an incoming but also an 
outgoing DDoS attack.83 
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With this in mind, it would be acceptable to infer that States with a well-developed cyber 
intelligence apparatus and an extensive history of Internet censorship or monitoring involving 
‘constantly [keeping] a close watch over the’84 ISPs and Internet traffic in general should 
indeed possess knowledge of the malicious cyber activity using the Internet infrastructure 
under its jurisdiction. 
2.3. Standard of due diligence 
The standard of due diligence is a flexible concept. Historically, ‘the standard according to 
which international law has held its subjects accountable for actions of individuals has varied 
greatly’.85 Generally speaking, due diligence requires a State to ‘deploy adequate means, to 
exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost’86 to prevent or terminate an internationally 
wrongful conduct emanating from its territory. It requires an honest attempt at prevention or 
termination; the State exercises due diligence if it ‘honestly gives so much care as may seem 
to an average intelligence to be proportional to the state of things existing at the time’.87 In 
other words, States have common but different responsibilities.  
The due diligence standard, due to the lack of internationally agreed upon standards regarding 
cyber operations, admittedly lacks exactness. Nevertheless, lessons from international 
diplomatic and environmental law point to the fact States are generally expected to observe 
the standard of a reasonable State or good government.  
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In the context of the due diligence principle, States are to exhibit ‘reasonable prudence’88 
which is an ‘overarching’89 due diligence standard. The ILC90, the ICJ91 as well as other 
international tribunals92 and arbitral awards93 have also confirmed this reasoning. Legal 
literature also seems to be just as unified.94 The due diligence standard, specific scholarship 
asserts, will be no different in the context of unlawful cyber operations.95 To narrow down the 
concept of a reasonable commitment by a State, several elements and variables need to be 
clarified. 
Firstly, the due diligence standard is era-sensitive and will vary according to the state of the 
technology (available to a particular State). The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS)96 as well as the ILC97 texts recognise the standard is of variable nature and may 
change over time. To live up to the standard of a good government, States are required to 
stay vigilant and informed of various technological and scientific developments.98 The need to 
stay up to date is especially prominent in the cyber context. Threat detection methods are 
progressively more effective. For example, recently a combination of the machine-learning 
driven modelling and human analysis has proven to be a far more effective method of cyber 
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threat detection than the usual methods.99 At the same time, the sophistication of cyber 
operations, in particular the well-funded, State-sponsored ones, is on the rise.100 Proactive 
cyber vigilance, including cooperation with other nations and the private sector, reasonable 
investment in cybersecurity research and development efforts, as well as regular review and 
evaluation of specific cybersecurity practices, regulatory or legislative measures, is therefore 
crucial in meeting the ever-changing due diligence standard. 
A plain example of what seems to be a lack of an informed and current vigilance is provided 
by the list of the State-owned Aramco servers attacked in the Shamoon operation; the majority 
of servers ran on an outdated operating system released in 2003, no less than nine years 
before the attack.101  
Secondly, the due diligence standard depends on the circumstances surrounding the 
unlawful act. When considering circumstantial variables of the due diligence standard, due 
diligence obligations must be satisfied in a timely manner while the required action depends 
on the target, foreseeability, magnitude and probability of harm. Whether the (re)action of the 
State amounted to this requirement is ‘not measured by any absolute standard, but depending 
on the relative facts of the special case’.102 
Specifically, the State must ‘inform itself of factual or legal components that relate foreseeably 
to a contemplated procedure and [must] take appropriate measures in timely fashion, to 
address them’.103 Similarly, when the State is equipped with knowledge of the imminence of 
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an unlawful act and ‘does not take timely steps to prevent such act’,104 international 
responsibility arises. In fact, because the orders to its State agent were not only delayed but 
also impractical, the Alabama Claims tribunal ruled that the British government failed to exhibit 
due diligence in the performance of its neutral obligations.105 On the other hand, the ICJ did 
not find Iran internationally responsible for the early attacks on American diplomatic premises 
by the mob, since Iranian authorities, though failing to in fact prevent the attack, ‘they acted 
promptly in response to the urgent appeal for assistance made by the Embassy during the 
attack.’106 The CoE has applied this doctrinal requirement to cyberspace.107 
Considering the aforementioned requirement, diligent behaviour, materialised in the form of 
appropriate legislation, technical capacities, organisational measures, capacity building and 
(inter)national cooperation, would have to be taken prior to the occurrence of the 
transboundary cyber incident. Only these actions, taken in a timely manner or without 
necessary hesitation, would realistically allow taking actions of prevention and termination. 
Another circumstantial variable comes distilled from the international diplomatic law; the 
required standard of vigilance depends on the foreseeability or probability of the unlawful act. 
The arbitral award in the case of Chapman v United Mexican States made it clear – Mexico 
was expected to meet a higher standard of diligence in relation to the obligation of the 
protection of aliens due to the fact that serious threats had been made against the safety of 
an American consular official and that ‘such threats had been brought to the attention of the 
appropriate Mexican authorities’.108 A more recent confirmation of the reasoning comes from 
ITLOS; the tribunal emphasised due diligence obligations may ‘change in relation to the risks 
involved in the activity’.109 When assessing the risk, States are to consider the nature and 
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magnitude of the action in question.110 It goes without saying that riskier activities demand a 
more stringent standard of vigilance. When considering the level of required diligence in the 
cyber context, the authors of the Tallinn Manual argue that variables such as ‘[t]he nature, 
scale, and scope of the (potential) harm’111 of the cyber operation should be considered. The 
CoE, too, discussing due diligence in the cyber context, felt the scope and risk of an injurious 
cyber operation define the required standard of care.112 Some scholars have offered similar 
views.113 
It is safe to say States are generally aware of the probability of malicious cyber operations 
originating from their infrastructure. Whether this holds true for a specific cyber operation, 
making it foreseeable, is another matter and remains unknown. Still, a higher standard of care 
would be expected with the probability of a cyber operation targeting foreign critical (network) 
infrastructure or systems vital to the wellbeing of the society. The aforementioned targets not 
only imply a significant scope of harm inflicted by the malicious cyber operation but also cater 
to the proponents of the necessity for greater vigilance when targeted subjects (and objects) 
are of special interest to the State.114 On the other hand, notwithstanding the potential of a 
swift propagation of the malicious code, an operation targeting a smaller number of personal 
computers or workstations would, require a more lenient standard of diligence. 
Thirdly, the standard of due diligence is subjective and depends on the State’s capacity to 
fulfil its obligations. The Corfu Channel judgment opined that ‘vigilance depends on the means 
available to a given State.’115 Indeed, a State cannot be expected to ‘exercise greater vigilance 
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than is consistent with the means at its disposal’116, a notion that fits in the concept of the 
reasonableness of due diligence. The notion is implicit in the observations that States are to 
do everything in their power to prevent and terminate the occurrence of unlawful acts; in the 
words of Kunz, inspired by the writings of the ILC, a ‘State which has used all the means at its 
disposal to prevent a violation of its [international obligations] but is unable to prevent it, has 
fulfilled its international duty’.117 A similar notion can be observed in the William E. Chapman 
(USA) v United Mexican States118 judgment, in the Article 194(1) of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)119 and, specifically in the context of due diligence in cyberspace, 
by the CoE120 and different authors.121 Specifically, the level of scientific knowledge,122 the 
technological123 and economic124 capacities are oft-considered variables of due diligence 
standard in the cybersecurity context.  
It is not hard to sympathise with the advocates of the wholly variable standard. Cyberspace 
indeed is a (relatively) new domain and achieving the international minimum standard, 
especially for developing countries, may seem everything but possible. It involves long-term 
effort, human capital of specialists and, due to the fact that much of technological development 
in the domains of security and prevention is conducted by private entities, significant financial 
resources. Indeed, meeting an international standard of diligence in the current context, with 
its technological underpinning, is a complex task. For this reason, the developing States may 
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be ‘permitted to exercise less diligence’125 compared to its counterparts with ‘a well-developed 
economy and human and material resources and with highly evolved systems and structures 
of governance’.126 
Be that as it may, the principle of due diligence has been explicitly linked to the international 
standard of justice.127 In the cyber context, considering the extraordinary interdependency of 
the national cybersecurity environments, States are therefore required to meet the standard 
of common prudence128 or an international minimum standard.129 Tsagourias, applying the 
ITLOS advisory opinion rationale,130 addressed the topic of due diligence in the context of 
cyber espionage and argued in favour of the international minimum standard; the lack of it 
would allow ‘private or public actors [to] operate from States with lesser capabilities and in 
doing so jeopardise international law’.131 
International responsibility arises when the State fails to meet the expected international 
minimum standard attached to duties related to either the development of capacity building or 
discharging the due diligence obligations. Support for this assertion may be found in the, for 
example, Neer L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v United Mexican States decision, 
where the General Claims Commission concluded that an insufficient State conduct in the 
context of due diligence obligations will give rise to State responsibility regardless of ‘[w]hether 
the insufficiency proceeds from deficient execution of an intelligent law or from the fact that 
the laws of the country do not empower the authorities to measure up to international 
standards’.132 Due to the technical nature and relative novelty of cyber operations, the 
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development of capacity allowing for prevention and termination should encompass more than 
only the legislative frameworks; this is well elaborated in the following section. 
When an international minimum standard is not embedded in the primary obligation, it can be 
deduced from the ‘the applicable principles of international law [and] analogous principles of 
justice generally recognised by States’.133 Due to the embryonic state of the international law 
in the context of cyberspace, the present text will source cyber due diligence minimum 
standard development trajectories from the standards of due diligence found in various 
analogous legal regimes and from the habitual performance of States. The latter, articulated 
in various national strategies, can be interpreted as their ‘recognition of [the] commitment’134 
to compliance with the obligation and ‘an important legal foundation’135 of the relevant 
international minimum standard. 
3. Content and the international minimum standard of due diligence in 
cyberspace 
3.1. Developing the capacity of performance 
The above-exposed lack of unity among international lawyers regarding the content and 
minimum standards of the capacity required to diligently prevent and terminate malicious inter-
State cyber operations emanating from a particular territory may be overcome by looking 
beyond the boundary of legal scholarship. 
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If due diligence requires States to remain vigilant, to ‘exercise good faith’136 and ‘honestly 
intending to fulfil the obligations’137 of prevention and termination, a serious and diligent 
national commitment to cybersecurity is required; only a serious commitment to cybersecurity 
will amount to a capacity which will enable the State to effectively prevent and terminate an 
incoming as well as an outgoing cyber operation. Several attempts to conceptualise (and 
assess) national commitments to cybersecurity have been made.138 The most authoritative 
and comprehensive one comes from a specialised UN agency, the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU). The Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) was compiled to 
assess ‘each nation state’s level of commitment to cybersecurity’139 and ‘foster a global culture 
of cybersecurity’.140 It is based on the ITU Resolution 130 and the agency’s mandate to assist 
in building ‘confidence and security in the use of information and communication 
technologies’141 of the ITU member States.  
The framework rests on five pillars of cybersecurity commitment and is supported by various 
forms of strategic and legislative commitments of different States. The GCI elements form a 
theoretical model of a flawlessly diligent State with an absolute commitment to cybersecurity. 
It indicates which areas of capacity building should be considered by the diligent States if they 
want to prevent and terminate malicious cyber operations emanating from their respective 
territories. Addressing all the pillars of capacity building does not guarantee a successful 
prevention or termination, nor is this a legal requirement by the due diligence obligations of 
conduct, demanding a genuine effort rather than a result. However, by addressing all the areas 
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of capacity required for cybersecurity, a State has the biggest potential to succeed in 
prevention and termination. Hence, it is submitted that States are under the obligation to strive 
towards the ultimate commitment to cybersecurity or the satisfaction of all the elements of 
cybersecurity commitment listed below rather than to succeed in preventing or terminating the 
unlawful cyber act. This is not to say that there is no minimum threshold of performance 
required by the law; the section elaborates the international minimum standards pertaining to 
the specific elements of due diligence. 
3.1.1. Legal measures 
As explained, the requirement of legislative measures in the attempt to observe the due 
diligence obligation of prevention and termination has been recognised by the customary 
international law as well as general and cyber-inspired legal scholarship. The function of 
appropriate cyber legislation is an enabling one. It not only allows the State to perform its 
duties of prevention and termination in terms of developing the capacity of performance by 
‘providing a harmonised framework for entities to align themselves to a common regulatory 
basis’142 but also to utilise the capacity by setting the ‘response mechanisms to breaches, such 
as through investigation and prosecution of crimes and the imposition of sanctions for non-
compliance or breach of law’.143 This could include so called soft law instruments including, 
voluntary Internet service provider (ISP) Code of Practice with specific provisions related to 
the prevention and termination of the malicious cyber operations targeting the infrastructure 
of another State.144 
Due diligence obligations require the States to enact as well as to enforce the appropriate 
legal frameworks, which will subsequently allow the prevention or termination of the unlawful 
cyber operations. This dual structure is clearly expressed in the Pulp Mills judgment where the 
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ICJ argued the obligation of prevention ‘entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and 
measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement’.145 
To enact or to possess a sufficient and up to date legislative framework is the least a State 
can do to conform to the capacity development duties dictated by the due diligence obligations. 
‘[H]aving in place a legal framework that anticipates the taking of “appropriate measures” is a 
sine qua non for [due diligence obligations]’146 argued the ILC in its commentary to the Draft 
Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters and the provisions prescribing 
the due diligence obligations of disaster risk reduction. A similar argument may be made in 
relation to the due diligence obligations of prevention and termination in the cyber context. 
Save for the failed States, the legislative function is indeed in the capacity of every State. 
Besides a clear agreement in the legal scholarship elaborated above, States too have argued 
in favour of the requirement, in the context of due diligence, to enact a specific cyber law. 
Germany, for example, has previously maintained that States should avoid facilitating ‘areas 
of lawlessness in cyberspace’ and take ‘appropriate national legislative and regulatory 
frameworks needed to meet international responsibilities’147 to ensure their territories are not 
used contrary to the interests of other States. The CoE echoed the German attitude – the due 
diligence principle in the cyber domain encompasses a requirement to ‘[formulate and 
implement] policies’148 designed to prevent and terminate cyber interferences. Such a 
prevalence of opinions points to the fact that the enactment of the related legislation 
constitutes an international standard of diligent behaviour in the prevention and termination 
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efforts. Habitual performance of the States supports and confirms the conclusion – as of 2017, 
159 UN member States have enacted legislative measures related to cyber conduct.149  
The subjective nature of due diligence obligations allows States a degree of discretion and 
thus does not prescribe which areas must be addressed by national legislation. Generally, 
diligent States with a serious commitment to the prevention and termination of cyber 
operations targeting a foreign State would enact the legislation related to, inter alia, prevention 
of unauthorised access, protection of domestic infrastructure from manipulation and abuse, 
prohibition of interference,150 breach notification,151 extradition,152 obligations of ISPs153 or any 
other legislation enabling the performance of international obligations of prevention and 
termination. Considering that due diligence obligations prescribe control over the specific 
territory, enabling legislation authorising various investigative measures including real time 
collection of real time content and traffic data154 would also be necessary. 
What is important however, is that the national laws are up to date and reasonably sufficient 
to allow the State to discharge the obligation of prevention and termination. To this end, the 
national legislation, ‘once adopted, may not be appropriate in perpetuity’;155 what it should be 
is synchronised with the relevant international standards and the state of technology. As 
much as it is true that the State will incur international responsibility by reason of the omission 
 
149 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Cybercrime Repository – Database of Legislation’ (UNODC) 
<https://www.unodc.org/cld/v3/cybrepo/legdb/search.html?lng=en> accessed 7 January 2018 
150 See eg Cybercrime Act 2007 (Sudan) arts 8–9 
151 See eg United States Guam Crimes and Corrections, ch 48, § 48.30, 48.40, 48.50; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) art 33  
152 See eg Cybercrime and Computer Related Crimes Act 2007 (Botswana) arts 4–16 & 29; Convention on 
Cybercrime (23 November 2001, entered into force 1 July 2014) ETS 185 art 24; Colombia, ‘Policy Guidelines on 
Cybersecurity and Cyberdefense’ (draft, 4 July 2011); Swiss Confederation, ‘National strategy for the protection 
of Switzerland against cyber risks’ (19 June 2012) 10; Finland, ‘Finland´s Cyber Security Strategy’ (24 January 
2013) 
153 Eg Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006 (Nigeria) art 13 
154 Eg Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act 70 
of 2002 (South Africa) arts 7(2), 8(3), 28(1)(2), 30(1) or 39(4), 50, 40, 62. 
155 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the 
Area (n 86) para 222 
189 
of the legislation, the act of the ‘enactment of a law which conflicts with some particular 
international obligation of the State’156 may equally trigger international responsibility. 
Additionally, due diligence ‘requires a State to keep abreast of technological changes and 
scientific developments’,157 to ‘inform itself of factual and legal components’158 and, on the 
basis of this, formulate appropriate policies ‘expressed in legislation and administrative 
regulations and implemented through various enforcement mechanisms’159 opined the ILC. 
The requirement to stay up to date is especially prominent in the fast-paced cyber domain. 
Thus, national legislation should be periodically reviewed and adapted. In the context of the 
time-sensitive standard of due diligence and especially in the context of cyberspace, the 
obligation to enact and enforce a sufficient legislation is ‘of continuous nature’.160 
Additionally, national laws need to be reasonably sufficient. The standard of legal capacity, 
in case of unlawful cyber operations, may not prescribed by the law but it is quite clear that 
the State is within the limits of the law ‘[so] long as these laws are reasonably sufficient to 
prevent’161 malicious cyber operations. Sufficiency of domestic legislation in observing the due 
diligence, has indeed been required before in the Alabama Claims arbitration tribunal.162 
Moreover, in the dispute between Germany and Switzerland regarding the pollution of the 
Rhine River, the Swiss acknowledged their lack of due diligence in preventing the accident 
through adequate regulation of its own pharmaceutical industries.163 In relation to this, 
Lauterpacht previously offered a similar argument; the State has performed the duty ‘so long 
as these laws are reasonably sufficient’164 to comply with the obligations stemming from the 
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due diligence principle. Insufficiency of national legislation is not an excuse to escape the 
international responsibility; a State ‘cannot justify itself for a failure in due diligence on the plea 
of insufficiency of the legal means of action which it possessed’.165 Writings of prominent 
scholars have also confirmed this point of view.166 Whether the legislation can be considered 
as sufficient or not depends on the circumstances of a specific cyber operation.  
It is also important that the legislation in question is enforced. Because cybersecurity and the 
ability of the State to prevent and terminate a cyber operation depend on the participation of 
a variety of stakeholders, States must make sure that the specific laws are observed by the 
subjects under its jurisdiction. Only then will the legislation serve its purpose and provide the 
desired effect – enabling the State to prevent and terminate an internationally wrongful cyber 
operation. In the words of the ICJ in the Pulp Mills case, due diligence requires ‘a certain level 
of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public 
and private operators’.167 
3.1.2. Technical measures 
Considering that cyber operations are conducted through the utilisation of computerised 
telecommunication infrastructure, it is reasonable to submit that technical measures are of 
vital importance in diligent prevention and termination efforts. Similar to legislation, the 
technical and procedural measures are an enabling factor in the process of the development 
of the capacity of performance allowing for the prevention or subsequent termination of the 
unlawful cyber act. In addition to this, they allow a State to control and monitor the deeds of 
all subjects within its jurisdictional domain, imperative to diligent State conduct.  
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‘Technical measures can be evaluated based on the existence of technical institutions and 
frameworks dealing with cybersecurity endorsed or created by the nation State.’168 Examples 
of such measures include, but are certainly not limited to, the establishment of national, 
governmental or sectoral Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT), which is 
responsible for monitoring, warning and response in the event of an incident. The recognition 
of the vital function of such an entity in national cybersecurity commitments may be deduced 
from the vows States made in their respective national cybersecurity strategies – no less than 
38 of 72 strategies elaborate the responsibilities and organisation of CERTs in different 
formats.169 Other data corroborate the deduction; as of October 2016, 102 out of the 193 ITU 
member States confirmed the existence of an entity and the authority of a CERT.170 
For the above reasons, the fact that the establishment of a CERT is indeed an international 
standard in diligent capacity building prescribed by the obligation of prevention and termination 
of the unlawful inter-State cyber operations should not be contentious proposition. The 
seemingly high standard is attainable for several reasons, even for less developed States. 
(Developing) States do have a plethora of international assistance mechanisms at their 
disposal and meeting this international standard may not be as unachievable as it may first 
appear. ITU, for example, conducts assessments and assists in the establishment of CERTs 
for all of its members.171 The Organisation of American States172 and the EU Agency for 
Network and Information Security (ENISA)173 also support their members in the establishment 
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of CERTs, while the National Cyber Security Centre of the Netherlands offers a dedicated 
service aptly named CERT-in-a-box174 and the Forum of Incident Response and Security 
Teams offers a medium for sharing best practices related to the operation and establishment 
of CERTs.175  
Another technical capacity building international minimum standard associated with the due 
diligence obligations aimed at preventing the negative effects of acts with transboundary 
consequences is the ‘installation and operation of early warning systems’.176  
This certainly is a technically viable measure in the domain of cybersecurity. Even though 
early warning systems are traditionally operated by CERTs, this can be done also at the ISP 
level. A German ISP Deutsche Telekom, for example, checks all outgoing queries for IP 
spoofing, thereby blocking bogus data traffic, which could constitute (part of a) distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) flood or participation in another malicious act.177 Extensive State 
practice corroborates the argument in favour of this minimum standard of capacity building. 
The US President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, for example, envisions 
a set of technical tools establishing the monitoring system which ‘scan[s] the network in real-
time to identify patterns of behaviour that were anomalous or abhorrent’178 to the pre-
established baseline level of a normal network operation, where anomalies imply the 
occurrence of a (outgoing or incoming) malicious cyber operation. In fact, in 35 national 
cybersecurity strategies States recognise the importance of such tools and proclaim a 
dedication to implementing a form of a warning system. 
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In spite of this, a proposition that the establishment and operation of such systems indeed 
constitutes an international minimum standard remains problematic. Establishing an early 
warning system in the cyber domain involves either considerable technical expertise or an 
allocation of significant financial resources to acquire commercially available products. 
Considering the due diligence obligation only expects a State to act within its means, these 
factors certainly pose a limitation on the expected (and flexible) standard of behaviour. 
3.1.3. Strategic and organisational measures 
To achieve a comprehensive and inclusive cybersecurity commitment to due diligence, States 
need to adopt a broad strategic objective in the form of cybersecurity strategy, including a 
robust governance model. This model will create or designate the entities responsible for the 
nation’s cybersecurity policy coordination and implementation. Unlike the previous two 
elements of a diligent approach to cybersecurity, the strategy with a governance model is a 
central element to the implementation of the cybersecurity commitment in a given State.  
More than one third of all UN member States currently possess a document or series of them, 
taking form of a national cybersecurity strategy.179 Whether this is enough to pronounce the 
possession of a cybersecurity strategy to be an international minimum standard of capacity 
building pertaining to the due diligence obligations in cyber context remains unanswered. On 
the one hand, the lack of a national cybersecurity strategy may not be interpreted as de facto 
proof of a government acting in bad faith or a definitive indication of its negligence since it can 
be substituted with the comprehensive legislation or a set of other polycentric policy 
mechanisms. After all, due diligence does impose best efforts, implying flexibility and 
discretion in observing the law. Nevertheless, it does hold true that without the strategy ‘efforts 
in different sectors and industries become disparate and unconnected, thwarting efforts to 
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reach national harmonisation in terms of cybersecurity capability development.’180 
Cybersecurity strategy is a vital harmonisation instrument in the facilitation of intra-agency, 
cross-sector and cross-border coordination, which is crucial in a complex and relatively new 
domain such as cybersecurity. It is for this reason that the Resolution 45 of the ITU’s World 
Telecommunication Development Conference recognised ‘the need for Member States to 
develop national cybersecurity programmes centred around a national plan’.181 The existence 
of such national strategic plan indicates ‘States are prepared to face serious risks, are aware 
of their consequences, and are equipped to appropriately respond to breaches in the network 
and information system’ argued ENISA. 
To support the global commitment to a secure cyberspace, a number of intergovernmental 
organisations offer assistance to governments in their efforts to draft, implement or evaluate 
their national cybersecurity strategies.182 Incapacity or lack of resources is therefore unlikely 
to be accepted as a reason for a State to have no cybersecurity strategy. 
3.1.4. Inclusive capacity building 
While inclusive capacity building cannot be considered a minimum standard of conduct, such 
devotion would certainly point towards a wholesome commitment to cyber due diligence. 
Particular measures in this context include, inter alia, the creation of standardisation bodies, 
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research and development programs, public awareness campaigns, and support for the 
domestic cybersecurity industry.183 
The CoE, in the context of due diligence, does consider wider societal capacity building 
measures as part of the assortment of reasonable measures aimed at the prevention and 
termination of malicious cyber operations; States ‘should also participate in the development 
and implementation of Internet user education and public awareness programmes, promotion 
and facilitation of dialogue with stakeholders as well as other appropriate measures’184 argues 
the CoE report. 
By all means, the aforementioned efforts are indicative of a general commitment to 
cybersecurity and widely recognised by various national cybersecurity strategies. The 
Australian national cybersecurity strategy, for example, recognised the importance of the 
awareness building measures in the effort to minimise the risk of cyber incidents; ‘there is a 
reasonable expectation that governments and the private sector, including the Internet 
industry, will educate users and their customers on the risks and the steps they can take to 
minimise them.’185 In like manner, Japan vowed to foster the ‘efforts of cyberspace users, 
including individuals, enterprises, and organisations, to raise their cybersecurity awareness 
and literacy, and take cybersecurity measures voluntarily’.186 
Two positive implications of the compliance with due diligence may be recognised. Firstly, 
awareness coupled with diligent cybersecurity measures, or sometimes called cyber 
hygiene,187 of all stakeholders could hold potential to reduce the likelihood of an outgoing 
malicious cyber operation. To illustrate, diligent individuals, attentive in their cyber hygiene 
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undertakings, are less vulnerable to assume the role of a zombie machine in an outgoing 
DDoS cyber operation. Secondly, State support of private sector research programs and 
domestic cybersecurity industry can indeed lead to the development of the technical capacity 
aiding the advancement of the State’s cybersecurity commitment efforts.  
Any positive effects of inclusive capacity building on the ability to prevent or to terminate a 
cyber operation are, however, far from guaranteed. Lessons from the 2007 DDoS attack on 
Estonia, for example, indicate botnets can be sourced from around the globe.188 This indicates 
that the implication of cyber hygiene of individuals in a particular State is a very negligible 
contribution to the prevention of an outgoing DDoS attack. Also, considering the fact that a 
machine is a participant zombie in a botnet is usually not apparent to an end user, a similar 
argument can be made about the role of cyber hygiene in the efforts to terminate such cyber 
operation. 
It is therefore submitted that, in their efforts to remain diligent in the observation of the duties 
to prevent and terminate, States may indeed wish to consider the inclusive capacity building 
measures but it certainly does not constitute a minimum standard of the obligations of 
prevention and termination. 
3.1.5. (Inter)national cooperation 
An international and intra-national cooperation in the context of the diligent prevention and 
termination of inter-State cyber operations is vital for a number of reasons. It is not only an 
implicit duty rooted in due diligence and the corresponding principle of good neighbourliness 
but also, due to the borderless nature of cyberspace, a prerequisite for successful prevention 
or termination of a transboundary cyber interference. The cooperation prescription is an 
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established legal doctrine and has received wide recognition in various national cyber policies 
and international cyber agreements. 
In essence, cooperation is indispensable for the satisfaction of the obligations of prevention 
and termination. The importance of international cooperation has been well documented; the 
Pulp Mills judgment stipulated that cooperation between nations is no less than ‘necessary in 
order to fulfil the obligation of prevention’.189 Other, more specific, international legal regimes 
stress the pivotal role of international cooperation in truly diligent prevention or termination of 
activities detriment to other States or the environment.190 
Considering the fact that the Internet service and hosting providers as well as domain name 
registrars, central to the process of (a malicious inter-State) cyber operation, are often owned 
and operated by non-State actors, diligent governments should enact and employ measures 
enabling the communication, cooperation and assistance of all the national stakeholders 
which are vital to the performance of the diligent prevention and termination of the cyber 
operation. The Estonian experience from 2007 shows that communication and cooperation 
between all stakeholders is of vital importance.191 As per the recommendation of ENISA, 
States should in their termination efforts ‘encourage [ISPs] to quickly contact technical experts, 
incident response teams (like national CERTs), crisis coordination groups, and other 
organisations relevant in the response phase’.192 Nigerian ISPs, for instance, are legally 
required to cooperate with enforcement and regulatory agencies, and must contact the 
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Nigerian Communications Commission, ‘in the event they become aware of any complaint or 
activity indicating Internet use for the commission of [a malicious cyber activity]’.193 This is in 
addition to the obligation part of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc) Act, stipulating 
that that ‘[a]ny person or institution, who operates a computer system or a network, whether 
public or private, must immediately inform the National [CERT] Coordination Center of any 
attacks, intrusions and other disruptions liable to hinder the functioning of another computer 
system or network, so that the National CERT can take the necessary measures to tackle the 
issues.’194 To facilitate cooperation in prevention, ISPs are required to ‘provide contact details 
for the ISP representative(s) responsible for addressing cybercrime issues [which] must 
include one or more means of contacting the identified individual(s) outside of normal business 
hours.’195  
The transboundary nature of cyber operations necessitates not only internal but also 
international cooperation. States shall cooperate to ensure ‘international information security 
to maintain world peace and security’196 and to prevent or repel a malicious cyber operation 
‘originating from their own territory or using the information infrastructure under their 
jurisdictions’197 stipulates the Draft Convention on International Information Security, drafted 
by the Russian Federation and several other States. Moreover, the European Commission 
stated that ‘building and maintaining robust alliances and partnerships with third countries is 
fundamental to the prevention and deterrence of cyber-attacks’.198 Equally important seems 
to be the role of cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Agreement on the 
Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security obliging the parties to cooperate 
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in diligent protection of the critical cyber infrastructure of the parties to the Agreement.199 
States have also individually recognised the importance of the international cooperation as 
part of their strategic commitment to cyber security.200 Relevant international legal scholarship 
has also argued in favour of cooperation being an essential element of diligent prevention and 
termination of the unlawful transboundary cyber operations.201 
As to the level of cooperation States are expected to exhibit, Jensen claims that ‘no specific 
standard for the level of cooperation is clearly agreed upon’.202 While it may be true that no 
explicit agreements exist, conceptualisation of the due diligence found in other analogous 
international legal regimes provide guidance. For example, the Draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm, indicates that a cooperative State, diligent in its efforts to prevent an 
event holding the potential to negatively affect other States, would at least ‘exchange in a 
timely manner all available information concerning the’203 looming event. Applying this 
reasoning to cyberspace, sharing all the available information related to the known and 
potentially unlawful cyber operation in a timely manner is the least a diligent State can do to 
prevent or terminate a cyber operation. Particularly so because of the speed at which cyber 
operations occur.  
The benefits of cooperation related to the maximisation of the potential to meet the prevention 
and termination duties are varied. It, for example, establishes a channel of inter-State 
communication, utilisation of which would be crucial in the attempt to satisfy the international 
standard of discharging the due diligence obligation of termination – providing a warning to 
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the targeted State(s). In addition to this, the indirect benefit of the cooperation comes in a form 
of ‘threat information, attack scenarios and best practices in response, mitigations’204 as well 
as the technology transfer,205 which would allow a State to develop the other elements of 
performance capacity more easily. 
3.2. Discharging due diligence obligations to prevent and to terminate 
Of course, not only do States have the duty to develop capacity but also to utilise it in order to 
prevent or terminate the unlawful inter-State cyber operation, when the situation demands. 
For example, prevention efforts involve enforcing the national legislation to arrest the plotters, 
engaging a CERT to remedy the network infrastructure vulnerabilities and prevent their 
exploitation for the purpose of conducting an internationally wrongful cyber operation, 
engaging ISPs to pre-emptively isolate or disable the network connection of the source of the 
potential cyber operation, and taking advantage of the intelligence and capabilities of the 
international partners.  
The requirement to diligently control the cyber infrastructure located in a domestic jurisdiction 
in order to comply with the due diligence obligation of prevention may indeed raise concerns 
over the abuse of the said obligation. Specifically, it is perhaps not unimaginable that a State 
could abuse the law and use it as a rationale for excessive control of the cyber infrastructure 
under its domestic jurisdiction. In the worst of the cases, a State could very well substitute 
national security concerns with the obligation of diligent prevention, using the principle and the 
stemming obligation as a justification to violate human rights of the people under its 
jurisdiction. A requirement to monitor cyber infrastructure on a specific territory could 
potentially be used as a rationale to violate, for example, human right to privacy or freedom of 
expression.206 
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While this is a reasonable concern, it is by no means an argument proposed by this thesis. 
Due diligence provides no universal right to derogation from the obligations part of the 
international human rights law and the interpretation of the international obligations stemming 
from the due diligence principle should be performed in good faith. 
Nevertheless, there are exceptional circumstances in which a State may be permitted to 
temporary disregard its human rights law obligations in order to comply with the due diligence 
obligation of prevention. Generally, such derogations are conditioned by the state of necessity. 
In certain cases, primary obligations include provisions stipulating the necessity; freedom of 
expression, for example, may be subject to restrictions when national security is threatened.207  
In cases where primary obligation offers no qualifications of necessity, one can resort to a 
more general guidance provided by the ILC’s codification of the customary international law 
on State responsibility, stipulating that derogation is permitted in case of necessity or when a 
violation of the obligation ‘is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril.’208 This construction of the necessity is elaborated in the 
following paragraphs.  
First, the only way means that the State seeking to violate human rights to fulfil its due 
diligence duties must first consider other means of compliance ‘even if they may be more 
costly or less convenient’.209 It must therefore first consider means of monitoring its territory in 
a way that is respectful of the human rights of its population. Being an obligation of conduct, 
due diligence obligation of prevention does not prescribe what specific measures should be 
taken by States. Whether a violation of human rights and freedoms was indispensable to 
comply with the obligation of prevention, will depend on specific circumstances and is question 
that is of more technical than legal nature. 
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The fact that peril must be, inter alia, imminent, is not in contradiction of the due diligence 
obligation of prevention as it does not signal urgency or an immediate action. Imminence of 
peril can be assessed well ahead of materialisation of that peril, or in the context of this thesis, 
of injurious cyber operation. ‘A “peril” appearing in the long term might be held to be “imminent” 
as soon as it is established, at the relevant point in time, that the realisation of that peril, 
however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable’,210 argued the ICJ. 
Equally, the fact that peril about to ensue is of sufficient gravity to invoke necessity as a lawful 
ground for derogation depends on the reasonably expected consequences of the cyber 
operations resulting from the non-diligent behaviour; ‘[U]ncertainty about the future does not 
necessarily disqualify a State from invoking necessity, if the peril is clearly established on the 
basis of the evidence reasonably available at the time.’211 
Similarly, what is essential interest ‘depends on all the circumstances and cannot be 
prejudged’212 by any theoretical stipulation. What should be noted, however, is that it is not 
only its own essential interest that the State can protect when choosing to disregard the 
international obligation rationalised by necessity. It can be also rights of other States; when 
considering the essential interest, States should consider ‘interests of the entire community of 
States’213 and not only its interests. In seeking compliance with the due diligence obligation of 
prevention, the necessity to temporary disregard human rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression can be invoked on the basis of a concern over an imminent grave peril threatening 
the essential interest of another State. 
In the context of the international human rights law, ‘it is for the national authorities to make 
the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of 
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"necessity"’214 as a legitimate reason to violate human rights in the name of compliance with 
the due diligence obligations of prevention. As a guidance, however, a violation of human 
rights in the name of mutual protection of international rights of other States, measures 
‘imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’,215 argued the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Handyside v the United Kingdom case. This reasoning 
of the court is in line with State practice and other judgements of the aforementioned Court.216 
After it has been established that a malicious inter-State cyber operation is indeed utilising an 
infrastructure under the jurisdiction of a particular State and that prevention efforts have failed, 
that particular State should notify the affected State(s) of the (potentially) damaging cyber 
operation, allowing the targets to immunise themselves or minimise the consequences. 
Notification constitutes a minimum international standard in the context of the obligation of 
prevention and the underlying principle of due diligence. An excerpt from the Corfu Channel 
substantiates this claim. After the automatic anchored mines damaged British warships, 
Albania incurred international responsibility for its omission ‘to notify the existence of the said 
mines [and] failed to warn His Majesty's ships of the danger of the said mines’,217 a duty based 
on the customary due diligence obligation.218 The requirement has been reiterated by the ILC 
in the context of the prevention of environmental transboundary harm; ‘the State of origin shall 
notify without delay the States likely to be affected and shall transmit to them the available 
technical and other relevant information’.219 The obligation of notification is well established in 
the international regimes regulating the State response in environmental emergencies220 and 
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has been applied to the domain of cyberspace by various scholars.221 Several particularities 
of the requirement of notification ought to be noted. Should a cyber operation hold a potential 
to damage more than one State or there is an explicit danger of the uncontrollable propagation 
of the malicious code beyond the borders of one nation, the State of origin is to issue a general 
warning to all States.222 It should be issued immediately, preferably prior to the termination 
efforts being taken. Principally, the warning and the subsequent communication is to be 
conducted in good faith; inter alia timely and in accordance with the State capacity.223 
And when the cyber operation finally does occur, the State of origin must again utilise the 
previously developed capacities and attempt to diligently terminate the operation. While the 
elaboration of several technical measures to achieve this is beyond the scope of the present 
text, States should once again utilise the previously developed capacity and, for example, 
isolate or cut the connection between the servers used in the operation; in the event of a DDoS 
attack, filter the redundant data packets, break off the connection of zombie machines and 
review the user privileges;224 or, in the event of espionage where phishing is usually the 
preferred method of penetrating the computer network system, prevent the perpetrators from 
using the dedicated Internet domain. If termination is not feasible, the State of origin must, in 
accordance with the due diligence principle, use all the previously developed capacity to 
contain and mitigate the incident and thus minimise its consequences. 
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4. Establishing State responsibility for non-diligent behaviour 
State which fails to develop the minimum capacity or discharge it to prevent and terminate a 
cyber operation depriving the other nations of their legally protected international rights is 
internationally responsible for the violation of the due diligence obligations. This section 
explains that invoking State responsibility for the lack of diligence in prevention or termination 
efforts of the unlawful cyber operation is a more feasible endeavour as compared to invoking 
responsibility for the operation itself, which, as explained in the preceding chapter, is almost 
impossible in the given context.  
To invoke international responsibility for the violation of due diligence obligations, an injured 
State must be ready to provide evidence substantiating claims of the jurisdiction of origin, the 
(constructive or actual) knowledge of the unlawful inter-State cyber operation, and the non-
diligent attitude of the authorities in capacity building or discharging the obligations of 
prevention and termination. In the attempt to prove the alleged violation of due diligence, 
invoke State responsibility and employ countermeasures, injured States should, if they wish 
to avoid employing unlawful countermeasures or contributing to the erosion of the rule of law, 
adopt standards of proof accepted in international law. Only by doing so will they escape 
inherently subjective judgment and escape escalation of the conflict. For this very reason, the 
following discussion rests on the standards and acceptable methods of proof documented in 
the jurisprudence of the ICJ and the ICTY. 
4.1. Evidence and proof of origin 
Since States can only be responsible for failing to exhibit diligent behaviour in relation to their 
prevention and termination of operations emanating from their territories or infrastructure 
under their jurisdiction, the State wishing to employ countermeasures should be able to point 
a finger at the State of emanation. 
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As established in the preceding chapter, a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not 
only overly demanding in the cyber realm but also disproportionate to the seriousness of the 
allegation225 – be it the orchestration or toleration of the unlawful cyber operation. Instead, the 
sufficiently clear and convincing proof is the standard States are to attain when seeking to 
substantiate allegations of attribution as well as the involvement of a particular infrastructure 
(located on the specific territorial unit) in the malicious cyber operation. This is supported by 
the legal scholarship and State opinio juris.226 International jurisprudence reinforces this 
reasoning; in the adjudication between the US and Iran, the former party presented the ICJ 
with evidence alleging that the HY-2 missile fired upon the Sea Isle City vessel ‘was fired from 
Iranian-held territory in the Fao area’.227 The evidence, however, did not amount to ‘sufficiently 
clear’228 proof and was thus unable to substantiate the conclusion the missile was fired by or 
from Iran. The application of the doctrine leads to a single deduction – the allegations that the 
unlawful cyber operation indeed originated from a particular territory have to be supported by 
a sufficiently clear and convincing proof.  
Undoubtedly, the various methods of establishing the origin of the cyber operation presented 
in the previous chapter hold the potential to provide such proof. Nevertheless, they remain 
plagued with unreliability. Once again, socio-political methods are unconvincing and cannot 
amount to the sufficiently clear and convincing standard, which should be self-imposed by the 
injured State attempting to invoke State responsibility should it wish to avoid escalation of the 
conflict. Conversely, while often incapable of pointing at the specific orchestrator or a natural 
person, computer science does offer a variety of methods with the potential to identify (the 
location of) the computerised devices utilised in a particular cyber operation. IP traceback 
remains the main technique in this endeavour229 although it can sometimes retain an unreliable 
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nature as it is subject to heavy computational load for path reconstruction and likelihood of 
false positives.230 This is particularly true in the case of a DDoS attack.231 Other computer 
science methods are also available. One of particular interest is the tracking of the 
Autonomous system number (ASN); it leads researchers to the specific network or ISP and 
therefore the country of origin,232 it can be a robust substitute to IP traceback. Both methods 
previously proved the origin of various inter-State cyber operations, but they failed to establish 
the identities of specific culprits or the attribution to the State authorities. Based on the IP 
address, South Korea's Communications Commission found that the 2013 operations 
targeting various Korean networks originated in China.233 The same State was found to be the 
origin of the widespread cyber espionage efforts.234 In another case, a particular Chinese ASN 
was identified as a source of espionage against Mongolian governmental systems235 and other 
malicious cyber operations.236 
As indicated in the previous paragraph, evidence pointing to the State of origin, comes in 
different forms though direct technical proof may hold the highest potential to achieve the 
sufficiently clear and convincing standard of proof. It may certainly not need to come in a 
physical form, as required by the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case when trying to determine the 
origin of the unlawful act.237 Firstly, physical evidence will probably not be available in the 
cyber domain. Secondly, and as it has been already established, digital evidence has indeed 
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been a permitted form of evidence in international adjudication.238 Lastly, the Court in the Oil 
Platforms case seems to have used the aforementioned restrictive terminology in order to 
distinguish and indicate the insufficient and unreliable character of the witness statement.239 
4.2. Evidence and proof of knowledge 
As previously established, the injured party in the conflict should be able to establish the 
allegedly negligent State was or should have been aware of the unlawful cyber operation. This 
can be achieved through the establishment of actual or constructive knowledge.  
The doctrinal standard of proof in the case of proving knowledge is less clear – the evidence 
may be circumstantial but should amount to ‘sufficient’240 proof or ‘lead to a single 
conclusion’241 or ‘leave no room for reasonable doubt’,242 the ICJ argued somewhat puzzlingly 
in the case of Corfu channel. Once again and for the well-documented reasons, this thesis 
argues in favour of the standard lower than beyond reasonable doubt.  
The ICJ took a more liberal position in the Tehran hostages case, where the evidence had 
amounted to proof which would satisfy the Court that the submissions were well founded.243 
Two things had been established to the ‘satisfaction of the Court’244 – historically, vigilance in 
monitoring the security situation around the US Embassy in Tehran and success in preventing 
and terminating similar attacks on the said diplomatic premises245 pointed at the fact that Iran 
should have known of the risk of the raid in question; direct evidence in a form of the records 
of repeated official calls for help246 as well as public statements of endorsement by Ayatollah 
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Khomeini and the Foreign Minister of Iran247 proved the State had actual knowledge of the 
aforementioned events in violation to the international diplomatic law. 
Much like the Iranian authorities should have known of the imminent danger of the attack, the 
Serbian regime should have known of the danger of the genocide in Srebrenica being 
committed. While requiring a proof of high certainty for the attribution,248 the employed 
standard of proof substantiating the knowledge was however most lenient. The Genocide case 
judgment recognised the fact that there was no evidence pointing that Milosevic or the Serbian 
authorities knew of the perpetrators’ decision to conduct the massacre in Srebrenica.249 
Nevertheless, the Court argued actual knowledge (or certainty) is not the precondition for the 
international responsibility to arise; ‘it is enough that the State was aware, or should normally 
have been aware, of the serious danger’250 of the genocide.  
In fact, it would appear that the ICJ employed the permissive standard of balance of 
probabilities – in the attempt to prove the fact that the Serbian regime was indeed aware of 
the prospects of genocide, the Court took into consideration two statements; General Clark 
stated before the ICTY that a conversation with Milosevic ‘indicated that [the latter] had 
foreknowledge of’251 the potential genocide while the recollection252 of the then EU envoy to 
Yugoslavia Carl Bildt, urging Milosevic to allow access to United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees and International Committee of the Red Cross to Srebrenica, ‘clearly 
[suggested]’253 that an awareness of the serious danger of genocide existed. Considering this 
conclusion, in spite of the fact that Milosevic contradicted254 the statement of General Clark, it 
is safe to deduce that the ICJ evaluated the proof on the basis of balance of probabilities; the 
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evidence amounted to a proof providing that it is ‘more likely than not’255 that the Serbian 
authorities knew of the imminence of the Genocide.  
This thesis has already argued in favour of the standard demanding a sufficiently clear and 
convincing standard of proof and it continues to do so. The reasons for this have been well-
documented in the preceding chapter – to avoid the escalation of the conflict, balance of 
probabilities is not an appropriate standard of proof while the standard beyond reasonable 
doubt is too demanding considering the alleged unlawful act. 
The fact that Russia was aware of the (imminent) DDoS attack on Estonia cannot be confirmed 
with a sufficiently clear and convincing proof. Doubtful factuality of the self-proclaimed 
responsibility of State Duma Deputy assistant Goloskokov,256 recorded no less than two years 
after the incident,257 does not amount to the standard of the clear and convincing proof. Similar 
can be claimed of the vague statements by the State Duma Deputy Markov, who (also two 
years after the fact) acknowledged the attack was conducted by his assistant.258 Although 
certainly indicative of the possibility that the Russian authorities knew of the malicious 
operation in March 2007, this statement does not constitute a sufficiently clear and convincing 
proof.  
But should have it known of the operation or the danger of it? The circumstantial evidence, in 
the form of public knowledge consequential to the ‘extensive coverage in the world press’259 
indeed points to the fact that Russian authorities should have been aware of the undergoing 
cyber operation. When evidence is out of reach or located in the foreign territory, circumstantial 
evidence (of public knowledge) may be used to substantiate the allegations of the constructive 
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knowledge, as previously indicated by the ICJ Tehran Hostages260 and the Corfu channel 
judgments. Since evidence pertinent to a cyber operation may be scattered around the world, 
located on different servers in several territories, this is of special interest in the present 
investigation. 
An affirmative answer providing a clear and convincing proof also follows the test employed 
in the Corfu channel case. The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation Information 
Security Center is normally vigilant in monitoring Russian Internet networks ‘using hardware 
and software installed at Russian [ISPs], Internet access points, and Internet exchanges’261 
just like Albania has historically kept a close eye on the Corfu naval passage. This must be 
particularly true for the State networks, from which the 2007 DDoS partially originated. Same 
holds true for any modern State, such as members of the Five Eyes262 alliance. Said Russian 
cyber capacities are also indicative of the possibility for the authorities to spot the network 
anomalies pointing at the outgoing 2007 DDoS attack which ‘involved large botnets with 
Russian based command and control nodes’;263 to construct a sufficiently clear and convincing 
proof, the affirmation of this theoretical possibility should be corroborated by the assessment 
of IT experts. Similarly, technical evidence of the Chinese extensive monitoring activities264 of 
their networks and the enabling infrastructure provides a sufficiently clear and convincing proof 
of ordinary vigilance. Should the States whose networks were penetrated by the infamous 
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ATP1 group be able to clearly demonstrate that Chinese capabilities were indeed sufficient for 
the theoretical detection of such an outgoing cyber operation, a sufficiently clear and 
convincing proof may be established. 
4.3. Evidence and proof of the lack of diligence 
Finally, the injured State needs to be able to prove that the allegedly perpetrating State failed 
to observe the due diligence principle in its attempt to prevent or terminate the unlawful cyber 
operation against another State. As established beforehand, this imposes a duty of diligent 
development of performance capacity as well as the utilisation of it or termination of the cyber 
operation. 
In its endeavour to establish State responsibility, the injured party should be able to prove the 
alleged perpetrator failed to attain the minimum international standard pertaining to the due 
diligence obligations. Namely, it should be in possession of a clear and convincing proof 
demonstrating the fact that the allegedly perpetrating State failed to enact, implement and 
enforce the appropriate legislation, failed to establish CERT and draft a comprehensive 
national cybersecurity strategy, share information regarding the incident or warn of the cyber 
threat.  
Russia has indeed enacted the appropriate cybersecurity legislation, established national 
CERT and drafted several strategic documents forming a national cybersecurity strategy.265 
Be that as it may, there is no public information indicating that the Russian authorities warned 
Estonia of the DDoS attack or that they offered help in mitigation. Instead, implicit 
endorsements were voiced – ‘something bad had to be done to these fascists’266 said State 
Duma Deputy Markov. What is more, in the time of the attack, Russian authorities and CERT 
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proved to be reluctant to offer any kind of assistance although they were asked for one, argued 
Estonian diplomats.267 Thus, Russia has failed to observe the due diligence standard.  
In an effort to prove the negligent behaviour of the State, an injured party can rely on public 
information. Numerous repositories of international organisations keep track of the status of 
national cybersecurity strategies,268 some of them rely on the data supplied by the States 
themselves.269 Similar can be said about the status of the national cybersecurity legislation270 
and existence of national CERTs.271 
5. Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated the utility of the due diligence doctrine in response to the 
questionable feasibility of the attribution and, subsequently, establishment of State 
responsibility for the unlawful inter-State cyber operations, exposed in the preceding chapter.  
I have elaborated the content and the flexible standard of due diligence in international law 
and provided evidence in support of the applicability of the doctrine in cyberspace; there is no 
denial that States have the due diligence obligations to prevent and terminate the 
internationally wrongful cyber operations emanating from their territories.  
This includes not only discharging the obligations but also the development of the capacity 
performance. In brief, the chapter argues that States are under the obligation to do all in their 
power to, firstly, develop the capacity of performance and, secondly, utilise this capacity to 
prevent or terminate an unlawful cyber operation performed by any actor under their 
 
267 Gregg Keizer, ‘Estonia blamed Russia for backing 2007 cyberattacks, says leaked cable’ Computer World (9 
December 2010) <http://www.computerworld.com/article/2511704/vertical-it/estonia-blamed-russia-for-backing-
2007-cyberattacks--says-leaked-cable.html> accessed 8 January 2018 
268 See eg CCD COE, ‘Cyber Security Strategy Documents’ <https://ccdcoe.org/strategies-policies.html> 
accessed 8 January 2018 
269 See eg International Telecommunication Union, ‘National Strategies Repository’ <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Cybersecurity/Pages/National-Strategies-repository.aspx> accessed 8 January 2018 
270 See eg United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (n 149) 
271 See eg Carnegie Mellon University, ‘List of National CSIRTs’ <https://www.cert.org/incident-
management/national-csirts/national-csirts.cfm> accessed 8 January 2018 
214 
jurisdiction. This involves at least the development and enforcement of sufficient contemporary 
cybersecurity legislation, establishment of CERTs, adoption of the national cybersecurity 
strategy and cooperative information exchange when a malicious event materialises. An 
inclusive participation capacity building is optional but certainly an indication of diligence.  
In the final section of the chapter I examined the principle of due diligence in the context of 
State responsibility and concluded that the injured parties wishing to employ countermeasures 
must be able to clearly and convincingly prove, first, the territorial or jurisdictional origin of the 
cyber operation, second, that the State of emanation knew or ought to have known of the illicit 
use of the infrastructure under its jurisdiction and, finally, that the allegedly responsible State 
was non-diligent in its prevention or termination efforts.  
Since all of the aforementioned tasks are attainable – something that cannot be claimed for 
the tasks required for the invocation of State responsibility on the grounds of agency – I 
proceed to elucidate how the injured State is to employ countermeasures, enforce the current 
and future performance of the law and thus restore the power and security. 
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Chapter 6 
Countermeasures, the non-diligent State and inducing compliance 
with international law in cyberspace 
1. Introduction 
Not only does international law prohibit the commission of cyber operations in violation of the 
rights of other States, it also dictates the diligent prevention and termination of such operations 
emanating from one’s territorial jurisdiction. From a factual perspective, a State responsible 
for the former is also responsible for the latter.  
This is not the case from the legal perspective; a combination of technological limitations and 
stringent legal standards of attribution prevent the injured State from invoking legal 
responsibility for the wrongful cyber operation and inducing compliance by way of 
countermeasures. It can, however, invoke legal responsibility for the violation of the due 
diligence obligations of prevention and termination. 
Generally, a failure to exhibit due diligence in prevention and termination efforts will result in 
international responsibility for the omission of diligence but not necessarily for the act resulting 
from this omission.1 Consequently, and in accordance with the law of the State responsibility, 
the non-diligent State is under obligation to cease the unlawful act, and thus do its utmost to 
terminate the cyber operation injurious to the legal rights of the other State. In accordance 
with the international law of State responsibility, it must also provide guarantees or assurances 
of non-repetition, namely of its future diligent efforts in prevention and termination of unlawful 
cyber operations stemming from their territory. Thirdly, the responsible State is under the 
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obligation to provide reparations for the injury caused to the State deprived of its international 
rights by the absence of due diligence and the resulting events.  
In light of the persisting positive cost benefit calculous of the non-compliance, it is highly 
unlikely the responsible State will indeed comply with the aforementioned legal obligations. 
This has been already established in the third chapter. The injured State is therefore entitled 
to employ countermeasures, by doing so to effectuate the obligation of reparations and so 
alter the cost benefit calculation of the non-complying party, rendering the current and potential 
future violation irrational. 
This chapter explains who can take countermeasures against whom, and when and how to 
effectively and lawfully induce compliance with the due diligence obligations. It also elaborates 
that the quantitatively proportional countermeasures effectuating reparations arising from the 
responsibility for the omission of a diligent conduct indeed change the calculation of the State 
in fact responsible for the cyber operation and thus deter it from violating international law with 
cyber means in the future. 
2. Who can take countermeasures against whom? 
2.1. Who can take countermeasures? 
Under international law, only States have the legal capacity to employ countermeasures. This 
does not mean that every State has the right to give effect to this capacity; generally speaking, 
it is a State affected by the breach of international obligations that can take countermeasures, 
although in exceptional circumstances,2 countermeasures may also be employed by a non-
injured State.  
Only States can take countermeasures against the foreign powers ‘for the State is like a 
screen between [non-State actors] and the international legal order.’3 According to the ICJ’s 
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argumentation advanced in the Barcelona Traction case, whether the claims under the law of 
State responsibility ‘are made on behalf of a [non-State actor] or on behalf of the State itself, 
they are always the claims of the State’.4  
Nevertheless, the reality is that non-State actors play a prominent role in cyberspace and it is 
not uncommon for a non-State actor, initially targeted by the unlawful cyber operation for which 
the State is responsible for, to react and hack back.5 The cyber operation aimed at Google in 
2009 is one example of a State pointing its cyber arsenal at a non-State actor. Even though 
the search giant had taken it upon itself to coerce the Chinese government cyber operatives 
to cease the operations against its computer network infrastructure located on American 
territory,6 such measures of actors not associated with the concept of international legal 
personality are not countermeasures as part of the international law of State responsibility. 
Principally, countermeasures may only be employed by an injured State. This is well-
established by the State practice, doctrine and jurisprudence7 and clearly expressed in the 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).8 In the words 
of the ILC in a commentary to the ARSIWA, countermeasures are ‘a feature of a decentralised 
system by which injured States may seek to vindicate their rights and to restore the legal 
relationship with the responsible State which has been ruptured by the internationally wrongful 
act’.9  
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On the surface, the concept of an injured State is rather straightforward – ‘[a] State whose 
individual right has been denied or impaired by the internationally wrongful act or which has 
otherwise been particularly affected by that act’10 is considered to be the injured State. In the 
context of this thesis, States deprived of their rights to diligent protection are therefore 
considered to be injured and legally empowered to employ countermeasures.  
However, due to the fact that the occurrence of events in contravention to the international 
rights of a State is ‘the sine qua non condition for the existence of the breach of the obligation 
[of prevention and termination]’,11 countermeasures against the non-diligent State can only be 
employed by a State injured by the wrongful cyber operation resulting from the breach of due 
diligence obligations. In other words, a State is considered to be injured by the denial of its 
rights to diligent protection only when it has also sustained an injury from the resulting unlawful 
act.  
To identify the State injured by the resulting wrongful cyber operation one needs to, firstly, 
establish which legal obligations a cyber operation violated and, secondly, to whom the legal 
obligations are owed. The specific unlawful character of the Shamoon, 2007 DDoS and 
RedOctober operations have already been elaborated in the first chapter of the thesis. What 
remains is to determine which State’s rights were violated in the course of the cyber incidents.  
States may be deprived of their rights by a cyber operation directly or indirectly. An example 
of a directly injured State is the DDoS operation in 2007 which targeted, inter alia, the 
governmental computer systems of Estonia12 constituting an unlawful intervention aimed 
against its political independence. Since the primary targets in this case were actual organs 
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of the State, it was Estonia that was an injured State, and thus legally empowered to take 
countermeasures against the State responsible for the violation.  
A similar conclusion can be drawn in relation to the RedOctober cyber operation that was in 
violation of the provisions of the international diplomatic law, which designates the sending of 
States’ diplomatic communication and archives, irrespective of their location, to be inviolable.13 
Every State whose diplomatic archives were compromised during the RedOctober operation 
is considered an injured State and therefore entitled to take countermeasures against the 
internationally responsible party.  
A malicious cyber operation can also injure a State indirectly. In fact, the reality is that rational 
States in pursuit of a quick inflation of their relative power will often direct their offensive cyber 
capacity against a non-State actor. Considering that various private entities are vital to the 
power and security of a modern State, it is rather unsurprising that they may be attractive 
targets of the unlawful power maximisation misdeeds of the rational States. Even when State 
organs are not directly targeted, the cyber operation may culminate in denial of the 
international rights of a State. Disrupting the operation of a critical national infrastructure14 
owned and operated by a non-State actor, may serve as an example. 
To illustrate, I turn again to the 2007 DDoS operation against Estonia, which targeted not only 
the web services of the State but also important financial institutions, which, by legal 
standards, do not fit the concept of a State but of a non-State actor. Nonetheless, as 
established in the first chapter, the aim of the operation was coercive interference with a matter 
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in exclusive domain of Estonia. Estonia is thus entitled to take countermeasures against the 
State internationally responsible for the violation of the principle of non-intervention. 
Yet another example of an indirect injury to a State by a cyber operation primarily targeting a 
non-State actor can be identified in the doings of the Shamoon malware. Despite the fact that 
the target of the malicious cyber operation was not the State itself, its internationally wrongful 
character lies in the fact that it constituted unauthorised access to the Saudi cyber 
infrastructure, which amounted to a violation of its sovereignty.15 Saudi Arabia, whose 
international sovereign rights were violated during said cyber operation, is therefore 
considered to be the injured State. 
An unlawful cyber operation may result in more than one injured State. In such case, ‘each 
injured State may separately invoke the responsibility of the State which has committed the 
internationally wrongful act’16 and take countermeasures to restore the material and legal 
relationships between the States, therefore rendering the violation irrational and thus inducing 
compliance. Due to automated propagation techniques and the low cost of scalability, the 
potential of such an event in cyberspace is significant.  
As a matter of fact, a single cyber operation employing the RedOctober malware breached 
the inviolability of the diplomatic correspondence and archives of no less than 43 States.17 
Each State, which experienced the violation of its right to confidentiality of diplomatic 
documentation is considered to be an injured State and legally entitled to take 
countermeasures against the party internationally responsible for the unlawful deed.  
Yet another and a more recent example of a single cyber operation infringing on the 
international rights of a multitude of States is the havoc wreaked by the WannaCry malware. 
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The cyber operation, which affected the network systems of 15018 States, including the British 
National Health Service,19 Iranian hospitals,20 systems of the Russian Interior Ministry21 and 
the Indian law enforcement entities,22 constituted a violation of the principle of sovereignty and 
thus injured the legal rights of several States.23 As it stems from the law of State responsibility, 
each of them can invoke State responsibility and consider taking countermeasures against 
the responsible State. 
Opinio juris indicates that solidarity with allies is a legitimate foundation for lawful 
countermeasures taken by States whose legal rights were not affected by the unlawful cyber 
operation. Most recently, the President of Estonia argued  
States which are not directly injured may apply countermeasures to support 
the State directly affected by the malicious cyber operation. […] The threats to 
the security of States increasingly involve unlawful cyber operations. It is 
therefore important that states may respond collectively to unlawful cyber 
operations where diplomatic action is insufficient, but no lawful recourse to use 
of force exists. Allies matter also in cyberspace.24  
In the context of anarchical international relations, this is a reasonable proposition of an 
egoistic State interested in its individual security and self-preservation rather than an objective 
appeal to promote the rule of law and general compliance with international law. Due to doubts 
in its own capacity to alter the rational choice calculation of the States diminishing the national 
 
18 Michael Schmitt & Sean Fahey, ‘WannaCry and the International Law of Cyberspace’ (22 December 2017) 
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security of Estonia by way of cyber operations, the President sought to establish legal 
foundation for countermeasures taken by a concert of allied States, which are presumably 
more likely to successfully restore the power balance disturbed by a wrongdoing cyber power.  
Limited State practice in support of the legality of collective countermeasures does exist.25  An 
example of third-party countermeasures in the context of this thesis are the ones taken by 
several States other than the US after Iran refused to prevent and terminate the internationally 
wrongful detention of US diplomats in Tehran. After the vetoed UN SC resolution26 calling for 
sanctions against Iran, the EEC, Japan and the UK27 took matters into their own hands.28 The 
UK, for instance, decided to proceed with countermeasures against Iran for three distinct 
reasons – to peacefully compel Iran to comply with international law and thus discourage the 
US from escalating the conflict by military means,29 to act in solidarity with their ally,30 and 
most importantly, to protect the status of the erga omnes obligations of international diplomatic 
law. Referring to the international community at large, British foreign minister Douglas Hurd 
argued in the House of Commons, ‘[t]his is not just a quarrel between the US and Iran in which 
the rest of us are essentially spectators. What has happened in Tehran has been […] an affront 
to a part of international law in which all our interests are involved’.31 
However, from a legal standpoint this non-discriminatory approach to who can take 
countermeasures against the internationally responsible State is problematic; the 
aforementioned State practice is embryonic and the existing customary law of State 
 
25 Several examples listed in ILC (n 9) art 54 cmt 3; ILC, ‘Fourth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Gaetano 
Arangio-Ruiz, Special Rapporteur’ (1992) ILC Ybk II(1) UN Doc A/CN.4/444 and Add.1–3, para 38. See also 
Jochen A Frowein, ‘Obligations erga omnes’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (December 
2008) paras 12 & 13 
26 UNSC Verbatim Record (11 & 13 January 1980) UN Doc S/PV.2191 para 149 
27 Iran (Trading Sanctions) Order 1980 (29 May 1980) 737 Statutory Instruments 2585; Export of Goods (Control) 
(Iran Sanctions) Order 1980 (29 May 1980) 735 Statutory Instruments 2579 
28 Russian representative at the UN General Assembly meeting complained: ‘This is a clear lack of respect for 
the Charter of the United Nations and an attempt to take the law into one’s own hands, and it should be resolutely 
condemned by all Member States.’ [emphasis added] UNSC Verbatim Record (n 26) para 168 
29 L. R. Fletcher arguing the British reaction will have a ‘restraining influence upon the military proclivities of our 
major ally in the Western Alliance.’ HC Deb 12 May 1980 vol 984 c959 
30 ‘[To sustain] the good health of the Alliance on which our national security depends to a large extent.’ ibid c963 
31 ibid c913 
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responsibility as codified by the ARSIWA Article 49 does not permit countermeasures by a 
State, the international legal rights of which were not injured by a cyber operation. States, such 
as France, have also spoken against the legality of the countermeasures taken by the States 
not legally injured by the internationally wrongful cyber operation.32 
What States other than the directly injured ones can do is invoke responsibility and take lawful 
measures, such as retorsion, when the violated rights in question are owed either to a group 
of States which it is a member of or of the legal obligation owed to the international community 
as a whole.33 States can therefore invoke responsibility ‘not in its individual capacity by reason 
of having suffered injury’34 but in the interest of preservation of the rule of international law. 
Accordingly, if a cyber operation was to violate obligations of erga omnes status, that is, the 
obligations owed ‘towards the international community as a whole’,35 any of the members of 
the international community may be considered to have a legal interest in the survival of the 
specific rule and empowered to take invoke State responsibility.36 ‘Acts of aggression, and of 
genocide, [violations of] the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human 
person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination’37 as well as the right of self-
determination38 are all considered to be erga omnes obligations.  
Since the 2007 DDoS operation against Estonia violated its sovereignty but did not constitute 
a breach of erga omnes obligations, under the existing international law, Estonia is the only 
State allowed to invoke State responsibility and take countermeasures. In the same vain, it 
should not be claimed that any State with legal interest could invoke State responsibility of the 
internationally responsible party for the RedOctober cyber operation in violation of the 
provision of the diplomatic law. While the protection of diplomatic personnel may constitute 
 
32 Michael Schmitt, ‘France’s Statement on International Law and Cyber: An Assessment’ (Just Security, 16 
September 2019) 
33 ARSIWA (n 8) art 48 
34 ILC (n 9) art 48 cmt 1 
35 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (n 4) 32 para 33 
36 ARSIWA (n 8) art 48 (1b) 
37 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (n 4) 32 para 34 
38 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep para 29 
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the erga omnes obligation,39 this is certainly not true for the inviolability of premises and the 
derivative40 obligations of the inviolability of diplomatic correspondence and archives; the ILC 
was explicit that ‘the obligation of the receiving State […] to protect the premises of a mission 
is owed to the sending State’.41  
Further elaboration of the extended legal right to invoke State responsibility is not attempted 
below; invocation of State responsibility itself and adopting lawful measures not proportional 
with the unlawful inter-State cyber operation does not sufficiently alter the cost benefit 
calculation of the perpetrating State and is therefore not enough to induce compliance with 
the international law. 
2.2. Targets of countermeasures 
Countermeasures, being a compliance inducing mechanism, are only to be aimed at the State 
considered to be responsible for the internationally wrongful conduct. The ICJ was clear on 
this matter – countermeasures ‘must be taken in response to a previous international wrongful 
act of another State and must be directed against that State’42 and the customary nature of 
the rule was reinforced by the ILC arguing ‘countermeasures may not be directed against 
States other than the responsible State’.43 Contemporary opinio juris indicates the same 
understanding of the law of countermeasures in the context of cyber operations.44 
As explained in the preceding pair of chapters, a State is deemed responsible for the violation 
of international law by cyber means when the violation has been legally attributed to that State. 
Due to the technical limitations and stringent legal standards of attribution, a State injured by 
 
39 ILC, ‘Fourth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Special Rapporteur’ (1992) ILC Ybk 
II(1) UN Doc A/CN.4/444 and Add.1–3, para 38; Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga 
omnes (Clarendon Press 1997) 192 
40 Eileen Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (OUP 2016) 
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41 ILC (n 9) art 43 cmt 6 [emphasis added] 
42 Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 83 
43 ILC (n 9) art 49 cmt 4 
44 Jeremy Wright, ‘Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century’ (23 May 2018) 
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an unlawful cyber operation is unlikely to be able to invoke responsibility and take 
countermeasures against the State which is in fact responsible for the cyber operation. 
However, if a State has commissioned the unlawful cyber operation, it has also failed to take 
diligent steps to prevent or terminate the said wrongful operation. As indicated by the previous 
chapter, the injured State may indeed be able to establish State responsibility for a failure to 
meet the standards pertaining to the due diligence obligations of prevention and termination 
and by doing so remove the power and security benefits of the non-diligent and de facto 
orchestrating or sponsoring State by way of countermeasures. 
To establish which State bears the responsibility of failing to act diligently, the State whose 
rights to diligent protection have been violated by the cyber operation must be able to 
convincingly prove the territorial jurisdiction of emanation, the accused State’s knowledge of 
the (imminent) unlawful cyber operation and its non-diligent attitude towards termination or 
prevention.  
To illustrate, the 2007 DDoS operation against Estonia cannot be attributed to the Russian 
Federation45 because the nexus of agency or control between the natural persons involved in 
the operation and the State cannot be legally established. Even if socio-political methods of 
attribution indicated that Russia was in fact responsible for the unlawful DDoS operation, it is 
not to be considered legally responsible for the said cyber operation. However, what can be 
established is that Russian authorities should have known of the DDoS in violation of the 
Estonian international rights, that the operation emanated from Russian territory and that 
Russia had failed to exhibit diligence in the prevention and termination of the cyber operation.  
Firstly, the presence of constructive knowledge of the Russian authorities has been already 
indicated in chapter five; due to the ordinary vigilance over their cyberspace and the 
widespread media reports, Russia should have been aware of the outgoing DDoS.46  
 
45 See ch 4 
46 See ch 5 
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Secondly, Russia has exhibited diligence by developing the capacity to prevent and 
terminate,47 but public information does not indicate it has taken any steps to discharge the 
pair of due diligence obligations. In fighting off the perpetrators and the crippling data traffic, 
Estonia received assistance from the European community of the Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams,48 from NATO, Finland and US but not Russia.49 Besides, President Putin 
has shown reluctance to prevent or terminate the Russian non-State actors from conducting 
cyber operations against other nations; ‘[artists] may act on behalf of their country, they wake 
up in a good mood and paint things. Same with hackers, they woke up today, read something 
about the state-to-state relations. […] If they are patriotic, they contribute in a way they think 
is right, to fight against those who say bad things about Russia’50 Putin opined several years 
after the 2007 DDoS operation.  
Thirdly, technical information substantiates the assessments that the said cyber operation 
indeed emanated from the territory of Russia. Generally speaking, several particularities of 
the cyber operation point to its territorial origin; the language of the malware, its metadata, 
fonts and the keyboard layout used by the authors can all reveal the origin of the operation. 
Though it has been said that, for example, the language indicators found in malware ‘often 
point to the attacker’s country of origin’,51 the territorial origin of the malicious computer code, 
however it is established, does not amount to convincing proof for the legitimate target of 
countermeasures. Much like how the ICJ did not proclaim international responsibility on the 
State whose territory was used to manufacture or assemble the mines which sank the British 
navy ships in the Corfu straight, the State where the malware is written or compiled cannot be 
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considered to be the originating territory of the cyber operation and cannot be held responsible 
for the violation of the due diligence obligations. The exploits used in the WannaCry operation, 
for example, were the work of the US National Security Agency,52 though later used by North 
Korea in the operation targeting various governmental computer systems.  
Even though the authors of the malicious code and the actual cyber operation may very well 
be the same actors, what the injured State should establish is under which territorial 
jurisdiction were the perpetrators acting from, which territory were the main command and 
control servers situated on, which State was the end destination of the stolen data, and which 
territory was used to manipulate the functioning or the components of the malware or similar. 
The preceding chapter has shown this can be done via IP traceback or, more reliably, ASN 
analysis, though other forms of evidence may serve as a sufficiently clear proof of the State 
of origin. 
The fact that the 2007 DDoS was organised on Russian-speaking forums53 does not say much 
of the territorial origin and certainly does not amount to the legal standard of proof, which 
should be observed to avoid false conclusions and consequentially unlawful 
countermeasures. Sufficiently clear and convincing proof that the 2007 DDoS emanated from 
Russia is however available. According to a simple whois query, the web-dozor.ru and 2ch.ru 
forums both provided the perpetrators with the list of Estonian targets and instructions on how 
to conduct the operation54 and were thus deemed to have been central organisational points 
for the operation as they are not only registered in Russia but also hosted by the Russian 
ISPs, on computer servers under the Russian territorial jurisdiction.55 Coupled with the fact 
that Estonia identified ‘specific IP addresses and references to web forum users, who were 
 
52 Brad Smith, ‘The need for urgent collective action to keep people safe online: Lessons from last week’s 
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likely located on the Russian territory’56 it is safe to say that the 2007 DDoS indeed emanated 
from Russian territory and that the allegation may be substantiated by a sufficiently clear or 
convincing proof. 
Note also that there may be several territories and thus several States that serve as the point 
of emanation. In fact, in an effort to obscure the origin, many cyber operations rely on a 
significant number of transit points or servers located in different territories.57 These transit 
States are also considered to be territorial jurisdictions of emanation, putting them under the 
obligations of due diligence. Much like the State of origin, the non-diligent State of transit is 
internationally responsible for its failure to take reasonable steps to prevent and terminate the 
cyber operation in contravention of the international rights of the targeted State.  
A number of legal scholars advanced the idea that due diligence obligations imposed on the 
States of the cyber operation emanating from their jurisdictions includes not only the States of 
origin but also the States of transit through which the injurious operation is routed.58 Indeed, 
expanding responsibility to the transit States serves the purpose of reinforcing the law and 
aids the aim of it – to promote peace among nations by minimising the occurrence of unlawful 
maximisations of power. Also, akin to the argument in favour of the international minimum 
standard of due diligence obligations of prevention and termination, holding the intermediaries 
responsible for non-diligent behaviour discourages the creation of areas of lawlessness and 
thus further promotes a decentralised international system of mutual reassurance of peaceful 
cohabitation among nations.59  
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Although this may be true, further investigation of the responsibility of the transit States falls 
outside of scope of this thesis for three interconnected reasons. Firstly, this thesis is set to 
seek legal mechanisms that induce compliance with international law from States that are in 
fact responsible for the materialisation of the unlawful cyber operation and thus reap significant 
benefits or increase of power by disregarding the law. Except in the case of cooperation 
between States sharing a common interest in decreasing the power and security of a common 
adversary,60 the transit State will not benefit from the unlawful cyber operation. Russia, one of 
the transit States in case of RedOctober,61 has not benefited from the cyber operation, for 
instance. On the contrary, reports indicate that the perpetrators stole the diplomatic documents 
of the Russian embassy in the US,62 thus denying its rights to inviolability of the diplomatic 
correspondence and archives. This also suggests that Russia had no knowledge of the 
RedOctober operation; if it did, it would undoubtedly do its utmost to diligently prevent or 
terminate the operation in contravention of its legal rights.  
Secondly, because the malicious traffic is often dispersed and hidden in legitimate data flows, 
the transit State is unlikely to possess actual or even constructive knowledge of the cyber 
operation, which would be needed in order to place it under the due diligence obligations to 
prevent and terminate. This is particularly true in the context of DDoS operations. Not only did 
most of the 17863 transit States not benefit from the cyber operation and the consequential 
decline of Estonia’s power and security, they are also unlikely to have had any knowledge of 
the enabling role the infrastructure under its jurisdiction played in the 2007 operation. Unless 
informed by Estonia, they could not have possessed any actual knowledge. If the operation 
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peaked at 90 Mb/s64 and 178 transit States were involved, the average traffic contribution of 
one State was 0.51Mb/s, which is low enough to be easily mistaken for a legitimate outgoing 
traffic. And because the strength of a DDoS operation lies in the great number of participants 
individually contributing rather innocent amounts of data traffic, States of transit cannot 
possess the capacity to spot the malicious activity, which is a necessary requirement for 
establishing constructive knowledge. A similar argument can be made for other cyber 
operations. ProjectSauron, a State-orchestrated cyber operation targeting government and 
military systems of several States, relied on legitimate email service to exfiltrate the stolen 
information.65 It is absolutely unreasonable to claim that the transit States hosting the relevant 
cyber infrastructure required for a normal operation of the specific email service knew or even 
should have known of the cyber operation and thus be placed under the due diligence 
obligations of prevention and termination.  
The last example exposes a third issue with the potential invocation of State responsibility of 
the non-diligent transit States. Territories of the transit States may indeed be an enabling factor 
in a cyber operation but can seldom be considered to have actually been ‘used contrary to the 
rights of other States’,66 and thus be under the due diligence obligations of prevention and 
termination. Because cyber operations often consist of different separate modules and utilise 
several routing infrastructures or transit States, their malicious and unlawful nature may only 
materialise when used in conjunction with each other. Email servers, which carry the data 
acquired by a cyber operation in violation of State sovereignty, cannot be considered to have 
been used contrary to the international rights of other States if the individual action has no 
unlawful character. Also, one State whose infrastructure is involved in the DDoS operation 
and has provided only incremental amount of traffic unable to cause disruption on itself, cannot 
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be rightfully considered to have violated the rights of the other States; especially considering 
that legitimate and illegitimate traffic (in reasonable quantities) are indistinguishable in the 
case of DDoS operations.  
Due to the nature of cyber operations, only territorial jurisdictions of transit infrastructure may 
be known. A technical analysis of the RedOctober operation, for instance, indicates that the 
perpetrators utilised several servers and relied heavily on the commercial network 
infrastructure under the jurisdictions of Germany and Russia. The State of origin or the prime 
beneficiary of the reduction in power and security of the injured States, however, cannot be 
determined through this measure.67 Injured States are therefore unlikely to be able to point at 
the State of emanation with sufficiently clear or convincing proof, which is a legally prescribed 
standard of proof in relation to the question of emanation.68 Even though the invocation of 
State responsibility for the failure to make diligent efforts to prevent and terminate a cyber 
operation is indeed more likely than the invocation of the responsibility for the cyber operation 
itself, technology remains a limitation for the inducement of compliance by countermeasures 
based on the former. This holds true also for the Shamoon operation, which exemplifies the 
limits of the application of the due diligence principle in the quest to induce compliance by way 
of countermeasures. There is no public information pointing at the fact that the operation 
originated in Iran, nor is there any information exposing the transit States. Nevertheless, if 
Saudi Arabia was to take countermeasures against Iran, it should be able to prove with 
sufficient clarity that Shamoon was deployed from the territory of Iran, that Iran indeed knew 
or should have known of the operation and that it had not taken diligent efforts to prevent and 
terminate the operation. 
In spite of the fact that countermeasures are to target only the internationally responsible non-
diligent State, strict containment of their effects is not always possible. Considering that the 
proliferation of (simple forms of) computer malware is notoriously indiscriminate, this is 
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particularly true in case of countermeasures by cyber means. The doctrine of 
countermeasures indicates that such measures are not strictly prohibited. The 
Portugal/Germany Arbitral Tribunal's award, deliberating on the reprisals taken by Germany, 
recognised the fact that consequences may indeed be felt by the innocent State; as long as 
the reprisals are directed against the responsible State, their ‘indirect and unintentional 
consequence which, in practice, the injured State will always endeavour to avoid or to limit as 
far as possible’,69 do not render them unlawful. Infringement on the international rights of 
Portugal by German reprisals, however, was not incidental. Even though it was intended to 
inflict an indirect deprivation on Great Britain, reprisals targeted Portugal, which were used as 
a means to an end. Because the latter violated no legal rights of Germany, reprisals were 
pronounced unlawful.70 Inspired by the aforementioned decision of the Arbitral Tribunal's 
award, the ILC’s Special Rapporteur Ago distinguished between the unlawful ‘cases in which 
the action implementing the reprisals against the State guilty of prior breaches is an action 
immediately and deliberately directed against the innocent third State [and, on the other hand, 
the lawful] cases in which, conversely, the action is aimed directly only at the State against 
which the reprisals are being taken and it is only in the context of this action that the rights of 
a third State are also infringed.’71 
Three conclusions in regard to the effects of countermeasures in the cyber context can be 
drawn from the paragraph above. It transpires that unintended consequences of 
countermeasures on innocent States are to be avoided or limited as far as possible. The 
borderless nature of cyberspace and the traditional conception of the indiscriminate 
propagation of a computer malware suggest caution when countermeasures are conducted 
by a reactive cyber operation. Pretending for a moment that they were reactive cyber 
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countermeasures, ProjectSauron and WannaCry serve as an illustration of the two opposites 
of the spectrum – on the one hand, a tailored and targeted cyber operation and, on the other 
hand, an indiscriminate cyber operation with unlimited consequences on the third States. 
ProjectSauron, a State-orchestrated cyber operation, is a tailored operation, targeting only 
specific governmental network infrastructures of several States. While cyber operations with 
similar functionality usually result in a widespread infection, ‘ProjectSauron seems to [have 
been] dedicated to just a few countries, focused on collecting high value intelligence by 
compromising almost all key entities it could possibly reach within the target area. […] Almost 
all of ProjectSauron’s core implants are unique, have different file names and sizes, and are 
individually built for each target.’72 Even if the effects of ProjectSauron would have spilled over 
to the innocent States, the orchestrator clearly tried to avoid this. Conversely, WannaCry 
infected more than 230,000 systems in 150 countries73 and has rightly been characterised by 
the British74 and American75 authorities as indiscriminate. In brief, if these two operations were 
legitimised as cyber countermeasures furnished by a previous lack of diligence in preventing 
and terminating a wrongful cyber deed, the ProjectSauron would be within the limits of the law, 
while the same cannot be claimed for WannaCry.  
What is more, cyber countermeasures must not use the infrastructure of an innocent State as 
a means to an end. In the era of cloud computing governed by remote storage solutions,76 a 
situation where countermeasures target the infrastructure of a non-State actor in one State in 
order to inflict compliance-inducing deprivation onto another State is not hard to envision. 
Indeed, disrupting the infrastructure under the jurisdiction of an innocent State, potentially the 
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weakest link on which the functionality of the internationally responsible State depends, may 
be a convenient method of reactive cyber measures against the non-diligent wrongdoer. Such 
countermeasures, however, would not constitute a lawful reaction of the initially injured State.  
Lastly, this does not mean the non-State actors cannot be targeted by countermeasures. Much 
like how an injury may be inflicted on a State indirectly, countermeasures may live up to their 
instrumentality in an indirect manner. As long as the State is the object of the 
countermeasures, ‘[t]he targets of a countermeasure need not be State organs or State cyber 
infrastructure’.77 It is important that these non-State actors are under the jurisdiction of the 
State targeted by the countermeasures, otherwise the State taking countermeasures may be 
responsible for using the third State as an intermediary, which is, as explained in the preceding 
paragraph, not permissible. 
3. Procedural and temporal considerations 
3.1. Ex-ante procedural conditions of resorting to countermeasures 
Before the injured State is permitted to employ countermeasures to induce compliance with 
the obligations arising from the international responsibility, certain procedural conditions must 
be met. If the instrumentality of countermeasures – inducing compliance78 – is to be achieved, 
the non-punitive character of the response must be explicitly communicated to the wrongdoing 
State. This condition is of imperative importance in distinguishing the instrumental 
countermeasures meant to reinforce the law from the usually practiced reactive violation of 
the law, which indeed provides restoration of power but also brings about the deterioration of 
the rule of law.79 
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To communicate the instrumentality, the State about to employ countermeasures should, inter 
alia, call the responsible State to comply with the primary obligation and explicitly notify the 
perpetrator of its intentions to take countermeasures.80 To live up to the instrumentality, 
countermeasures must also be limited to temporary non-performance and must be 
discontinued, if possible, as soon as compliance is achieved.  
International customary law outlines the conditions relating to the resorting of 
countermeasures, designed to not only announce the instrumentality of the imminent 
countermeasures but also to assure that less invasive methods of reconciliation are used 
before flexing any muscles. Acknowledging that taking countermeasures involves the risk of 
‘causing an escalation which will lead to a worsening of the conflict’,81 the underlying purpose 
of these preconditions is to avoid the fruition of such a situation, to induce compliance without 
any reactive deprivations and to restore the power and security relationship as it existed before 
the breach. 
Regardless of when the injured State invokes the international responsibility and decides to 
proceed with countermeasures, it must invite the non-diligent State to compliance and inform 
of its intention to take them. These are well-established ex-ante procedural conditions of 
resorting to countermeasures. In assessing the lawfulness of Czechoslovakia against Hungary 
in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the ICJ maintained ‘the injured State must have 
called upon the State committing the wrongful act to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to 
make reparation for it’.82 This stance was endorsed and codified by the ILC in the ARSIWA. 
Prominent scholars such as Zoller83 and Elagab84 also argued in favour of the legal 
 
80 ARSIWA (n 8) art 52(1b) 
81 Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France [1978] XVIII 
UNRIAA para 91 
82 Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (n 42) 56, para 84 
83 Zoller (n 3) 119 
84 Elagab (n 7) 64–79; Omer Yousif Elagab, ‘The Place of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in Contemporary 
International Law’ in Guy S Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon (eds), The Reality of International Law: Essays in 
Honour of Ian Brownlie (Clarendon Press 1999) 129–132 
236 
requirement of a demand for compliance with the obligations of cessation and reparation prior 
to the employment of countermeasures. 
In theory, a call to compliance and a threat of countermeasures may be sufficient to procure 
the desired effect and in fact convince the responsible State to take diligent steps to terminate 
a continuous cyber operation emanating from its territory or to prevent a future one as well as 
to provide reparations for the violation. Elagab offers an example of a dispute between the US 
and Yugoslavia in 1948 where a mere threat of countermeasures induced compliance. After 
the latter shot down a pair of American aircrafts and detained crew and passengers, the US 
protested and threatened with countermeasures if the Yugoslav government did not cease the 
unlawful conduct and did not provide reparations in 48 hours. A threat was sufficient to induce 
compliance as both of the secondary obligations consequential to its international 
responsibility were met by Yugoslavia.85 
However, when it comes to cyber operations, protests and invitations to compliance are 
unlikely to restore the legal relationship or power and security balance between the States. As 
I have explained in the second chapter of this thesis, practice indicates States are unlikely to 
admit having anything to do with malicious cyber operations, let alone to take steps toward 
compliance with international law; protests diminishing the reputation of the responsible State 
are insufficient to change the rational calculation of the wrongdoing State.86	
Even though it is unlikely to procure the desired effect, an invitation to compliance and 
notification of intent to take countermeasures are nevertheless important steps in avoiding the 
escalation of a conflict, particularly so in the context of cyber operations. Since evidence 
pointing to the originating jurisdiction of a cyber operation might be unreliable, the injured State 
should put its claims to the test by inviting the allegedly responsible State to comply with its 
obligations and give them the opportunity to explain their behaviour.  
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This is well-established State practice, be it in relation to unlawful cyber operations or other 
violations of international law. For example, after what seems to have been a series of 
unauthorised intrusions in the American network infrastructure, officially classified as an 
interference with the 2016 US presidential elections,87	US President Obama reached out to 
his Russian counterpart; according to the former, Russia was urged ‘to cut it out [or] there 
were going to be serious consequence’.88 	
The rejection of responsibility or a lack of any satisfactory response to the allegation and call 
to compliance triggers the right to resort to countermeasures. To illustrate, in the dispute 
between France and the US, which was finally resolved by the Air Services arbitration, the 
latter took countermeasures only after a warning of upcoming countermeasures had been 
conveyed to France. The reply of the US to the Memorial Submitted by the Government of the 
French Republic explained that ‘the US specifically warned, by diplomatic note, that 
countermeasures would be taken if France did not end the violation’.89 Because the demands 
remained unsatisfied even after a 30 day period and because France indicated no intention to 
comply with the specific international obligations in the future, the US resorted to 
countermeasures. In a similar vein, the British government recently decided to proceed with 
freezing Russian assets only after the demands to explain the allegations of the Russian 
conduct in violation of the British legal rights had been met with ‘sarcasm, contempt and 
defiance […, demonstrating] a complete disdain for the gravity’90 of the violations. 
The ex-ante preconditions to countermeasures outlined are however not absolute. The regime 
of countermeasures recognises the priority of inducing compliance over the fear of escalation 
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of the conflict. In what is classified as an urgent countermeasure, injured States are permitted 
to proceed with taking countermeasures when there is a real possibility the responsible State 
will be able to immunise itself from the effects of countermeasures and thus escape the 
equalising impacts countermeasures would have on the power and security relationship 
between the parties in the conflict. In my view, this fear of immunisation is exaggerated and 
the States injured by a cyber operation consequential to the absence of diligent attempts of 
prevention and termination should avoid them as much as possible.  
The fear of immunisation from the effects of countermeasures as a rationalisation for urgent 
countermeasures is provided by the ILC as well as the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in the specific 
context of wrongful cyber operations. Clearly inspired by the ILC’s warning of the ‘modern 
conditions of communications’,91 the Tallinn Manual 2.0 substantiated the argument in favour 
of urgent countermeasures based on the fact that ‘[n]otifying the responsible State of its intent 
to [respond by blocking all electronic access to the responsible State’s bank accounts] would 
afford that State an opportunity to transfer assets out of the country, thereby effectively 
depriving the injured State of the option of taking that countermeasure’.92  
The key erroneous assumption in both is that the injured States need to specify the kind of 
countermeasures to be taken if the call to compliance with the secondary obligations of 
cessation and reparations are not met in due course. State practice does not support this.93 
To build up on the examples given above – US President Obama did not specify what serious 
consequences in reaction to the Russian interference with the electoral process are to be 
expected if the unlawful intrusions to the American computer network infrastructure persist.94 
Nor did British Prime Minister May enumerate on the ‘full range of measures’,95 when declaring 
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the intent to take countermeasures against Russia in 2018 for the alleged poisoning of British 
citizens on British soil.  
Because the law of State responsibility does not prescribe reciprocity but proportionality96 and 
because it does not dictate the methodology of countermeasures, the injured State is 
permitted to deprive the responsible State of almost any international right97 even if 
countermeasures are preceded by a call to compliance and notification of intent. The fact that 
the responsible State is unaware where countermeasures will manifest, effective immunisation 
is virtually impossible. 
Given these points, urgent countermeasures have no real advantage. In fact, urgent 
countermeasures in the context of this thesis pose a significant risk of being unlawful and of 
sparking the escalation of a conflict. Firstly, evidence pointing at the origin of the cyber 
operation is frequently characterised by a degree of uncertainty and taking countermeasures 
against a State which has not breached the obligation of due diligence is unlawful. Secondly, 
while the diligent development of capacity to prevent and terminate is largely a matter of public 
knowledge,98 whether the State of emanation has or has not fulfilled the obligations may not 
always be apparent. Avoiding urgent countermeasures, and thus calling on the allegedly 
responsible State to comply with the due diligence obligations and informing it of the intent to 
take countermeasures, will allow the allegedly responsible State to potentially demonstrate 
that it indeed has done its utmost to prevent and terminate the unlawful cyber operation. At 
the same time, refraining from taking urgent countermeasures will protect the injured State 
from inflicting an unlawful reactive deprivation, which could lead to escalation. 
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3.2. Temporary character of countermeasures 
To be instrumental, countermeasures are only to be applied at the time of the non-compliance 
with the international obligations. In other words, when the breach occurs and the responsible 
State refuses to comply with the due diligence obligations of prevention and termination, with 
the obligation to guarantee non-repetition or with the obligation of reparation, the injured State 
may proceed with inducing compliance by way of countermeasures. Most recently, the 
principle has been pronounced by the ICJ in 2011 during its deliberation of countermeasures 
taken by Greece against the Republic of North Macedonia. The court found that the 
countermeasure employed to procure cessation of North Macedonia’s wrongful act was in 
itself wrongful because the initial wrongful conduct ceased long before the countermeasure 
was taken.99 This means that instrumental countermeasures are limited to a temporal 
suspension of the international obligations,100 which is why they ought to be ‘suspended 
without undue delay’101 once the responsible State has complied with the obligations arising 
from its international responsibility.  
In order to determine the timeframe during which the injured State is permitted to employ 
countermeasures, establishing the beginning and the end of the non-compliance with the 
obligations stemming from failure to take diligent steps to prevent and terminate the unlawful 
cyber operation is imperative. 
Provided that the State is or should have been aware of the imminent or the ongoing cyber 
operation emanating from its territory, a breach of due diligence obligations occurs if the 
unlawful cyber operation in fact materialises. Consequentially, the State incurring 
responsibility for the very breach is therefore under the so-called secondary obligations from 
the moment the unlawful cyber operation occurs. To establish the window of opportunity for 
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countermeasures, the temporal characteristics of the trinity of obligations should be 
elaborated. 
First, the responsible State is under the obligation to cease a non-diligent conduct, which 
means to take diligent steps towards prevention and termination of a cyber operation. Since it 
is not legally responsible for the resulting unlawful cyber operation, it is also not under the 
obligation to cease the latter; ‘cessation of the continuing breach is solely owed by the state 
or the organisation responsible for it under the rules of attribution of conduct’.102  
As explained in the third chapter, obligations of cessation or compliance with the primary 
obligations in the present only apply when the non-compliance has a continuous character. 
Since the unlawful event which diligence was supposed to prevent already materialised, the 
responsible State cannot be under the obligation to take diligent steps towards prevention. In 
other words, the violation of the due diligence obligation of prevention is an instantaneous 
wrongful act. This means that the employment of countermeasures to induce compliance with 
the due diligence obligation of prevention cannot be instrumental, which is the defining 
attribute of a lawful reaction under the international law of countermeasures. 
A violation of the due diligence obligation of termination, on the other hand, may extend in 
time. For as long as the unlawful cyber operation in question is ongoing, the State of origin 
ought to cease with the non-diligent behaviour or, in other words, to do everything in its power 
to terminate it. If the State of origin takes no steps towards compliance with the due diligence 
obligations or cessation of the non-performance, the injured State may induce compliance by 
way of countermeasures during the entire period of this non-performance.  
If, however, the cyber operation has completed, the responsible State is not under the 
obligation of cessation as there is nothing to prevent or terminate anymore. Once again, 
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countermeasures intended to induce compliance with the unlawful conduct concluded in the 
past are not instrumental and therefore not a lawful reaction. 
This is not to say that in the event of the completed cyber operation, the non-diligent State has 
escaped the responsibility and that the State which is in fact responsible for the resulting 
unlawful cyber operation got away with the benefit of an increase in its national power and a 
rational reason to resort to illegitimate power maximisation also in the future.  
The obligations assuring future compliance are indeed still outstanding. If countermeasures 
inducing cessation are intended to procure current compliance with the primary due diligence 
obligations, the secondary obligations of non-repetition and reparation, on the other hand, aim 
to induce diligent behaviour in the future. Both can and should be demanded and induced by 
way of countermeasures even once the unlawful conduct has concluded.  
Obligation to provide guarantees of assurances of non-repetition, seeks to do so by relying on 
the promises of compliance given by the wrongdoing State. To provide guarantees of non-
repetition, the responsible State, is to indicate willingness to be diligent in the future, to do its 
utmost to prevent and terminate a cyber operation emanating from its territory. Guarantees 
and assurance of non-repetition can only be demanded in the face of a significant risk of 
repetition103 and may take the form of a commitment to technical, organisational and legal 
capacity-building measures, which will allow it to discharge the obligations of prevention and 
termination in the future.  
Unfortunately, promises of non-repetition do not provide much of an assurance that the breach 
of obligations will in fact not occur again.104 What is a more effective method of assuring future 
compliance is the third secondary obligation, the obligation of reparation, which aims to ensure 
compliance by increasing the costs of non-compliance, thus to change the rational calculous 
and deter impending violations. Even though the obligation of reparation arises as soon as the 
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unlawful cyber operation materialises and hence the breach of due diligence obligations 
occurs, reparation should not be demanded nor should they be enforced by way of 
countermeasures until the resulting cyber operation is concluded and the scope of injury can 
be assessed in its entirety.  
Because the responsible State is legally obliged to provide reparations and guarantees of non-
repetition for as long as these two obligations have not been met, it is worth noting that the 
right to invoke State responsibility and employ countermeasures does not stretch in time 
indefinitely. While ‘[n]one of the attempts to establish any precise or finite time limit for 
international claims in general has achieved acceptance,’105 steps towards employment of 
countermeasures should be taken without an unreasonable delay.106 When it comes to 
inducing compliance through international judiciary, it is ‘for the Court to determine in the light 
of the circumstances of each case whether the passage of time renders an application 
inadmissible’107 and thus decide whether the process of including compliance with 
international law has been attempted within the boundaries of reasonableness. Accordingly, 
in the context of inducing compliance by measures of self-help, quantification of a reasonable 
delay and therefore determining the availability of redress by countermeasures is to be 
determined by the injured State based on specific circumstances of the breach and the 
responsibility. 
Generally speaking, the sooner the injured State takes steps towards employing 
countermeasures, the better.108 Not only is this true in the interest to uphold the legitimacy of 
the law, as argued in the third chapter, but also in the context of the obligation of cessation. In 
the case of an ongoing unlawful cyber operation occasioned by the lack of due diligence, early 
countermeasures may indeed induce compliance with the obligation of diligent termination 
and thus possibly prevent further damage caused by the operation of a continuing character. 
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In the event of a completed cyber operation, on the other hand, swift countermeasures aimed 
at procuring the guarantees of non-repetition or securing reparation may deter the responsible 
State from repeating the unlawful maximisation of the power and security, a situation that is 
indeed likely to materialise if not met with proportional costs in the form of countermeasures.109 
Resorting to countermeasures as soon as the breach occurs may however not always be in 
the interest of an injured State. The so-called limit to application of due diligence originating in 
the inability of an injured State to clearly and convincingly establish the State of emanation 
could be eliminated as the time passes. Rapid advancements in technology may, for example, 
enable Saudi Arabia to convincingly establish the State of origin of Shamoon in the years 
following the conclusion of the operation. 
What does all this mean in practice? We now know the first wave of the DDoS cyber operation 
in violation of the sovereign rights of Estonia hit its network infrastructure on the 27th of April 
2007.110 It originated from the territory of Russia, which should have been aware of it and (as 
far as the public information goes) did nothing to diligently attempt to prevent or terminate the 
operation and thus incurred the international responsibility for its violation of due diligence 
obligations. On that very date, the breach occurred and by operation of law, Russia was under 
the secondary obligations of present and future compliance – to cease with the non-diligent 
behaviour, to guarantee non-repetition in the future and to provide reparations. By the 11th of 
May, the time the operation concluded, Estonia did not attempt to induce diligent termination 
by way of countermeasures even though it had every right to do so; if it did, however, the 
countermeasures inducing cessation should be suspended on the 11th of May as the object of 
termination has ceased to exist. 
Even after the breach of the due diligence obligations of prevention and termination have long 
concluded, Estonia may still be legally empowered to enforce non-repetition and reparation. 
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Estonia could very well take countermeasures against Russia even 11 years after the cyber 
operation occasioned by the Russian lack of diligent prevention and termination efforts 
crippled its computer network systems. Provided that it is able to provide a justification for the 
delay of several years, that is.  
Since there is a significant risk of repetition indicated by the permissive attitude of Russian 
authorities in relation to the so-called patriotic cyber artists111 and the fact that its relationship 
with Estonia has not seen significant improvements in the last 11 years,112 the latter may 
rightfully demand non-repetition. However, because future compliance with the primary 
obligations based on guarantees and assurances of non-repetition depends on the unreliable 
promise of rational egoists, the effectuation of reparation is imperative; the restoration of the 
earlier power relationship through reparation alters the rational choice calculation of the 
responsible State and therefore ensures compliance with the law in the future.113 
Countermeasures effectuating reparation may be employed for as long as the obligation is 
due. Since there is no indication of the Russian attempt to re-establish the power relationship 
by, for example, providing satisfaction in form of an apology or compensation for the economic 
damage caused by the DDoS botnets targeting Estonia’s financial systems, Estonia is still 
permitted to take countermeasures to restore the power relationship, thus changing the 
rational choice calculation of Russia and inducing compliance with the obligations of due 
diligence in the future. 
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4. Lawful and effective countermeasures are proportional 
To be lawful under the international law of State responsibility as well as effective in inducing 
compliance with the obligations of due diligence, countermeasures must be proportional with 
the initial wrongdoing and the material injury caused by it. 
To exhibit qualitative proportionality with the initial breach of the international obligations, 
countermeasures must approximate legal equivalence with the initial wrongdoing; in the 
context of responsibility for the non-diligent behaviour, deprivation of international rights by 
way of countermeasures must not be grossly disproportionate to the violation of the due 
diligence obligations of prevention and termination. To particularise a qualitatively proportional 
countermeasure in reaction to a violation of due diligence obligations is not needed here; aside 
from restrictions enshrined in the ARSIWA article 50,114 States can choose to take whatever 
proportional measures they deem potentially effective in procuring compliance. Suffice to say 
that a violation of due diligence obligations to prevent and terminate the internationally 
wrongful acts does not need to be countered by a non-diligent behaviour or a measure 
absolutely equivalent to the initial breach what would constitute a reciprocal countermeasure.  
Proportional deprivation of peace and security by reciprocal and reactive non-compliance with 
international obligations may be a sufficient cost to induce temporary cessation but not 
necessarily an adequate one to match the benefits of the initial violation and to alter the rational 
choice of the non-diligent States in fact conducting or sponsoring the cyber operation.115 
Countermeasures which are not proportional with the consequences of the unlawful cyber 
operation cannot be an effective compliance inducing mechanism in the case where a State 
legally responsible for the non-diligent prevention and termination was also in fact responsible 
for the unlawful cyber operation itself and thus reaped the benefits in a form of the inflation of 
its relative power. Countermeasures taking into account only the qualitative proportionality 
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may also jeopardise the purpose of the law of State responsibility and diminish its potential to 
supress the (re)occurrence of inter-State cyber operations in contravention with the 
international legal rights.  
As per the rational choice theory, countermeasures are only effective in reducing the benefits 
reaped by the State responsible in fact for the unlawful cyber operation and in imposing 
compliance with its international obligations when they are proportional also in quantitative 
terms116 or when effects of countermeasures on the responsible State’s power exhibit an 
approximate equivalency with the injurious consequences of the non-diligent behaviour of the 
responsible State. 
According to the international law of State responsibility, the material consequences ‘caused 
by the internationally wrongful act of a State’117 are embodied by the reparation owed. It is 
therefore submitted that countermeasures must be in quantitative proportional relationship 
with the due reparation. In spite of the fact that the non-diligent State cannot be considered to 
be legally responsible for the resulting cyber operation, it is to provide reparations for all the 
injurious consequences of the resulting unlawful cyber operation based on the principle of 
causation. 
The State wishing to employ effective countermeasures must establish a sufficient causal 
nexus118 between the lack of due diligence in prevention or termination efforts and the injurious 
consequences of the resulting cyber operation – material injury, being the loss of power and 
thus a reduced level of security. The principle of causation derives from tort law but has been 
applied to public international law by the scholarship119 as well by the international 
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jurisprudence. In the Corfu Channel case, the United Kingdom requested that the Court 
declare Albania as internationally responsible not only for the omission of the due diligence 
obligation but also for the reparation of material injuries inflicted by the resulting incidents in 
the Corfu straight.120 The ICJ obliged and found Albania responsible for inter alia ‘the damage 
and loss of human life which resulted from them, and that there is a duty upon Albania to pay 
compensation to the United Kingdom’.121 A similar reasoning is observed in the Tehran 
Hostages case, where the ICJ ruled that ‘Iran is under an obligation to make reparation to the 
Government of the United States of America for the injury caused to the latter by the events 
of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events’,122 events being the lack of 
diligence in prevention of the occupation of American diplomatic and consular premises in 
Iran. What the Court did not provide is an explanation of how exactly the material injuries 
incurred by the United Kingdom and the United States were caused by the acts resulting from 
the omission of the due diligence obligations.  
To establish when the responsible non-diligent State is under the obligation of reparation for 
the material injuries of the resulting unlawful cyber operation, I proceed to explaining the 
applicable principles of the law of tort; accordingly, to indicate a factual and a legal causation 
between a non-diligent behaviour and the injury of a resulting unlawful cyber operation, the 
State wishing to take countermeasures ought to confirm that the lack of diligence was a cause 
and the cause123 of the injury from resulting unlawful cyber operation.  
The inquiry of causation is therefore twofold – first, the unlawful omission has to amount to ‘a 
substantial factor in producing’124 the material injury or in fact cause or occasion the said 
injurious act. To say that the conduct was a cause of the subsequent injury it must be 
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‘necessary to produce the event and [constitute] an abnormal intervention in the existing or 
expected state of affairs’.125 To establish whether the conduct was indeed necessary to 
produce an injurious event in violation of the rights of another State, tort dictates the 
application of the but for test. What is a standard test of causality in tort law and ‘of particular 
interest for international law because it has also been used by international courts and 
tribunals’,126 the so called but for test considers the omission to be the cause of the injurious 
unlawful act if the act would not have occurred but for that omission. In other words, the but 
for test ‘tells us whether the relevant, legally proscribed conduct was a necessary condition 
for the outcome in question’.127 Omission of due diligence may indeed be a necessary 
condition for the injurious event to materialise in another State; in the Corfu channel case, it is 
more likely than not that the explosions would not have occurred had Albania notified the 
British navy of the existence of the minefield and the dangers it posed to its warships. 
Additionally, to be considered a cause, the omission must also constitute an abnormal 
intervention in the regular state of affairs. It is said that an omission is to be ‘treated as an 
[abnormal] intervention […] and so as a cause whenever a positive act is expected or required 
but the [State] does not perform it. Thus, the change brought about is a change not in the 
existing but in the expected state of affairs.’128 In the context of the law of State responsibility 
and the omission of the diligent prevention and termination, any conduct below the legally 
acceptable standard of due diligence would constitute an abnormal intervention and thus a 
cause of the resulting act and its material injury. For example, in the case of the incident at 
the US embassy in Tehran, Iran did send the Revolutionary Guards to the scene to protect 
the diplomatic premises but the Guards’ inaction once there meant that Iran did not do enough 
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to comply with the due diligence as expected and prescribed by the international diplomatic 
law.129  
Accordingly, failing to satisfy the expected standard of diligent prevention or termination of 
legally injurious cyber operation would constitute an abnormal intervention but to argue the 
omission was indeed a necessary condition for the resulting cyber operation remains 
challenging. While diligent efforts of prevention and termination are indeed more likely than 
not to prevent or terminate a cyber operation and thus prevent or minimise the consequential 
material injury or loss of power resources, it is by no means a guarantee that the injury and 
loss of power resources will not occur. In other words, even territories of the most diligent 
nations can be used for malicious cyber operations, injurious to other nations.130 In fact, 
success is not a requirement of the law; being obligations of conduct, diligent prevention and 
termination do not require States to succeed and guarantee the absence of injurious cyber 
acts. Besides, cyberspace offers immense flexibility and creative State agents or non-State 
actors wishing to diminish the power and security of another State will always be able to launch 
a cyber operation even under the conditions of a diligent State. In brief, though it is not 
impossible, it would be hard to establish ‘with a sufficient degree of certainty’131 that the 
violation and the consequential injury would not have occurred but for the omission of diligent 
prevention or termination efforts by the State and thus the omission was in fact the cause for 
the resultant cyber operation.  
What is more plausible to be successfully established is that the omission of a diligent 
prevention in fact occasioned the cyber operation and the consequential injury. Thus, a non-
 
129 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (n 122) 13 
130 US is such an example. Although diligent in prevention and termination capacity building, most malicious 
(although not necessarily also inter-State) cyber operations nowadays come from the US. See International 
Telecommunication Union, ‘ITU Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2018’ (2018) 62 
<https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2018-PDF-E.pdf>; Jordan Robertson, ‘A Decoy 
Computer Was Set Up Online. See Which Countries Attacked It the Most’ Bloomberg (24 September 2014) 
<bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-23/a-decoy-computer-was-set-up-online-see-which-countries-attacked-it-the-
most.html> both accessed 11 August 2019 
131 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (n 118) para 462 
251 
diligent State may be under the obligation of reparation proportional with the material injury of 
the resulting wrongful cyber operation if its failure to meet the due diligence standards in fact 
occasions the resulting cyber act in question. In other words, a factual causal relationship 
between the omission and the injury of the resulting act materialises when the first creates or 
fails to remove the opportunity for the occurrence of an act in violation of the rights of the other 
State.132 That a breach of duty to prevent indeed occasions the malicious cyber operations 
and that this allows for countermeasures commensurate with the material injury of the resulting 
cyber operations on the grounds of causal nexus between the omission and cyber operation 
has been recognised by several States. Applying the causality principle to international law, a 
document jointly produced by 16 States and NATO, argues that if a State fails to live up to the 
standard of diligent prevention, ‘it should be held responsible for international cyber attacks 
against another State because its omission helped create a safe haven for attackers to attack 
other States.’133 
After a cause in fact has been established, the second stage in the injured State’s causal 
inquiry must determine whether the non-diligent behaviour was also a cause in law; it must 
determine whether the omission of due diligence was the cause of the injury of the resulting 
cyber operation.  
The ILC has been careful not to take a clear position on the universally applicable methodology 
and omitted the prescription of attributes pertaining to the nexus between the unlawful conduct 
and the injury. Drafters of the ARSIWA ‘had considered a number of suggestions for qualifying 
that causal link, but, [concluded] that, since the requirements of a causal link were not 
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necessarily the same in relation to every breach of an international obligation, it would not be 
prudent or even accurate to use a qualifier.’134  
Nevertheless, the commentary of the aforementioned Articles does point in the direction of the 
applicable principles of the law of tort. Common law135 and the international arbitration awards 
have adopted the test of directness based on foreseeability. An injury, which ‘is too indirect 
and remote [cannot] become the basis, in law, for an award of indemnity’136 argued the 
arbitrators in the Trail Smelter case. 
Whether the injuries of the resulting cyber operation are too remote or not depends on the 
assessment of the foreseeability137 of the injury. For example, the arbitrators in the Naulilaa 
case did not hold Germany responsible for reparations of the indirect damage resulting from 
‘an unforeseen sequence of exceptional circumstances’.138 The fact that injury from a resulting 
unlawful cyber operation is indeed foreseeable can be distilled from the purpose of the due 
diligence obligation, which is established for the very reason of preventing the occurrence and 
consequences of unlawful transboundary cyber operations, imposing a shared responsibility 
for the functional international law and nurturing international peace and security. What is 
more, as established in the preceding paragraphs of this thesis, the obligation of diligent 
prevention and termination in cyberspace has been explicitly voiced by various States, further 
supporting the argument that they are indeed aware of the foreseeability of the cyber 
operations in violation of the legal rights of other States in the event of non-diligence.  
The fact that internationally wrongful and injurious cyber operations stemming from a particular 
territorial jurisdiction are indeed foreseeable is also supported by the factual arguments. This 
is particularly true for the States which have historically been the source of cyber operations 
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in contravention to the international rights of other States. Accordingly, the internationally 
wrongful cyber operations originating in China, Russia and Iran, territories which accounted 
for more than a third of all sources of malicious inter-State cyber operations in the past 
decade,139 can rightfully be considered as foreseeable consequences of their potential lack of 
non-diligent attitudes in regards to prevention and termination efforts. 
Upon successfully establishing a causal relationship between the (injury of the) resulting cyber 
act and the omission of the diligent behaviour, the non-diligent State is under the obligation to 
provide reparations not only for the lack of diligence but also for all the injurious consequences 
of the resulting cyber act. In the context of the rational choice theory outlined in the second 
chapter, the non-diligent State is under the obligation to repair all the loss of power and security 
incurred by the State injured by the unlawful cyber operation. 
This leads to the conclusion that the non-diligent State of origin can be subjected to 
countermeasures proportional to the consequences of the resulting cyber operation, which are 
a reduction of relative power of the targeted State and a relative increase of power of the State 
which is in fact but not also in law responsible for the unlawful power-maximising cyber 
operation. The utility of countermeasures proportional to the resulting cyber operation 
therefore stretches beyond inducing compliance with the due diligence obligations. It assures 
that the States responsible in fact but not also in law140 for the internationally wrongful cyber 
operation, are indeed subjected to costs, the extent of which will match the power benefits 
born by the unlawful cyber operation and therefore render the selfish illegitimate power 
maximisation irrational.  
All things considered, Estonian countermeasures inducing Russian compliance with the 
reparation and consequentially future compliance with the due diligence obligations of 
prevention and termination should be proportional with the initial violation and its effects. 
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Whatever form the reactive breach of international obligations of Estonia, the important part is 
that their effects are quantitatively proportional with the effects of the non-diligent behaviour. 
But because Russian failure to take diligent measures of prevention and termination has 
occasioned a foreseeable internationally wrongful cyber operation, the State is also under the 
obligation of reparation for the effects of the denial of Estonian sovereign rights consequential 
to the non-diligent behaviour.  
As already established, these effects materialised in a decrease of the economic and political 
power of Estonia141 which the injured State may collect by way of quantitatively proportional 
countermeasures. By doing so, Estonia will proportionally reduce the power benefits gained 
by Russia, which is in fact responsible for the DDoS and thus render future non-compliance 
irrational. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter elaborates which States can take countermeasures, which States can be 
targeted by countermeasures and when can they be taken. Additionally, it discusses the 
potential of proportional countermeasures against the non-diligent State to deter States in fact 
responsible for unlawful cyber operations from resorting to such wrongful maximisation of 
power in the future. 
To this end, the chapter argues that countermeasures can only be taken by States directly or 
indirectly injured by the unlawful cyber operation, by States on behalf of the non-State actors 
under its jurisdiction whose international rights were infringed upon by the cyber operation in 
question and by third States with a vested interest in the preservation of the erga omnes 
oblations breached by the cyber operation.  
The chapter also discusses which States can be targeted by countermeasures. Though there 
may be several States of emanation under the due diligence obligations of prevention and 
 
141 See ch 1 
255 
termination, this chapter only considers countermeasures against the State of origin. This is 
not only because the transit State is less likely to have actual or constructive knowledge of the 
operation but also because the infrastructure under the jurisdiction of a transit States may 
contribute only a portion of the cyber operation which may not be unlawful in itself. What is 
more, the context of the thesis is regarding States which are in fact responsible for the cyber 
operation and reap the benefits of it, which is not the case with the States of transit.  
When countermeasures are conducted via cyber means, a spill-over of their consequences is 
likely; the chapter argues that such consequences are permissible as long as the primary 
target of instrumental countermeasures was the responsible state. In particular, the spill-over 
effect is not contentious when the State taking countermeasures has done its best to avoid 
them and has not used the infrastructure of other States as a means to an end.  
Thirdly, the chapter elaborates the time frame of lawful countermeasures, argued against 
taking urgent countermeasures and discussed the ex-ante procedural obligations of the State 
taking countermeasures. 
Lastly, the chapter discusses the lawfulness and effectiveness of countermeasures from the 
perspective of their proportionality. It argued that quantitatively proportional countermeasures 
will render the cost benefit calculation of the non-diligent behaviour as well as of the unlawful 
cyber operation irrational, and thus promote future compliance in general. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and the way ahead 
This concluding chapter summarises the arguments made in this thesis and critically evaluates 
whether it has achieved the objectives set at the very beginning.  
The first chapter of this thesis argued that cyber operations depriving States of their 
international legal rights, of their power and security, are frequent and on the rise for they are 
a power maximisation tool of selfish States in anarchical international relations.  
States injured by these malicious cyber operations respond by increasing their institutional 
capacity to conduct and defend from such operations and by investing in new technologies 
enabling them to do so. States also seek a solution to the proliferation of cyber operations in 
developing and promoting the voluntary non-binding norms guiding international conduct in 
cyberspace. Be that as it may, the introductory chapter indicates that these solutions do not 
have any tangible effect on the quantity of malicious inter-State cyber operations.  
For this reason, this thesis proceeded to investigate the ability of international law to supress 
the occurrence of malicious inter-State cyber operations and consequently increase peace 
and security. 
Traditionally, international law provides peace and security by limiting the selfish maximisation 
of power of States in the anarchical world constellation. Nevertheless, international law can 
only perform this function when States comply with their international obligations. The 
investigation of this thesis is therefore centred on the compliance-inducing mechanisms of 
international law and its ability to reduce the present-day degree of non-compliance and thus 
provide nations with peace and security in the cyber era. 
Since the prospect of a cyber-specific treaty legal regime is currently meagre, the thesis 
investigated the compliance-inducing powers of the established international law. It scrutinised 
the primary obligations of developing lex specialis, primary obligations of dynamically 
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interpreted and applicable rules of the established international law, as well as the secondary 
rules arising from the international legal responsibility of the States. Although it is 
acknowledged that international law itself cannot be a panacea for all cyber ills, nor is absolute 
compliance a realistic prospect, it is nonetheless hoped that the outcomes of the thesis will 
prove useful to injured States and encourage them to make use of the legal compliance 
inducing mechanisms and thus secure peace and strengthen security. 
In addition to exposing the scale of the aforementioned problem and charting the investigation 
of a solution, the introductory chapter presented the methodological boundaries. Accordingly, 
it explained the limited scope of the research, which only considers unlawful inter-State cyber 
operations below the threshold of the use of force. What is more, the focus on inter-State cyber 
operations, the ones which target a State and are conducted or sponsored by a State, is 
dictated by their complexity and scale, making them the biggest threats to peace and security. 
The research avoided cyber operations amounting to the use of force due to a clear 
prevalence of operations short of causing physical damage and injury to human beings. The 
limited scope is further rationalised by the fact that much has been already written on the topic 
of the law of use of force in cyberspace. Three cyber operations – 2007 DDoS, Shamoon and 
RedOctober – were extensively analysed throughout the thesis. The first chapter concluded 
by proving they fit into the methodological framework and provides the reader with the relevant 
information surrounding the cyber incidents further analysed throughout this thesis. 
In order to uncover a solution to non-compliance with the international law in cyber space, one 
has to understand the deeper issue at hand. This is the objective of the second chapter of 
the thesis, which lays down the theoretical foundation. In brief, the chapter establishes the 
main motivation of States in an anarchical world and asserts that States resort to unlawful 
cyber operations simply because non-compliance pays off.  
Under the circumstances of anarchy in international relations, where no central power 
(enforcing entity) may be identified, States are drawn to seek security manifesting in absence 
internal or external threats to their survival. They do so, firstly, by maximising their power. In 
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particular, States seek to maximise their power resources, be it economic, military or 
diplomatic, generating security through either power projection or by being a deterrence.  
Security is also attained by means of peace. In the pursuit of peace or absence of whatever 
commotion to sovereign life, States establish and uphold international law, embodying the 
restrictions on maximisation of power and promise of peace. As argued in the preceding 
chapter, the objective of international law has not altered with the introduction of the cyber 
operations into the international life and States still count on international law to provide peace.  
Although States generally comply with international law, systemic and technological motives 
provide a strong temptation to resort to deviance. First, the limitations on power maximisation 
imposed by the law cannot be seen favourably by States concerned with their security. 
Second, under the conditions of anarchy trust in reciprocal compliance is fragile and States 
are further inclined to violate the law. The third reason is provided with the introduction of new 
technology. New technology, and particularly so the complex and invisible nature of cyber 
operations, enhances distrust between nations and distrust in reciprocal compliance, which is 
needed for the law to deliver peace. 
Of course, States gravitate towards non-compliance when the benefits are unilateral. 
Accordingly, States seek a violation that will bring a quick and inexpensive maximisation of 
power resources, reduce the relative power and security of the adversary all the while keeping 
the protection of peace provided by the adversary’s compliance with international law.  
The temptation turns into actual violation when the benefits of non-compliance surpass the 
costs. Simply, non-compliance is rational when it pays off. States therefore resort to the 
maximisation of their security by way of unlawful cyber operations because the benefits clearly 
outweigh the costs associated with such conduct. Therefore, the extent and probability of 
facing costs play a pivotal role in the decision to comply or not with international law.  
The second chapter established that the costs associated with an unlawful cyber operation 
are unlikely to be imposed, mostly due to limitations of technology. And when costs are 
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imposed on the non-compliant State, they are limited to reputational or other costs, which are 
significantly inferior to the substantial benefits reaped by the non-compliant State.  
The power and security gains of the non-complying State are, however, a mirage. To make 
up for the lost power, and consequentially security, the State injured by a cyber operation will 
– in order to match the scope and speed of the unlawful relative power gains of the adversary 
– follow suit and seek power via unlawful means. If it proves to be rational, to pay off, they will 
repeat it. Others will take note and follow their deviant path. This leads to a spiral of conflict 
and the erosion of the rule of law, causing a reduction of security for every State. 
Every State-conducted or -sponsored cyber operation in violation of its international 
obligations involves the international responsibility of that State. Responsibility is the central 
element of any binding normative order and corollary to the legal nature of its obligations. This 
led Crawford to argue that State responsibility is ‘a cardinal institution of international law.’1 
The third chapter elaborates the role of the international law of State responsibility in inducing 
compliance of the rational States with their primary obligations under the conditions of 
anarchy. Being an antithesis to the preceding chapter, the third chapter exposed a lawful and 
feasible solution, with a notable potential to be effective in inducing the State responsible for 
an internationally wrongful cyber operation to comply with international law today and 
tomorrow.  
Upon a breach of international obligations, and in accordance with the law of State 
responsibility, three secondary general obligations are imposed upon the wrongdoing State – 
the obligations of cessation, of non-repetition and of reparation. These obligations aim to 
induce compliance by the operation of law.  
 
1 James R Crawford, ‘State Responsibility’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (September 
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e1093?rskey=R5NNaq&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 13 August 2019 
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The first, the obligation of cessation, is merely a restatement of the primary obligation and 
reiteration of its obligatory nature. It requires the State responsible for an ongoing violation of 
international law to comply at will, to restore the levels of peace and security as they existed 
prior to the breach. 
Although the obligation of non-repetition also seeks restoration of peace and security, it aims 
to assure compliance in the future. It is only relevant when an unlawful cyber operation has 
concluded and arises only when there is a significant risk of repetition. Due to the fact that 
unlawful cyber operations are easily repeated, guarantees of non-repetition should be 
demanded from the responsible States, particularly so from the ones with a prior history of 
resorting to unlawful cyber operations in their quest for inexpensive and quick power 
maximisation.  
Assuring compliance in the future is the objective of the third secondary obligation, the 
obligation of reparation. Three forms of reparation are recognised by international law – 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction. 
Restitution, the preferred method of reparation, requires the State in the wrong to re-establish 
the material situation that existed before the breach, or to re-establish the power balance 
between the nations. When restitution is not possible, which is often the case in cyber space, 
the responsible State is obliged to provide compensation, satisfaction or both. When damage 
is materially assessable – when a cyber operation causes the loss of economic power – the 
appropriate method of reparation is compensation, taking the form of repayment for the 
decrease in economic power with interests. Satisfaction, on the other hand, comes in the form 
of an apology or similar symbolic deed, amounting to a detriment to the international reputation 
of the responsible State.  
Each of the forms of reparation are plagued with issues in the context of unlawful cyber 
operations. The specific nature of cyberspace inhibits the ability of restitution to actually 
restore the power relationship between the parties prior to the conflict; compensation is only 
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successful in inflating the costs of the wrongdoer when the unlawful cyber operation inflicts a 
relative decrease in economic power of the targeted State; and, restitution or the self-inflicted 
reduction of international standing of a responsible State, as already mentioned, is not 
sufficient to alter the cost benefit analysis of the selfish States and to render non-compliance 
irrational. As a matter of fact, all secondary obligations assume the wrongdoing State’s 
admission of responsibility for the unlawful cyber operation, which has not been publicly 
recorded to date. 
For the above reasons, the injured State seeking to induce compliance of the wrongdoing 
State should direct its attention towards various mechanisms offered by the international law 
(of State responsibility). The third chapter first considers the possibilities of international 
adjudication and multilateral sanctions which both indeed inflict undesired deprivation of power 
on the State responsible for a breach of its international obligations and thus counterbalance 
the benefits of non-compliance. However, political considerations of the heterogeneous 
international community and the expected unwillingness of the wrongdoing State to agree to 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ, for example, hinders the effectiveness of these two mechanisms in 
bringing the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations.  
The State, deprived of its legal rights by an unlawful cyber operation, should therefore resort 
to lawful measures of self-help. As shown in the chapter three, retorsion, a form of unfriendly 
actions not in contravention to the international obligations of the injured State, cannot be 
considered an effective compliance inducing mechanism. Similar to reparation by way of 
satisfaction, public protest, being the most prevalent form of retorsion, only affects the 
international reputation of the wrongdoer and is not effective in inducing the rational State to 
comply with its international obligations. At least not in the context of unlawful cyber 
operations. 
For this reason, the third chapter took a closer look at the self-help mechanism of 
countermeasures, which not only deliver a proportional deprivation of power and therefore 
restore the prior power relationship but also do not depend on consent from the responsible 
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party or the international community to do so. To be lawful and effective in inducing compliance 
with international law, countermeasures must be qualitatively and quantitatively proportional 
with the initial wrongdoing. While lessons from the jurisprudence indicate the former is of 
supreme importance when assessing their lawfulness, the quantitative proportionality is the 
one which guarantees countermeasures will inflate the costs of the wrongdoing State to the 
point of restoration of power and security relationship, thus effectively rendering the non-
compliance irrational. If employed regularly, countermeasures will also assume the role of a 
deterrent and discourage the rational States from resorting to unlawful cyber operations in the 
future.  
Before proportional countermeasures are employed, the injured State must legally attribute 
the unlawful cyber operation to a State. The fourth chapter exposed the reasons behind the 
inability of the injured State to do so.  
Attribution, the core of the international law of State responsibility, requires the injured party 
of the inter-State cyber conflict to identify the authors of the unlawful conduct as well as 
establish their association with a particular perpetrating State. 
In its first task – assigning authorship to a particular natural person – the State wishing to 
employ countermeasures must identify the computer or network of origin which leads to the 
natural person utilising it in order to launch a cyber operation against a foreign nation. Indeed, 
this may be a tedious task, plagued with unreliability of the conclusions stemming from the 
nature of the Internet protocols, but not an impossible one. What will, in all likelihood, be 
impossible is to successfully identify the natural person using said equipment for the 
perpetration of the internationally wrongful cyber operation as this would involve the use of 
forensic methods, which are rather ineffective when not deployed locally.  
The second issue with establishing attribution is related to establishing a nexus between the 
cyber perpetrators and a State. Once the natural person responsible for a cyber operation is 
identified, the State wishing to invoke State responsibility and employ countermeasures must 
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be able to establish an association of the author with a particular State. In accordance with 
the international law of State responsibility, the unlawful act is attributed to the State when 
conducted by a de facto or de jure State organ. Specifically, attribution to the State is 
established if the unlawful act was found to have been perpetrated by an actor which is 
designated as organ of the State by the relevant domestic legislation or when the actor is 
found to be operationally assimilated with or dependently acting on behalf of a State. Other 
forms of relationship between the perpetrators and the State permit attribution; when the 
authors of an unlawful cyber operation operate under the instructions, directions or effective 
control of a State, that act is legally attributed to that State. Actors allegedly orchestrating the 
Shamoon and 2007 DDoS attacks and the lack of information connecting them to a State 
exemplify the issues injured parties have when trying to establish attribution to a State, even 
when the actors behind the operation are known. Specifically, it cannot be legally established 
that Nashi, the author of the 2007 DDoS, is a de facto or de jure organ of the State, or that it 
acted under the directions, instructions or effective control of Russia. Similarly, the 
orchestrating organisation of the Shamoon operation cannot be connected to Iran, which is 
allegedly in fact responsible for the operation.  
The biggest issue with attribution is that the burden of proof lies on the injured State, which 
needs to be ready to provide sufficiently clear and convincing, direct evidence before State 
responsibility is invoked and countermeasures are employed. Specifically, the fourth chapter 
argued for a self-imposed high standard of proof, in order to, inter alia, prevent escalation 
following the employment of countermeasures. Since the focus of this thesis is the 
responsibility of States, I argued that the third standard of sufficiently clear and convincing 
proof would be appropriate in establishing the attribution of a cyber operation to a State. The 
standard is supported by not only the international jurisprudence related to the State 
responsibility but also by several expressions of opinio juris specifically addressing the issue 
of standard of proof in the context of inter-State cyber operations. 
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Another potential issue with the evidence required for attributing the cyber operation to a State 
is related to the legally permitted types of evidence. Direct evidence is likely to be unavailable 
to the injured State due to the aforementioned technical difficulties. Circumstantial evidence, 
on the other hand, is only acceptable in situations when no rebuttal is provided by the accused 
State or to prove the knowledge of the State of a cyber operation. Indeed, circumstantial 
evidence and deduction prove with sufficient certainty that Russia knew of the 2007 cyber 
operation, for example. But since Russia rejected the responsibility, the cyber operation in 
question cannot be attributed to it by means of circumstantial evidence.  
Forms of evidence, ordinarily referred to by politicians when making claims about the 
attribution of cyber operations to a particular State, also prove problematic from the standpoint 
of international law. Although legitimate, digital forms of evidence can be easily falsified and 
should thus be corroborated with other evidence. Similar can be claimed about newspapers, 
which standing on their own, according to jurisprudence related to State responsibility, cannot 
be sufficient to establish attribution.  
Since States have previously relied on evidence provided by the private actors when making 
claims of attribution of cyber operations, the fourth chapter analysed the suitability of such 
forms of evidence in the process of legal attribution. Although jurisprudence indicates that 
evidence provided by private actors may be used for the purpose of attribution, caution must 
be exercised. Private actors rely on a combination of technical and socio-political methods of 
attribution and their claims have no political or legal repercussions if a State is wrongly 
accused. States invoking international responsibly on the basis of such claims, on the other 
hand, risk employing unlawful countermeasures if evidence provided by a non-State entity is 
not verified and turns out to be simply wrong. 
Due to the issues with attribution and the consequential inability to employ countermeasures 
and thus increase the cost of the rational perpetrating State, the party injured by the unlawful 
cyber operation should rethink the unlawful character of the cyber operation. This is the subject 
matter elaborated in the fifth chapter of the thesis.  
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To this end, the chapter investigated the well-established legal principle of due diligence and 
the corresponding international obligations, requiring States to do their utmost to prevent and 
terminate acts stemming from their territories which are in contravention with the international 
rights of other States.  
The investigation of due diligence is rationalised by the premise that every State sponsoring 
or conducting an unlawful cyber operation is also in violation of the due diligence obligations 
of prevention and termination. Both the due diligence principle, as well as the resulting 
obligations, are recognised by the international customary law and international jurisprudence. 
Most importantly, due diligence and the obligations of prevention and termination are 
recognised by many States in the context of cyber operations.  
International legal doctrine indicates that due diligence requires proactive posture even before 
the occurrence of a cyber operation that deprives the other States of their international rights. 
Accordingly, due diligence requires States to develop the capacity to prevent and terminate 
an unlawful act and to discharge the said capacity when circumstances demand so. 
A State is considered to have violated due diligence obligations only when it has failed to act 
diligently in its prevention and termination efforts of an unlawful cyber operation of which it 
knew or should have known. Even when the actual knowledge of the emanating unlawful cyber 
operation is absent, States are considered to be in violation of their international due diligence 
obligations when they possess constructive knowledge. The existence of the latter is 
determined on the basis of the test devised by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case and adopted 
by this thesis. Accordingly, the State should have known of the emanating unlawful cyber 
operation if it is established that it ordinarily monitors cyber infrastructure on its territory and 
that it has the theoretical capacity to spot the operation in question.  
Due diligence obligations are obligations of conduct and not of result, which means the 
pertaining legal standards are flexible. These obligations dictate the employment of best 
efforts to achieve prevention and termination but impose no obligation to actually prevent and 
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terminate the unlawful act. Although the due diligence standard depends on the capacity of 
the State and the circumstances of the unlawful act, States should conform to the international 
minimum standards at all times.  
The fifth chapter further detailed the due diligence obligations in cyberspace and indicates the 
possible international minimum standards related to the due diligence obligations of 
prevention and termination in cyberspace. Specifically, it outlined the areas which a diligent 
State could address if it genuinely wished to develop and to discharge the capacity to prevent 
and terminate a cyber operation emanating from its territory. It also presented the international 
minimum standard of due diligence obligations of prevention and termination, which requires 
States to have a national cybersecurity strategy, enact and enforce national cybersecurity 
legislation enabling it to diligently prevent and terminate, establish a national CERT as well as 
engage in international cooperation on matters related to cybersecurity. In addition to these 
minimum legal standards related to capacity development, States must also at least warn the 
targeted State of an incoming the unlawful cyber operation.  
The benefit of invoking the State responsibility for the omission of diligence in termination and 
prevention efforts related to the emanating unlawful cyber operation (as opposed to the State 
responsibility for the conduct of the said cyber operation) lies in the fact that the former can in 
fact be proven despite of limitations of technology. Firstly, although proof of territorial origin of 
the cyber operation must still be sufficiently convincing and the relevant evidence may still be 
plagued by unreliability, evidence of the territorial origin of a cyber operation is more likely to 
be available to the injured State than evidence pointing at the natural person conducting the 
cyber operation and its connection with the State for the purpose of invoking State 
responsibility. Secondly, sufficiently clear proof of the knowledge of the emanating unlawful 
cyber operation may be established by way of circumstantial evidence. This is important since 
circumstantial evidence has, historically speaking, not been permitted in establishing the 
attribution of the unlawful act itself. Thirdly, proving the lack of due diligence should also be 
an achievable task for the injured State; the cybersecurity capacity enabling a State to prevent 
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and terminate the operation is a matter of public information while the questions of whether 
the injured State was warned or whether its termination efforts were aided by the State of 
emanation, can easily be answered by the former. 
The sixth chapter applied and tested the theory developed in the previous chapters. It 
explained who under international law is entitled to induce compliance by way of 
countermeasures and against whom countermeasures can be taken.  
Specifically, the chapter argues that countermeasures precluded from wrongfulness under the 
law of State responsibility may only be taken by the State whose international rights were 
directly or indirectly violated by another State’s failure to diligently prevent or terminate a cyber 
operation. In the event of a multitude of injured States, each of them is entitled to take 
countermeasures against the internationally responsible State.  
While countermeasures may only be aimed at the latter, the instrumentality of the reactive and 
lawful deprivation of the responsible party of its legal rights can be achieved indirectly by 
targeting the non-State actors under its jurisdiction. Be that as it may, countermeasures must 
not utilise the infrastructure of the third, innocent State and by doing so deprive it of its 
international legal rights in order to achieve compliance of the responsible State. 
Considering the legal nature of due diligence obligations, injured States can only take 
countermeasures against the non-diligent State which knew or should have known of the 
internationally wrongful cyber operation. Additionally, it can only take countermeasures 
against the State whose territory has been successfully established as the origin of the cyber 
operation occasioned by the omission of diligent prevention and termination.  
To investigate the theoretical arguments made in the preceding chapters and substantiate the 
utility of invoking the responsibility of a State for its failure to diligently prevent and terminate 
instead of responsibility for the unlawful conduct of cyber operations, I further examined the 
2007 DDoS operation against Estonia. Accordingly, I provided evidence proving that the 
aforementioned cyber operation originated from cyber infrastructure under the territorial 
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jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. I also explain why Russia should have known of the 
internationally wrongful cyber operation and why it failed to comply with its due diligence 
obligation of termination. All things considered, Estonia could have taken countermeasures 
against Russia, because the latter failed to exhibit due diligence in prevention or termination 
efforts related to the 2007 cyber operation. The operation, of which Russia should have known, 
emanated from the cyber infrastructure located on the territory under its territorial jurisdiction.  
The chapter also elaborated procedural conditions and temporal considerations related to 
countermeasures for the lack of diligence in prevention and termination efforts in the context 
of unlawful inter-State cyber operations below the use of force. Specifically, the instrumentality 
and the non-punitive character of countermeasures must be communicated with the targeted 
State to avoid escalation and erosion of the normative order. States injured by a cyber 
operation occasioned by non-diligent behaviour must therefore invite the responsible State to 
comply with its international obligations and, in the case of continuing violation, communicate 
the intention to take countermeasures before these are taken. Although the latter condition 
can be rightfully omitted in the case of taking urgent countermeasures, the chapter made a 
clear case against them.  
Intended to secure compliance of the internationally responsible State, countermeasures are 
to be employed only during the period of its non-compliance with the secondary obligations 
stemming from the international law of State responsibility and should be promptly 
discontinued as soon as compliance and thus power level is restored. Specifically, the injured 
State can induce the obligation of cessation by way of countermeasures once the unlawful 
cyber operation which the responsible State was required to terminate or prevent occurs. 
These countermeasures should be dismissed as soon as the cyber operation concludes. 
Countermeasures intended to induce compliance with the obligations of non-repetition and 
reparation, however, can be taken for as long as the promises of non-repetition and reparation 
in full are outstanding. Note that this does not mean that the injured State is allowed to wait 
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indefinitely before taking countermeasures, which should generally be taken without undue 
delay.  
In its third section, the chapter explained how can countermeasures induce compliance not 
only with the obligations of due diligence but also with the obligations breached by the cyber 
operation occasioned by the lack of diligence. Accordingly, irrespective of their form, 
countermeasures must be quantitatively proportional with the material injury consequential to 
the cyber operation occasioned by the non-diligent behaviour.  
The aim of the present thesis was to investigate the theoretical capacity of the established 
international legal mechanisms to supress the present-day degree of non-compliance with the 
international law in cyberspace. All things considered, I have shown that countermeasures 
based on the State responsibility for the non-diligent prevention and termination of the cyber 
operation can be used by the injured States to lawfully inflate the costs of the State in fact 
responsible for the unlawful cyber operation, thus removing the main reason fuelling the 
rational choice of non-compliance. The elaborated compliance inducing methodology based 
on the legal responsibility for the non-diligent behaviour in cyber space indeed gives the 
injured States the ability to not only restore individual peace and security but also to reinforce 
the rule of law in cyberspace, consequentially contributing to an increase in peace and security 
for all States. 
Invoking State responsibility for the non-diligent behaviour in cyberspace and, on the basis of 
that, taking countermeasures against the States in fact responsible for the cyber operations is 
important particularly in the context of hurdles preventing a successful attribution in 
accordance with the established standards part of the international law of State responsibility.  
Whether the presented solution is indeed satisfactory and has a potential to realistically 
minimise the proliferation of the internationally wrongful cyber operations can be answered 
affirmatively only in part. Relying on the responsibility for the violation of the obligations of due 
270 
diligence is not the panacea for all temptations of inexpensive and rapid State power inflations 
offered by cyber operations.  
Perpetual technological advancement of malicious cyber operations will undoubtedly continue 
to allow States to seek illegitimate but quick and inexpensive maximisation of their relative 
power resources. As indicated in this thesis, the principle of due diligence and the 
corresponding obligations of prevention and termination can alleviate this issue and allow the 
States to induce compliance of the selfish power maximisers but will certainly not completely 
remove the temptation of unilateral non-compliance. 
Technology is also a limitation to the application of the solution proposed by this thesis. As 
explained in chapter six, I have focused only on States of origin and not the States of transit. 
And although I have claimed that establishing and proving the origin of a cyber operation is a 
more feasible task than attributing a cyber operation to a particular State, technology remains 
a limitation. Examples were given where the State of origin is unknown. Other examples were 
provided where neither the State of origin nor the State of transit were known. 
By investigating the issue of compliance with international law in the context of cyber 
operations below the use of force, I have addressed the literature gap. This is not to say that 
the doctoral thesis, proposing a solution to the proliferation of unlawful inter-State cyber 
operations below the use of force, will in fact have any positive effect on international peace 
and security. To achieve this, the proposed compliance-inducing legal mechanisms must be 
utilised. Only when the power-hungry, rational States comply with their obligations also in 
cyberspace, international law will perform its function to provide peace and security.  
Primarily, the presented legal mechanisms should be utilised by the States deprived of their 
international legal rights by the cyber operation. I am of a firm conviction that international law 
can still perform its function in the cyber era – that is to provide peace and security – as long 
as States do not lose faith in its ability to deliver. In the anarchical world and in the absence 
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of a central enforcement entity, it is up to the (injured) States to stand up to the wrongdoers, 
employ measures of self-help and induce compliance with international law. 
The first step towards this should be an explicit recognition of the due diligence obligations in 
cyber space, reaffirming their status in the international law applicable in the digital domain. 
This should be followed by countermeasures, which will proportionally reduce the relative 
power gains of the wrongdoing State and thus compel it to cease with the wrongdoing cyber 
operation and to refrain from conducting or sponsoring one in the future. It will also send a 
clear message to the rest of the international community that unlawful power maximisation by 
way of cyber operations is not a rational choice in their pursuit of security. As noted in the 
initial chapter of the thesis, I hope States will find utility in this thesis. I wish the injured States 
would take notice of the law and feel empowered to act. 
Caution is however advised as international law applicable to cyber operations is still under 
development. As indicated, primary rules, such as sovereignty, are still questioned by some 
States, for example. Also, despite a clear indication of the existence of the due diligence 
obligations of prevention and termination in cyberspace, some States remain fearful of the 
requirements such obligations may impose on them. And because an international minimum 
standard of diligence depends on the state of technology and its price or availability, it certainly 
will change as time goes on. 
Due to the politicised efforts to establish a new cyber specific treaty, the aforementioned 
development of the law will most certainly be achieved through State practice and opinio juris. 
This does not mean that States are the only drivers of normative progress, as some would like 
us to believe. Scholarship is an important force behind the normative development of the 
international rules applicable to cyberspace. The topics legal scholars should thus further 
investigate include the questions of sovereignty in cyberspace, the content and standards of 
due diligence in cyberspace, the obligations of transit States, and the issues of causation, 
particularly the qualification of the remoteness of the material injury and similar. 
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